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Preface
This volume reproduces, with minor changes, a set of previously published papers on the history
of the contract labour system in Namibia. The main aim is to make them easily accessible,
especially to Namibian readers - at present they are scatlered around different academic books
and journals which are often diffcult to obtain, especially in Namibia.
The research on which these papers are based was undertaken during 1974-76. At that time,
published scholarly research on any aspect of Namibian history was extremely sparse, the first
Namibian history doctorate had only recently been completed (Dr Zed Ngavirue at Oxford) and
conditions for research under hostile colonial regimes and escalating counter-insurgency
operations in both Namibia and Angola were decidedly diffcult. These papers must therefore be
read as part of the pioneer phase of modern historical research and writing on Namibia, now
greatly enriched wih primary research by scholars such as Frieda-Nela Williams, Harri Siiskonen,
Patricia H ayes , Mart Eirola, Lazarus Hangula and Peter Ka~avivi, with more in the pipeline from
researchers such as Wolfram Hartmann, Emmanuel Kreike and Meredith McKitlrick.
It must be emphasised that the papers in this volume have not been updated from their published
versions: no new research is incorporated and footnote references to secondary literature are
Iimited to what was available at the time of writing 20 years ago. I have however taken the
opportunity to integrate the technical presentation of the original papers through:
correction of misprints and the occasional factual error;
clearer configuration of the tables;
more sub-headings;
a uniform footnote style;
a list of references and archives.
For the sake of clarity the origins of each paper are summarised below:
Paper 1: based on a synthesis of my own research on Namibia and Gervase Clarence-Smith's
doctoral research on southwestern Angola. The paper was published first as a journal article and
then with min or revisions in an anthology on southern Africa; this later version is used here
(Gervase Clarence-Smith & Richard Moorsom, "Underdevelopment and class-formation in
Ovamboland, 1844-1915", Journal of African History, 16, 3, 1975, pp. 365-381; ibid.,
"Underdevelopment and class-formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917", in Robin Palmer & Neil
Parsons (eds.), The roots of rural povert in central and southern Africa (London, Heinemann,
1977), pp.96-112). My earlierversion was also published (Richard Moorsom, "Underdevelopment
and class-formation: the origins of migrant labour in Namibia, 1850-1915", in T. Adler (ed.),
Perspectiveson South Africa: a col/ection of working papers (Johannesburg, African Studies
Institute, Univ. of the Witwatersrand, 1977).
Paper 2: first published as a seminar paper and later with minor revisions in an anthology, which
is the version used here (Richard Moorsom, Underdevelopment and class-formation: the birth of
the contract labour system in Namibia, Univ. of York, Centre for Southern African Studies,
Col/ected Seminar Papers, 5, 1978/79, pp. 17-44; ibid., "The formation of the contract labour
system in Namibia, 1900-1926", in Abebe Zegeye & Shubi Ishemo, Forced labour and migration:
patterns of movement within Africa (London, Hans Zell, 1989), pp. 55-108.
Paper 3: because of overlap, I have combined two papers into an integrated text (Richard
Moorsom, "Underdevelopment, contract labour and worker consciousness in Namibia, 1915-72",
Journal of Southern African Studies, 4, 1, 1977, pp.52-87; ibid., "Labour consciousness and the
1971-2 contract workers strike in Namibia", Development and Change, 10, 1979, pp.206-31).
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1. Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917
Gervase Clarence-Smith & Richard Moorsom
Introduction
Much work has recently been done on the processes of underdevelopment and class formation
in Southern Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Mostly it has focused on
agricultural societies in close and direct conflict with white settler or company agriculture, under
the shadow of the colonial state. The purpose of this paper is to look instead at a peripheral
African society in a period when contacts with white settlers, companies, or colonial offcials were
reduced or non-existent. Even in these conditions Ovambo and Nkhumbi society underwent a
process of underdevelopment essentially similar to that of other African peoples who have
become impoverished labour-exportng peasantries. Articulation with European capitalist societies
was characterised by an inital productie boom, followed by a slow decline into rural stagnationl11.
Ecology and pre-colonial agriculture
The land of the Ovambo and Nkhumbi form an isolated area of dense population in the wide
expanses of the northern Kalahari.(2) The Nkhumbi inhabit the flood plain of the middle Kunene,
which spreads out on the western bank of the river. The Ovambo, linguistically and culturally
closely related to the Nkhumbi, inhabit a flat sandy plain immediately to the south-east, normally
f100ded by a wet-season river, the Kuvelai, which has its source to the north. The floodwaters of
the Kuvelai and a few small er streams fiter through Ovamboland in an intricate maze of broad
and shallow channeis, wih some surplus water occasionally reaching the Etosha Pan. All around
this island of fertle f100ded land lie vast areas of thorn bush and meagre pastures, which support
only sparse groups of hunter-gatherers and cattle nomads. The traveller Galton, who reached
Ovamboland from the south in 1851 after a weary journey through the thornveld, was struck by
the sudden appearance of cultivated land:(31
Fine, dense timber trees, and innumerable palms of all sizes were scattered over
it. Part was bare of pasturage, part was thickly covered in high corn stubble;
palisadings, each ofwhich enclosed a homestead, were scattered everyhere
over the country. The general appearance was that of most abundant fertility.
1. A seminal work in this field is G. Arrighi, "Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianisation
of the African peasantry in Rhodesia", Journal of Development Studies, 6, 1970, 197-234. See also C. Bundy, ''The
emergence and decline of a South African peasantry", African Affairs, 71, 285, 1972, 369-88. This essay is the fru it
of research by Gervase Clarence-milh on southem Angola and by Richard Moorsom on Namibia, and has involved
the use ofthree major archival sources on the Portuguese side: the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) in Lisbon,
the Arquivo Histórico de Angola (AHA) in Luanda, and the Archives Générales de la Congrégation du Saint-Esprit
(AGCSSp) in Paris.
2. The ecological and ethnographic conditions described in these opening paragraphs are taken from the following:
C. Estermann, Etnografia do Sudoeste de Angola, Vol. i (Lisbon, 1956); C. Estermann, "Les Bantous du Sud-
Ouest de l'Angola", Anthropos, 59, 1964,20-74; T. Delachaux, Ethnographie de la région du Cunène (Neuchâtel,
1948); A.W. Urquhart, Patterns of settement and subsistence in South-West Angola (Washington, 1963); E.C.
de Carvalho and J.V. da Silva, "The Cunene Region - ecological analysis of an African agropastoral system", in F.
Heimer (ed.), Social change in Angola (Munich, 1973); J.P. Neto, O Baixo Cunene (Lisbon, 1963); E. Loeb, In
feudal Africa, published as an annex to International Journal of American Linguistics, 28, 1962; C. Mittelberger,
"Entre os Cuanhamas", Estudos Ultramarinos, 6, 1956, 131-72; G. Nitsche, Ovamboland (Kiel, 1913); FR
Lehmann, "Die anthropogeographischen Verhâltnisse des Ambolandes 1m nördlichen Südwestafrika", Zeitschrift
für Ethnologie, 79, 1954,8-58; H. Tönjes, Ovamboland (Berlin, 1911); V. Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen in
Südwest- und Südafrika (Leipzig, 1934), 188-254; C.H.L. Hahn, H. Vedder and L. Fourie, The native tribes of
South West Africa (Cape Town, 1928); 1-36; J.H. Wellington, ''The Cunene River and the Etosha Plain", South
African Geographical Journal, 20, 1938, 21-32.
3. F. Galton, Narrative of an explorer in tropical South Africa (London, 1853), 125.
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The similarities with the ecological conditions prevailing in Barotseland spring immediately to
mind. Like the Lozi, the Ovambo and Nkhumbi combined fairly permanent settled agriculture with
cattle-herding. However there were a number of important differences. The characteristic Lozi
mounds did not exist in Ovamboland, and the population lived on sandy ridges which were not
normally flooded. The land was less fertile, and only a very little maize was grown in the most
manured areas close to the homesteads. Cassava was extremely rare. Some sorghum, generally
used for making beer, was planted along the clay-covered margins of the flooded areas, but the
staple crop was drought-resistant pearl (bulrush) millet, grown in the sandy soils of the ridges.
Pasture for cattle was provided as the floods receded, and water remained in small pools for a
considerable time. At the height of the dry season the Kunene provided a permanent source of
water, and the surrounding bush alternative forms of pasture. As among the Lozi, fishing was a
very important subsidiary source of food, and it was supplemented by hunting and gatheringl41.
The basic unit of production was the family, and homesteadswere isolated in the middle of family
fields. Fields were cultivated for four to eight years, and settlements were even more permanent,
remaining in one location for up to fort years. Polygamy was widely practised and young men
remained unmarried until fairly late. A typical household would thus have consisted of the family
head, his wives and children, and his married or unmarried adult sons. Division of labour within
the family was according to sex, the women being responsible for hoe agriculture and the men
for the care of Iivestock. Specialisation of labour within the society as a whole was limited to two
craft, iron-smithery and medicine. All other activities, such as pottery or trading, were carried out
in the spare time allowed by the prior demands of the agricultural cycle.
The effcient exploitation of varied local resources made possible the production of a certain
surplus over and above subsistence needs, and by the mid-nineteenth century had allowed the
development of two phenomena that will be of particular concern to us - vigorous local trade and
strong centralised kingdoms. Taking kingship first, it is diffcult to assess how far state and class
formation had proceeded. European explorers at the time, and ethnographers since, have painted
a stark picture of absolute tyranny, but this is suspect because it is so often used to justify
European conquest and acculturation, and it is contradicted by some accountsl51. The first thing
to note is that there was no single political authority over the whole area, although there is a
possibilit that in the eighteenth century the Nkhumbi kings of Humbe may have exercised some
form of hegemony in the population cluster61. In the mid-nineteenth century the Kwanyama kings
of north-eastern Ovamboland were the most powerful, and the Kwanyama are still the most
populous by far of the peoples of the area, but every kingdom was completely independent. In
addition the tendency seems to have been towards increased fragmentation, as kingdoms on
several occasions split in two as the result of a contested succession, although most of these
splits did not prove permanent!7l.
4. This and the following paragraph are writlen in an 'ethnographic past ten se' , which excludes modem activities and
gives a picture of what conditions were probably like in the mid-nineteenth century. For the Lozi see L. van Horn,
"The agricultural history of Ba'rotseland, 1840-1964", in M. Gluckman, Economy of the Central Barotse Plain
(Manchester, 1968). The best work on the Ovambo and Nkhumbi from this angle is Urquhart, Patterns of
settement.
5. A. Nogueira, A Raça Negra (Lisbon, 1880),253-311; H. Hahn, "Neueste deutsche Forschungen in Südafrika",
Petermann's Miteilungen, 12, 1867, 290. Nogueira's testimony is particularly valuable as he was a mulatlo trader
who Iived for many years in the 18505 among the Nkhumbi and spoke their language fluently.
6. Loeb, In feudal Africa, 49-50.
7. For the splitling and reunification of Ondonga, see F.R. Lehmann, "Die politische und soziale Stellung der
Häuptlinge im Ovamboland...", Tribus, 4-5, 1954-5,269-79.
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The powers of kingship
Within each kingdom the powers of the kings were great by the standards of South-Western
Africa, and were often commented on by travellers. But society was stil essentially structured on
a kinship basis, with dispersed matrilineal clans. The royal clan does not appear to have been
structurally different in any respect from the other clans, and was in many ways on prima inter
pares. Indeed a cluster of very small Ovambo and Nkhumbi states living close to the westward
bend of the Kunene had not developed the institution of kingship at all, and their Mbalantu
neighbours were reputed to have had a king once but to have dispensed with himia!. Royal power
was based in part on cIassic co-ordinating and arbitrating functions. The king exacted regular
military service for raiding, although he was personally forbidden to leave home territory and thus
could not act as war-Ieader. Supreme administrative and judicial power was exercised by him, but
under the supervsion of a powenul council of commoners. District headmen were appointed and
revocable at will by the king, but in fact exercised considerable local power. Headmen of the royal
elan were particularly independent and ofte n much resented by the people of their districts, and
they provided a constant focus for intrigue and even separatist tendencies.
The powers that were vested specifically in the king's person were intimately linked to ecological
conditons. In ideological terms this was expressed in the belief that the king's greatest power was
the magical one of making the rains fall, and it is significant that almost all reported cases of
dethroning were justified by the inabilit of the monarch to perform this vital functionl91. In practical
terms it was the king who organised corvée labour to dig the large reservoirs to store the
f100dwaters,l10) and it was he who had to take the diffcult decision of when to start planting, judging
whether the rainy season had started in earnest. It was the king who strictly preserved the fruit
trees and checked excessive deforestation. In an area where climatic conditions were so
precarious, these acties were essential for the survival of the whole community and legitimated
a certain degree of centralisation. Another source of royal power was control of land, all of which
was ultimately the 'propert' of the king, although strict rights of usufruct and the extended
permanence of settlements limited this in practice. Land was stil in some sense an open
resource, in that large swathes of uncultiated land separated the kingdoms from one another and
have only recently been entirely brought under cultivation, but the dependence on floodwaters
made for competition for privileged locations close to the major channeis, and thus contributed
to royal power.
The formal politcal powers ofthe king do not, however, in themselves give any precise indication
on the extent of state and class formation. The crucial element is rather the extent of surplus
appropriation, which in the mid-nineteenth century seems to have been little developed. Tribute
was in kind and irregular. The king received half the cattle and captives taken on raiding
expeditons, but these were still small-scale affairs, limited to the population cluster. Corvée labour
was on ly demanded for limited work in the king's field and for moving the royal homestead, apart
from the reservoir digging mentioned above. The king exercised a right of ritual seizure of young
girls to be his wives, which made his homestead the largest and the most agriculturally productive
in the land, and helped to spread his network of clientship. All this did not add up to very much,
and the circulation of goods and services which centred on the royal court was stiliargely in the
form of reciprocal gifts.
8. For the Mbalantu see Hahn, Vedder, and Fourie, The native tribes, 8-9; P. Serton (ed.), The narrative and journal
of Gerald McKiernan in South-West Africa (Cape Town, 1954), 107; C. Duparquet, "Voyage en Cimbébasie",
Missions Catholiques, 1880,429, 1881,514.
9. For the dethroning of the king of Humbe in 1891, see J.P.1. do Nascimento, Da Huila as terras do Humbe (Huila,
1891), Prologue; not all kings were credited with the same power to make the rain falL.
10. AGCSSp 465-111, Duparquet, Notes sur les différentes tribus des rives du Cunène and 478-8-11, Duparquet, 25 July
188; Urquhart, Patterns of settlement, 40; JV. de Castro, A Campanha do Cuamato em 1907 (Luanda, 1908),
185-6. This important point only rarely gets the attention it deserves in view of the intimate relations belween this
kind of activity and the rise of despoti c state systems in Asia.
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Nor can one speak of any form of 'feudal aristocracy' in the mid-nineteenth century. There was
no priate propert of land, and the king had very few permanent dependants living at his court.
The formation of bodies of armed men IMng permanently at the royal court clearly seems to have
been an innovation of the late nineteenth century111. It was almost impossible for any restricted
kin group to build up and transmit to other generations a substantial amount of movable propert,
partcularly cattle, for inheritance of such propert was matrilineal and extended to the whole kin
group, whereas residence was patrilocal. Thus at the death of a particularly wealthy family head,
his herds of cattle would be redistributed throughout the land to all his distant matrilineal re i atives.
There was therefore in operation a powerfui mechanism of social redistribution, which precluded
the emergence of a permanently wealthy group, although it should be noted that certain clans
were reputed to be more wealthy than others. Nor did this system stop the temporary
accumulation of large herds in one man's hands, and particularly in the hands of older men.
Local and external trade
So far only directly productive activities have been considered, but surplus generated in the
process of exchange must also be taken into account. Ovambo and Nkhumbi kings managed to
exert aremarkably thorough control of the whole trading process, and a system of compulsory
'gift' meant that in effect the surplus generated in trade tended to accumulate in royal hands. The
limitation of possible trade routes in a semi-desert environment was probably an important factor
facilitating this royal control, particularly with regard to long-distance trade. As this phenomenon
was to be of the utmost importance in the period of contact with European imperialism, it is worth
trying to sketch out the patterns of pre-colonial trade, as they emerge from the nineteenth-century
sources and the ethnographic material.(12)
Local trade was varied, but rested on three staple commodites, iron and copper artifacts, and salt.
Iron ore came from the area ofthe present Kassinga mines of southern Angola, and was worked
chiefly by the northern Ovambo. At some point before the mid-nineteenth century the Kwanyama
kings managed to impose a monopoly over the sources of ore. Copper ore came from the area
of the modern Otavi-Tsumeb mining complex in northern Namibia, and seems always to have
been a monopoly of the Ndonga, the second largest Ovambo group who lived in the south-
eastern part of the country. Salt was to be found in many places, but the principal sources were
to the north of Etosha Pan, and the southern Ovambo were its main purveyors. One of these
southern Ovambo peoples, the Ngandjera, made a speciality oftrading, both atthe regional and
long-distance level, but their predominant position was broken in the 1860s.
Long-distance trade was in slaves and ivory to the north, sold directly or indirectly to the
Portuguese traders of Benguela, and in metal artifacts to the east and south, sold to the peoples
of the Okavango and Herero. The Ovambo and Nkhumbi organised their own caravans, but were
also visited by their neighbours, particularly the Ovimbundu or 'Mambari' and the Damara.
However long-distance trade was of subordinate importance in the mid-nineteenth century,
particularly as the Nkhumbi kings completely forbade the entry of Portuguese traders into their
lands. It must also be repeated that there were no full-time traders as such among the Ovambo
and Nkhumbi, although it would seem that itnerant smiths along the Okavango and in Hereroland
11. Hahn, "Neueste deutsche Forschungen", 292-3; AGCSSp 478-B-III, Duparquet, 26 March 1885.
12. For nineteenth-centuiytrading pattems before and during the ivoiy boom, see notes 2,3,5 and 8, and the following:
B. Brochado, "Descripçao das terras do Humbe, Camba, Mulondo, Quanhama e outras...", Annaes do Conse/ho
U/tramarino, Parte nao-oficial, Serie 1, 1855, 187-97,203-8; J.L. da Silva and AI Franco, "Annaes do Municipio
de Mossamedes", Annaes do Conse/ho U/tramarino, 1858, 483-90; J.L de Lima, Ensaios sòbre a estatistica das
posesoes Portuguezas, Vol. 3 (Lisbon, 1846), Part 2 and map; L. Magyar, Reisen in Süd-Afrika in den Jahren
1849 bis 1857 (Pest and Leipzig, 1859), 298-9; C. Duparquet, Viagens na Cimbébasia (Luanda, 1953); J.
Chapman, Trave/s in the interior of South Africa (London, 1868), I; C. Andersson, The Okavango River (London,
1861); C. Anderson, Notes of trave/ in South Africa (London, 1875); Report of Mr. Pa/grave (Pretoria, 1969 edn,
1st edn 1877), 46-50; Petermann's Mitteilungen, 1859,295-303,1867,8-12,281-311.
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may have formed the nucleus of such a groupl131. There was no organised system of markets, and
exchange was by barter, although tendencies to use certain commodities as currency were
apparent. Surplus from exchange was to a large extent appropriated by the kings, and the system
of widely dispersed matrilineal inheritance acted as an effective barrier to long-term private
accumulation of capita!.
European traders were from the first subjected to the same rigorous controis, and had to pay
heavy 'gifts' to enter or leave the country, to trade, or to hunt. Royal offcials watched over every
move made by the traders, and reported regularly to the king. Bernardino Brochado, who
managed to enter Nkhumbi territory in 1844, could only do so at the price of wearing a skirt, and
the ban on trousers was periodically enforced by some Nkhumbi and Ovambo kings as late as
the 1870s. In later years European missionaries, offcials, and labour recruiters were constantly
to come up against the same pervasive royal control of their activities. This meant that the new
wealth and learning brought by the whites werefirst and foremost appropriated by the kings, and
were used to distort the old social equilibrium in their favour.
Three phases in this process stand out c1early. From the mid-1840s to the mid-1880s trade
relations were dominated by the growing European demand for ivory, but there were few formal
attempts by the Europeans at colonisation in the whole South-West African region. From the mid-
1880s to about 1900 cattle replaced ivory as the principal export commodity, while the Portuguese
and the Germans imposed their controlover the highland areas to thE! north and south. The final
phase, which ended wih the complete colonial conquest of the whole area in 1917, witnessed the
decline of the cattle trade and the development of the migrant labour system. We shall attempt
to show that the initial increase in the productive capacity of Ovamboland proved to be highly
iIusory, and led only to a slow decline into a rural backwater providing cheap unskilled labour for
the colonial heartlands.
1844-1885: ivory trading
Portuguese traders from Mossamedes and 'Cape' traders from Walvis Bay bot h began to reach
the Ovambo-Nkhumbi population cluster around the middle of the nineteenth century. The
Portuguese traders arrived earlier and were more numerous until the 1860s, at which point the
'Cape' traders, more highly capitalised and equipped with horses and ox-wagons, began to
supplant them. In both cases it was the search for ivory, already depleted in the areas closer to
the home port, which drove the traders even farther into the interior. Slaves in the north, ostrich
feathers in the south, and cattle throughout the area supplemented the trade in ivory, but were no
more than subsidiary items. The white traders brought beads and other forms of ornaments as
well as clothes, alcohol, and horses, but one item stands out as being of critical importance -
firearms. When the Europeans first reached the area the Ovambo and Nkhumbi possessed no
firearms, and for a brief period in the late 1850s and early 1860s they suffered severely as a
result. Between 1859 and 1863 the Portuguese made a short-lived attempt at the conquest of the
interior, and although the Nkhumbi and Kwanyama had by then acquired a few firearms, they
were deeply impressed by the effects of Portuguese weaponsi141. In the south the introduction to
firearms was even more dramatic, for the Ndonga were completely unable to resist the onslaught
of the Nama overlord, Jonker Afrikaner, who ravaged the southern peoples with peculiar ferocity
in 1860.
13. Serton, Narrative, 74; Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen, 203-4. Archaeological evidence of iron-smelting aiong the
Okavango is discussed in B.H. Sandelowsky, "Prehistorie metal-working in South West Africa", Journal of the South
African Institute of Mining and Meta/lurgy, 74, 1974, 363-6. See also B.H. Sandelowsky, ''The iron age in South
West Africa and Damara pot making", African Studies, 30, 1971,3-14.
14. N. da Matta, "Relater" Boletim Oficial de Angola, 28 July 1860, 3-8, and supplement to 17 June 1867, 267-89.
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The Nkhumbi and Ovambo thus learnt the biter lesson that firearms had become a new necessity
for a people who wished to preserve their independence. And since local technology was
generally incapable of producing firearms, external trade became essential for survival¡151. The
long-term success of this strategy was crucially dependent on the terms of trade, and here the
Ovambo and Nkhumbi possessed a certain num ber of advantages. The traders came up against
strong trading partners in the kings, who exercised close controlover the whole trading process,
and who from 1870 began to have missionary advisers to inform them of the values of
commodities on the world markets. The substantial 'gifts' levied by the kings acted as a form of
customs duty. At the same time the rivalry between the Portuguese and 'Cape' traders was
skilfully exploited. The kings of the Kwanyama were particularly well placed for this, for the
f1uctuating trade frontier between the hinterlands of Mossamedes and Walvis Bay usually passed
through their territory.
The white traders undoubtedly made considerable profis from their trade in the area, but it is not
possible to assess the rate of unequal exchange simply on the basis of exchange values in world
markets. It is also essential to see the impact of the trade on the productive base of the African
economy. In a sense this impact was very positive, for firearms were not simple objects of
consumption, but rather productive investments, in that they markedly increased the effciency of
hunting and raiding. At the same time ivory had not been exploited traditionally, and was therefore
a new source. But this increase in productivity could only be temporary, for the prevailing
ecological equilibrium was rapidly upset and elephants were all but shot out in the space of three
decades. And the period of prosperity had brought the Africans no further towards being able to
produce their own firearms, while leaving them dependent on importing new and increasingly
expensive rifles and ammunition.
1885-1900: cattle raiding
However there remained one way in which to 'invest the accumulated stocks of firearms, the
intensification between about 1885 and 1900 in the scope and scale of traditional raiding
activitiesi161. The southern slopes of the Bié high lands of Angola bec8me the scene of annual
raids, in which the horses and firearms acquired during the ivory boom gave the Ovambo and
Nkhumbi a decided advantage over the fragmented and iI-armed Ngangela and southern
Ovimbundu. The raiders seized mainly cattle and people, the former to seil to the European
traders and the latter to ransom, seil to the Portuguese, or incorporate into their own lineages. The
slaves who remained within Ovambo and Nkhumbi society were used to increase agricultural
production, and the Nkhumbi today say that their fields were much larger when they had slavesl171.
There was Iittle resistance to the raiders from the Portuguese, who were crippled by a severe
financial crisis during the 1890s. A slightly earlier attempt to conquer the Nkhumbi between 1886
and 1891 ended in a partial and very insecure victory for the Portuguese, but the garrison in
Humbe was practically impotent. Not until1905 did the Portuguese complete the conquest of the
entire Nkhumbi area, and push their frontier definitively to the Kunene.
The Ovambo and Nkhumbi were also able to find ready markets for the fruits of their raiding.
Slaves were sold to Portuguese and Ovimbundu traders from Kakonda, in spite of occasional
attempts by the Portuguese authorities to stamp out this ilegal traffc. The slave market was
15. H. Vedder, South West Africa in early times (London, 1938), 269-71, is always quoled on lhis, bul he is confusing
and conlradiclory. Preferable sources are Andersson, Okavango River, 105, 139-40, 231-3, 239-40; Andersson,
Notes of travel, 216-17. There is however evidence of lhe smilhs of king Mandume having manufaclured a breech-
lock for an imported canon (Hahn, Vedder and Fourie, The native tribes, 35-6).
16. For raiding from the Ovambo poinl of view, see Estermann, Etnografia, Vol. I, 141-6. For Portuguese action, see
R. Pélissier, "Campagnes militaires au Sud-Angola, 1885-1915", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 9, 1969, 65-82. Vast
amounls of detailed information on the raids are conlained in AHU, AHA, and AGCSSp.
17. Urquhart, Patterns of settement, 88.
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parlcularly buoyant, for the Ovimbundu needed plantation slaves to work their farms whilst they
mounted long-distance rubber caravans, and also ran a lucrative trade with the Portuguese on
the coast, who 'redeemed the slaves and packed them off as indentured labourers to the cocoa
islands of São Tomé and Principe. In return the Kakonda traders brought the Ovambo and
Nkhumbi alcohol and smuggled firearmsi181.
But the major commodity in the trade of the Ovambo - Nkhumbi area was now cattle. Most of
these were still exported through Mossamedes, but restrictions on arms sales after 1887 made
this market less attractive. An important trade developed with the areas to the south-east of the
Kalahari, to which over 4,000 head of cattle were exported from Ukwanyama alone between 1885
and 1895, according to Portuguese estimatesl191. The demand on this market may be explained
by the boom along the 'missionary road of Botswana before and during the construction of the
railway to the northl20I. The route from Botswana to southern Angola had been pioneered by the
'Thirstland Trekkers' from the Transvaal in 1875-81, and had remained a minor trade route ever
sincel211. The advantage of this market also lay in the fact that the Transvaal constituted a major
loop-hole in British measures to prevent arms sales to Africansl221. Indeed there is evidence to
suggest that the terms of trade were becoming generally more favourable to the Ovambo; in 1891
a modern rifle was said to cost twelve head of cattle in Ukwanyama, whereas in 1895 the price
was quoted as seven head of cattlel23J.
However pressure on the cattle resources of the Ovambo and Nkhumbi was growing in spite of
raiding, resulting in some social tension. As early as the 1870s the king of Ukwambi, a southern
Ovambo people, had considerably reduced the cattle population of his kingdom by ruth I ess
taxation and extravagant spending on luxury goods (from fiddles to wagons), although his
successor had restored the situationl241. In the 1890s similar pressure on the cattle population of
Ukwanyama began to appear, and the king made up for the shortall in cattle by seizing that of
his subjects. The traditional seizure of cattle for the king's court (okasava) slowly developed into
a regular form of taxation. Some Kwanyama began to emigrate permanently or to seek temporary
employment wih the Portuguese and the Germans, although this process remained fairly limited
during the 1890S1251.
Natural disasters and increasing Portuguese intervention brought the period of prosperous cattle-
trading to an end at the turn of the century. Rinderpest broke out in Botswana in 1896, and the
economic boom on the 'missionary road collapsedl26J. The disease reached Ovamboland from
the Okavango in 1897, and in the space of a few devastating months destroyed over 90 per cent
of cattle herds. This disaster was followed by a long series of drought years, interspersed with
18. AHU-IR-15P, Governor General, 15 January 1895 and others; Le Philafricain (Swiss Mission Journal), Série 1,
Rapport 4,9.
19. AHU-Companhia de Mossamedes-9 Chefe Humbe, 5 January 1896.
20. N. Parsons, ''The economic history of Khama's country in Botswana, 1844-1930", in R. Palmer and N. Parsons,
The roots of rural povert in central and southern Africa, (London, 1977).
21. D. Postma, Einige schetsen voor eene geschiedenis van de trekboeren (Amsterdam and Pretoria, 1897); F.
Seiner, Ergebnisse einer Bereisung des Gebiets zwischen Okavango and Sambesi (Berlin, 1909), 106 and maps.
22. S. Miers, "Notes on the arms trade and government policy in Southern Africa between 1870 and 1890", Journal
of African History, 12, 1971,577.
23. AHU-2R-15P, Relatorio Ramalho, 20 June 1891; AHU-Companhia de Mossamedes-9 Chefe Humbe, 5 January
1896. Unfortunately it is not clear whether these two figures are strictly comparable.
24. Serton, Narrative, 103-4.
25. For migrant labour, see Loeb, In feudal Africa, 29-32; Estermann, Etnografia, Vol. I, 146. For emigration as aresult
of 'vexations' practised by the king and his followers, see AHU-Companhia de Mossamedes-9 Chefe Humbe, 5
January 1896.
26. Parsons, "Economic history"; C. van Onselen, "Reactions to rinderpest in southern Africa, 1896-97", Journal of
African History, 13, 1972,473-88.
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floods and plagues of locusts, which culminated in the terrible famines of 1911 and 1915(271. The
Ovambo and Nkhumbi attempted to recoup their losses by intensifying raiding, but they found
other areas as badly hit as they were. And under the pressure of raids and natural disasters the
Ngangela and southern Ovimbundu drifted even farther north, or sought refuge in mission stations
and in mountain hide-outs(281.
Raiding also became increasingly hazardous after the turn of century because of more effective
Portuguese resistance. The Portuguese financial crisis was at last resolved in 1902, and
measures were taken to strengthen garrisons and equip them better. At the same time it was
decided to conquer the whole of the Ovambo-Nkhumbi population duster within the Portuguese
sphere of influence, partly in order to put an end to raiding once and for alL. A first expedition in
1904 was crushingly defeated by the Mbadya, the Ovambo people living closest to the Kunene,
but between 1905 and 1907 this defeat was avenged and a chain of forts was set up in Mbadya
territory. In 1908 and 1910 three other small Ovambo kingdoms were occupied without bloodshed
by the Portuguese, and a chain of forts was set up along the Okavango river(291. The Kwanyama
remained independent, but they were surrounded to the north and raiding became more diffcult.
Both the Portuguese and the Germans imposed strict regulations on trade, going so far as to ban
it altogether in order to deprive the Ovambo of arms. Although raiding continued, and although
the traders still managed to smuggle in arms from both sides of the frontier, there can be no doubt
that the terms of trade were now heavily loaded against the Ovambo(30I.
1900-1914: pauperisation and labour migration
In this critical situation the Ovambo and Nkhumbi kings fell into ever-increasing debt with the
traders, and the only solution left open to them was to intensify pressure on local cattle resources,
which made it impossible for Ovambo and Nkhumbi society ever to recover fully from rinderpest.
However this pressure was not even ly distributed in social terms. The kings did not pay the traders
from their own herds, but turned to internal taxation in order to maintain bot h the European
standard of living to which they had become accustomed and suffcient patron age to retain the
loyalty oftheir followers. The increase in raiding had led to the formation at court of a permanent
group ofwar-Ieaders, the elenga, each ofwhom received a horse and a number of rifles from the
king and led a body of about a hundred men on raiding expeditions. The elenga now became tax
collectors, and the traditonal seizure of cattle for the king's court, okasava, became a harsh and
arbitrary tax, which fell mainly on the most vulnerable members of society311. The polarisation of
the traditonal stable social order had begun, and incipient ciasses were entering into increasingly
unequal and antagonistic relationships. In the long term the rules of dispersed matrilineal
inheritance could have evened out this tendency, but the pace of social change was now
outrunning the traditional capacity for surplus redistribution.
The ravages of consecutie years of natural disasters and the growing weight of internal taxation
combined to produce, atthe opposite end of the spectrum from the elenga, a new social stratum:
men wihout cattle. To be sure, the agricultural production oftheir wives was scarcely influenced
by taxation, or by the pressures of external trade. Millet was of little interest to the elenga or
traders, and the Ovambo continued to make their own hoes until the 1920s, thus insulating the
27. For the rinderpest, see G.S. Dias (ed.) Artur de Paiva, Vol. 2 (Lisbon, 1938), 97-105. For the drought, see W.G.
Clarence-Smith, "Drought in southern Angola and northern Namibia 1837-1945", SOASIlCS African History
Seminar, 1974.
28. AGCSSp 476-B-II, Lecomte, 1 September 1899, AHU-IR-21 P, Projecto de reorganisaçåo, 9 December 1901; Le
Phi/africain, Série 1, Rapport 11,7.
29. Pélissier, "Campagnes militaires", 78-96.
30. Nitsche, Ovamboland, 147; C.M. Braz, Districto da Hui/a (Coimbra, 1918), 14.
31. Loeb, In feudal Africa, 29-32; Eslermann, Etnografia, Vol. 1, 141-2; Bulletin Général de la Congrégation du Saint-
Esprit, 1908,455-6.
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agricultural cycle of production from external pressures(32J. But drought, flood, and locusts
between 1900 and 1916 followed in almost uninterrupted sequence, reducing agricultural
production severely, and both the Portuguese and the Germans sent in relief supplies of grainl331.
And even when a family's agricultural production was substantial, it should be stressed that the
loss of cattle constituted a severe social disaster, in view of the importance attached to the
possession of catte(341. A complex process of pauperisation was thus set in motion, which the
compensatory mechanisms of traditional society were incapable entirely of relieving.
There were several possible courses of action left open to this new group of pauperised men: they
could attach themselves as clients to the elenga, join the Christian settlements of the
missionaries, set themselves up as bandits in outlying areas, or emigrate permanently to other
regions. But the major response to pauperisation was the development of mig rant labour. The
survival of kinship structures and of crop cultivation within the family unit, the distances to the
centres of employment, and the controls imposed by both traditional and colonial authorities on
migrant labourers combined to restrict the form of proletarianisation to recurrent migrancy, rather
than permanent settlement in mining and urban centres. There was little or no attempt within the
colonial economies at stabilising the workforce, for recurrent migrancy provided the type of labour
most required by the large-scale employers, that is, substantial quantities of cheap unskilled
labour for mining and infrastructural works(351.
The growth of pauperisation in the Ovambo - Nkhumbi population cluster coincided with a sudden
expansion in the dem and for labour in the colonial economies. In Angola this was due to the
building of the Mossamedes and Benguela railways from 1904 and to a permanent shortage of
labour in the plantations and fisheries of the coast, especially after the abolition of servile labour
in 1911 (361. Ovambo and Nkhumbi labour was especially important in railway building, for they
generally refused to work in plantations and fisheries, but there are unfortunately no detailed
statistics. It would appear thatthe numbers rarely exceeded 2,000 per annum in the period under
consideration. It should also be noted that much of this labour was obtained through the
imposition of hut tax after 1907 on Nkhumbi and Ovambo conquered by the Portuguese(371.
r
The f10w of labour to the south was on a larger scale, and can be fairly accurately charted(381.
Before 1908 it was under 2,000 per annum, but between 1910 and 1914 it averaged 10,000 per
annum. In the year 1910-1911 it was even estimated that over 5 per cent of the total Ndonga
population was away working in Namibia, which may have meant as much as a third of the able-
bodied adult males. Percentages for other kingdoms were however lower, and it should be
remembered that this was a year of terrible famine in the areal391. This expansion of mig rant labour
to central and southern Namibia was due to the fact that the Germans were struggling with a
permanent and growing labour crisis from the outbreak of the Herero Revolt in 1904. The war of
extermination waged against the Herero and Nama drastically reduced the local supply of labour,
while increasing the land area given over to white farmers, thus intensifying the agricultural
dem and for labour. The almost simultaneous opening up of the Tsumeb copper mine (1906) and
the Lüderitz diamondfields (1908) created overnight an acute shortall in the labour supply. An
32. Urquhart, Patterns ofsetflement, 126-7.
33. E. Stais, "Die aanraking tussen Blankes en OVambo's in Suidwes-Afrika, 1850-1915", Archives Yearbook for South
African History, 31, 1968, Part 2,334; J. de Almeida, Sul dAngola (Lisbon, 1912), 153.
34. Estermann, "Les Bantous", 53-6.
35. H. Bley, South-WestAfrica under German rule, 1894-1914 (London, 1971), 198,272-3. For a detailed treatment,
see R.J.B. Moorsom, Co/on/sation and proletarianisation: an exploratory investigation of the formation of the
working class in Namibia under German and South African co/onial rule to 1945, (MA, University of Sussex, 1973).
36. Almeida, Sul dAngola, 389-90; S. Katzenellenbogen, Rai/ways and the copper m/nes of Katanga (Oxford, 1973),
54-7; J. de O.F. Diniz, Negocios Indigenas, Relatorio do ane de 1913 (Luanda, 1914),61,81-3.
37. Almeida, Sul dAngola, 389-90,519; R. Hutchinson and G. M artell , Roberts people (London, 1971), 180-2; Le
Phi/africain, Série 2,2,32; AHA Avulsos 41-83-7, Relater, 30 September 1912.
38. Detailed monthly statistics are given by Stais, "Die aanraking", 333. For earlier years, see Nitsche, Ovamboland,
130-9.
39. Nitsche, Ovamboland, 134. For the famine, see Lehmann, "Die politische", 289.
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accelerated programme of railway and harbour construction and the generally buoyant state of
the colonial economy rendered the crisis even more desperate.
The German response was to segment the sources of labour supply. The forced labour regime
instiuted in 1907 bound the Herero and Nama to the farms and towns. Employers in construction
and min ing were thus forced to seek their supplies of labour elsewhere. Since foreign contract
workers, principally from South Africa, proved expensive both in wages and in transport costs, it
was to Ovamboland that the Germans turned their attentionl40I.
They did not follow the Portuguese example of conquest and taxation, although Governor
Leutwein had contemplated this before the Herero Revolt, but preferred the methods of indirect
pressure. The expense and dangers of conquest had been clearly demonstrated by the
Portuguese campaigns of 1904-1907, and as the Ovambo were not raiding to the south there was
no pressing need for military occupation. After the traumatic events of the Herero Revolt, the
German Reichstag was firmly opposed to any further military action in the colony, particularly in
the far north where there were neither minerals nor lands suited for white settlement. In addition,
the Portuguese victory over the Mbadya in 1907 had impressed the other Ovambo kings, and had
made them far more amenable to German pressure. The spread of mission stations provided the
Germans wih excellent intermediaries. By 1909 the German and Finnish Lutherans had stations
amongst all the Ovambo states in German territory which had kings. With the help of the
missionaries, protection treaties were signed with all these kings in 1908, and constant contact
was maintained wih them to persuade them to send as much labour as possible to the southl411.
In this the Germans were favoured by the dual process of natural disasters and pauperisation that
we have outlined above.
Migrant labour and the loss of in dep enden ce
The origins of the migrant labour syndrome may thus fundamentally be related to the process of
pauperisation in the Ovambo - Nkhumbi home lands, combined with a severe labour shortall in
the colonial economies. However two other less specific factors should also be considered. The
most diffcult facto r to handle concerns cultural adaptability to migrant labour. Colonial offcials
had an obvious interest in stressing this point, and its exact value remains in doubt. One can
tentatively say that labour migration reveals many structural similarities with raiding and long-
distance trading. In all three cases the men had to cross long distances through inhospitable
country in order to bring back specific material prizes. As raiding and trading were increasingly
curtailed by the expansion of the colonial system, it would appear that there occurred a form of
culture transfer in favour of migrant labour421. It should however be pointed out that whereas
raiding exalted a feeling of self-confidence and pride in one's own society, migrant labour seems
in the long term to have had an exactly contrary effect.
The other facto r to take into account is that during the period under consideration the permanent
shortage of labour in Angola and Namibia offered some relative advantages to Ovambo and
Nkhumbi labour. Although the German authorities attempted to apportion labour on their own
terms, the migrant labourers could in effect exercise a certain amount of choice. Groups of
Ovambo refused to be broken up, and rejected offers of work on farms, where conditions were
worst. The copper mine at Tsumeb tended to be used as a staging post on the way to the
40. Moorsom, Colonisation; Nitsche, Ovamboland, 130-9; Bley, South-WestAfrica, 170-3, 180-1, 198,259-60,272-3.
41. T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Berlin, 1908), 174-7, 191-2; Lehmann, "Die
politische", 270-95; H. Driessler, Die Rheinische Mission in Südwestafrika (Gütersloh, 1932), 249; Tönjes,
Ovambo/and, 250; N. Mossolow, Die Verhaal van Namutoni (Windhoek, 1971),45-7.
42. Estermann, Etnograf/a, Vol. " 1946-7; C. Estermann, A vida economica dos Bantos do Sudoeste de Angola
(Luanda, 1971),36.
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diamond fields, where conditions were bad, but wages were higherl431. And the Ovambo and
Nkhumbi retained the possibility of playing off the Portuguese against the Germans in order to
secure better terms. The Kwanyama were visited by rival groups of Portuguese and German
offciais, who used all kinds of blandishments to entice labour into their economies. In general, the
Kwanyama (and also a few Mbadya and Nkhumbi) preferred to go to central and southern
Namibia. King Nande explained to the Portuguese envoys in 1909 that this was because they
received better terms from the Germansl441.
The Ovambo kings never seriously opposed the growth of the migrant labour system, but tri ed to
make maximum profi out of it, while limitng its disruptive effects as far as possible. Workers were
only allowed to leave for periods of six months, and at times when the annual cycle of subsistence
activities required the least labour. Workers left in structured groups, under a leader, and
remained together during the period of employment, thus maintaining cohesion and discipline on
lines reminiscent of the raiding parties. 'Gifts' had to be made to the kings on return, a system
reminiscent in form and intention to earlier taxation of long-distance traders and of raiding
partiesl45J.
Although the degree of royal control maintained over the process is astriking tribute to the
resilience of African instiutions, royal control was by no means absolute. German statistics show
constant surpluses of departures over returns, partly due to the high death rates, but mostly to the
setting up of Ovambo settlements in the towns of the 'Police Zone' formed in 1911(461. Similar
settlements also sprang up in the highlands of Angolal47J. Both within their home country and at
their places ofwork the migrant labourers came increasingly under the influence of the missions,
with all that this implied in the way of subversion of older institutions such as matrilineal kinship,
polygamy, and kingship. This cultural mutation was most advanced among the Ndonga by 1915,
for they were most profoundly affected by all aspects of European intrusion from the earliest date.
It is significantthatthe last independent kingiofthe Ndongà was the first Ovambo or Nkhumbi king
to be converted to Christianity; and the colonial conquest of the whole area in 1915-17 was
followed by a general increase in conversionsl481.
Early in 1915 a power vacuum was suddenly created for a brief period throughout the Ovambo -
Nkhumbi population cluster. The Portuguese were defeated in a border skirmish with German
forces, related to the outbreak of war in Europe, and retreated to the high lands. The Germans
were unable to follow up this victory, for they had to retire to combat the invading South African
forces. The last Kwanyama king, Mandume, made an attempt to impose his paramountcy over
the whole area, and as Portuguese troops closed in on Ovamboland towards the end of the year
he became the symbol of resistance. With Mandume's defeat at the hands of the Portuguese in
43. Stais, "Die aanraking", 343; Nitsche, Ovamboland, 130-9; Driessler, Die Rheinische Mission, 260-1; Tönjes,
Ovamboland, 88-9; C. Schlettein, Der Farmer in Deutsch Südwestafrika (Wismar, 1907), 183.
44. AHA Avulsos, 31-9-4, Relatorios of Moraes, 27 February 1909, and Lobo, 1 March 1909; Nitsche, Ovambo/and,
130-9.
45. Estermann, Etnografia, Vol. I, 146; Nitsche, Ovamboland, 130-9; Driessler, Die Rheinische Mission, 260-1; Tönjes,
Ovamboland, 88-9; C. Schlettein, Farmer, 183.
46. Stais, "Die aanraking", 333, 338-9; O. Köhler, District of Karibib, Union of South Africa, Department of Native
Affairs, Ethnological Publications No. 40, (Pretoria, 1958),83.
47. Bulletin Général de la Congrégation du Saint-Esprit, 1913,255-6; AGCSSp 477-A-X, Rapport Steinmetz, 1917.
48. Diiessler, Die Rheinische Mission, 260-3; Loeb, In feudal Africa, 33-8. The contrast in attitude between the kings
of the two largest Ovambo peoples is stiiking. Mandume of the Kwanyama did his best to opp ose these tendencies,
whereas Martin of the Ndonga encouraged them. See Lehmann, "Die politische", 277-9, 290; L. Keiling, Quarenta
Anos de Africa (Braga, 1934), 173-4.
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1915 and his death at the hands of South African troops in 1917, the era of complete colonial
domination had beguni491.
Underdeve/opment and c/ass formation
Colonial strategy in the Ovambo - Nkhumbi area was essentially restricted to the maintenance of
an effectively functioning pool of migrant labour, particularly in the sector controlled by South
Africa. The general implications of this policy were that levels of production for the mass of the
population should be kept below consumption needs, but suffciently high to bear the costs of
reproducing and servicing the migrant labour forcel50J. The incipient class differentiation noted
above was more or less frozen, the elenga becoming a largely hereditary collaborating group, and
becoming the direct representatives of colonial administrations in those kingdoms, such as that
of the Kwanyama, where the kingship was abolished. The rest of the population sank to a
generalised level of pauperisation, although upward social mobility was by no means impossible.
The pressures of an ever-expanding population on extremely limited resources have been
particularly important in this process, and by the mid-twentieth century land shortage and
deforestation had become acute problems(511. The intensification of migrant labour was the only
solution to these pressures. The stagnation of the economy of southern Angola up to the late
1960s meant that the mines of Namibia became the chief centres of employment for the whole
population cluster, and indeed labour migration to Namibia or the Rand spread slowly to cover
a very wide area of southern Angolai521.
The particular form of underdevelopment that affects Ovambo and Nkhumbi society has thus
been integrated into the cIassic Southern African pattern of the creation and artificial maintenance
of labour-exportng peasantries. This raises a diffcult theoretical problem as to the precise class
positon of the migrant labourer. Recent discussion of the peasants of Africa has defined them as
a social stratum 'whose ultimate security and subsistence Iies in (itsJ having certain rights in land
and in the labour of family members on the land, but (which isj involved, through rights and
obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants'1531.
Labour-exporting peasantries are then defined as a specific sub-type.
But there is a qualitative difference in terms of the objective relations of production between
peasants, who own the product of their labour up to the moment of exchange, and wage-
labourers, who seil their labour-time to the owners of the means of production. The family units
of migrant labourers are systematically involved in both relations of production, which renders their
class positon genuinely indeterminate. Normally it would also be transitional, but in this case non-
economic forces are used to endow it with an abnormal degree of permanence. The definition of
the class positon of a migrant labourer must therefore rest, in the last instance, in the distribution
of his own and his family's labour time between peasant production and wage-Iabour, and in the
tendency for one or other to become increasingly dominant. The 1971-72 Ovambo strike in
49. Pélissier, "Campagnes militaires", 96-111; P. de Eça, Campanha do sul de Angola em 1915 (Lisbon, 1921); S.
Pritchard, Report by the offcer in charge of native affairs on his tour of Ovamboland (Cape Town, 1915); E.
Gorges and M. de Jager, Report on the conduct of the Ovakuanyama chief Mandume and on the miliary
operations conducted against him in Ovamboland (Cape Town, 1917).
50. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid", Economyand
Society, 1, 1972,437,439.
51. Moorsom, Colonisation; i. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa (Cape Town, 1971), 214-15, 227-8 (the date
given for Mandume's death is incorreet). For deforestation, see Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen, 189; J.
Wellngton, South West Arrica and its human issues (Oxford, 1967); deforestation gets progressively worse from
north to south.
52. A. Valente, "Problemas da emigraçåo de trabalhadores rurais...", Trabalho, 18, 1967, 133-40.
53. J.S. Saul and R. Woods, "African Peasantries", in T. Shanin (ed.), Peasants and peasant societies
(Harmondsworth, 1971), 105.
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Namibia is an indication that in this instance the process of proletarianisation has now reached an
advanced stage(541.
54. For details of the strike, see The Observer, 6 February 1972.
2. The Formation of the Contract Labour System in Namibia, 1900-1926
Richard Moorsom
In tro duction
This paper is presentedas a contribution towards the analysis of the political economy of Namibia.
More particularly, it investigates the origins of an institutionalised structure of labour exploitation
central to colonial power and profi, the contract labour systeml1l. It is exploratory in character. Not
being based primarilyon archival research, it attempts to synthesise a broad interpretation of one
of the major historical processes in the colonisation of the region.
Its origins lie in the pioneering phase of modern Namibian historiography, during which the
extraordinarily brutal system of labour coercion imposed by the German colonial regime was a
principal focus of researchl21. On the region now divided between northern Namil!ia and south-
western Angola the more protracted process of economic incorporation and political colonisation
and the origins of labour migration were the principal themesl31. More recently, the pace of
research on the transitional period (c1870-1930) has intensified: the coordinated Finnish history
project is yielding its first results; and theses are in preparation on mission ideology and early
labour migrationl41. For the first time the extensive mission, administrative and private archival
resources are being professionally researched and the results will modify and deepen our
understanding of a key period and region in the history of southwestern Africa, both largely
neglected hitherto.
In Namibia, colonisation proper was telescoped into a 20-year period under German rule. Not until
the 1890s was over half a century of "informal colonialism", whose chief agents were itinerant
traders and missionaries, reinforced by German military intervention. Yet by the outbreak of the
Great War most of the land in southern and central Namibia had been expropriated, some of it
al ready settled with immigrant farmers; internal resistance had been crushed in genocidal war;
and the Namib diamond deposits and Tsumeb copper, still among the territory's main mineral
resources, had been put into full production by international mining capita!.
None of the sectors of capital which developed during this period had more than a marginal
interest in the human resources of the country except as labour-power, whose recruitment,
distribution and control were from the start among the principal functions of the colonial
administration. However, the terrible cost exacted by the initial phase of military conquest was
1. The researeh for this essay, undertaken during 1975-76, was Iimited largely to the eontemporary non-Portuguese
literature and published documents and to seleeted file groups in the Central South Afriean Arehives, as well as the
reeords of the Angliean Mission. Many of its eonelusions are therefore tentative. It forms the seeond paper in a
trilogy on the origins and evolution of the migrant labour system in Namibia. (W.G. Clarenee-Smith and R.J.B.
Moorsom, "Underdevelopment and elass-formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917", in R. Palmer and N. Parsons
(eds.), The roots of rural povert in central and southern Africa, (London: Heinemann, 1977), pp.96-112; also
J.A.H., 16(3), 1975, pp.365-81; R.J.B. Moorsom, "Underdevelopment, eontraet labour and worker eonseiousness
in Namibia, 1915-72", J.S.A.S., 4(1), 1977, pp.52-87). An edited version appeared in Univ. of York, Cent re for
Southern Afriean Studies, Collected Seminar Papers, 5, 1978/79, pp.17-44.
2. In partieular: H. Bley, SWA under German rule, (London, Heinemann, 1971); H. Dreehsler, Südwestafrika unter
deutscher Kolonialherrschaft, (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1966), translated as Let us die fighting, (London, Zed
Press, 1980).
3. Substantial work on the pre-olonial soeial formations of southwestern Angola and northern Namibia ineludes W.G.
Clarenee-Smith, Slaves, peasants and capitalists in southern Angola, 1840-1926, (Cambridge, CUP, 1979); L.
Berger, Der Einfluss der Grenzziehung auf die Ovambo, (MA, Wiesbaden, Univ. Mainz, 1980); and C. Borkowsky,
Zu einigen Aspekten des Ovambolebens, (MA, Berlin, Freie Universität, 1975).
4. Under the Finnish projeet, two Iieentiate theses on politieal resistanee to eolonisation and long-distanee trade, are
being extended to doctorates: M. Eirola, Ondangan kuningaskunnan vastaus saksan siitomaavallen Iahestymiseen,
1884-1910, (Lie., Univ. Oulu, 1987) and H. Siiskonen, Kunikaiden kauppa eurooppalaisten ehdoila..., 1850-1898,
Lie., Univ. Joeiisuu, 1987); and a third, on politieal anthropology, is in preparation (M. Salokoski at Helsinki). Three
further theses are in progress, on mission ideology (T. Varis at Tampere), on mig rant labour on the diamond fields
to 1914 (R. Strassegger at Graz), and on the rural origins of labour migration to e 1930 (P. Hayes at Cambridge).
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suffcient to deter the German colonisers from completing the physical separation of subsistence
agriculturalists from their means of production. From 1904, the year of the great rebellion, the
level of recruitment from the ranks of the dispossessed consistently failed to meet the aggregate
labour demand of colonial capital and the state. It became the central motive of both German and
South African colonial regimes, in conserving the remaining areas of subsistence production, to
close this gap with migrant labour and to secure the latter's long-term reproduction.
On the class analysis of labour migration
I do not intend to enter here into the complex debate on the articulation of non-capitalist with
capitalist modes of production. However, since my analysis is informed by both the problematic
and the debate, it is necessary to touch on a few conceptual issues. Labour migration implies the
arlculation oftwo modes of production wihin a single social formation, the dominant mode in this
case being capitalist. At an advanced stage, as in parts of the South African reserves, such
articulation may entail the complete dissolution of non-capitalist relations of production. At its
formation, the system may follow the extension of the political hegemony of a capitalist state over
a previously politically autonomous non-capitalist formation.
But even atthe outset, as will be seen in this study, the articulation may operate more strongly at
the economic than at the politicallevel. A proportion of the direct producers in the non-capitalist
formation may be compelled, for temporary or permanent want of their subsistence by other
means, to seil their labour power before separation from their means of production at the hands
of capitalists or, more forcibly, the capitalist state.
The parlcular configuration of capitalist interest within the state - perhaps even independently of
it - will have astrong bearing on the form and scale of recurrent labour migration which it attempts
to institute. However, the system that finally emerges under capita list control is forged in a
complex process of struggle and collaboration with non-migrant workers, with the exploiters, the
exploited and the marginalised in the non-capitalist social order, as well as with the migrant
labourers themselves. For the non-capitalist society, into which the capitalist state intervenes
politically to subordinate it to its production needs, is often not - as it was not here - in a pristine
state of 'primitive communism', whether differentiation was generated by indigenous or external
forces. Where antagonistic social relations are incipient or developed, the politics of alliance and
conflict between ciasses from different modes of production within a common social formation
is integral to the analysis. Under such circumstances, labour migrants face struggle on two fronts.
This double dimension of class conflct, once placed in the centre ground of historical process,
allows space to the undercIasses as well as to the rulers as historical subjects.
The analytical framework is still incomplete, for there is a further and equally fundamental
dimension of exploitation and conflict, the exploitation of women, or as some would define it, the
sphere of patriarchy. This theme can receive only limited treatment here, a product both of the
silences in many of the published and archival sources, of many of the already scanty written
sources and of the formative state of much feminist theory, particularly as applied to social
analysis in the southern African context.
It is nevertheless a central plank of the argument presented here, for one of the most striking
features of the contract labour system thatwas constructed in Namibia was its attempts to exclude
all rural women from the north from wage labour. This exclusion cannot be fully explained by
deploying 'patriarchy' simply as a description of male privilege or the subordination of women, for,
as wih other social hierarchies, the social interest and the source of power of the advantaged and
the oppressors remain untouched. Nor is it suffcient to define it in terms solely of other particular
modes of production, in other words, a concept with only relative (and hence subordinate)
autonomy. To do so is to reduce the different forms it takes to a set of arbitrary particularisms,
related not by their common content but by their location in other varieties of class oppression.
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The standpoint taken here is rather that patriarchy is amenable to materialist analysis as a species
of exploitation in an absolute sense: it maybe specified in the absence of other forms of class
exploitation and, although this may be anathema to astrong current in the socialist feminist
critique of capitalist society, it may equally be absent in their presence. As such it refers to an
appropriation of surplus labour, both productive and non-productive, within or by means of the
domestic or household economy. Why gender should become the criterion of class identity and
men rather than women the exploiters requires, like racialism, particular historical explanation, for
there are exceptions as well as an infinite variety of forms.
But that explanation, in turn, requires the prior concept of patriarchal exploitation. It also entails
acceptance of the plurality of class exploitation and the complex, almost contradictory nature of
the notion of objective class position. Historically, patriarchy has usually coexisted with and its
ciasses have participated in other modes of production. Male household heads or female
housewies may at the same time be landlords, capitalists or pett commodity producers, wage
labourers or perhaps none ofthese. A similar plurality in the relations of production governing the
productie labour of migrating workers is an essential concept in understanding the strategies of
the struggle and survival under the migrant labour system.
This interpretation has an important bearing on the analysis of labour migration in the Namibian
context. First, it directs attention to social relations between men and women in non-capitalist as
well as capitalist society, especially where other forms of class exploitation are non-existent or
incipient. The demand for male rather than female labourers may not be solely the product of the
ideological expectations of the executives of the intruding capitalist class. Second, it brings
household labour, servicing as well as productive, into the foreground of the analysis of the
relations of production and the restructuring of the labour process, urban as well as ruraL. Thirdly,
it brings women into the foreground in analysing the complex class conflict which created the
contract labour system not merelyas a residual peasantry, or the passive and shadowy
appendages of a stratum of the new Namibian working class, but as a specific class with its own
interests, consciousness and sphere of struggle.
Capita i formation and labour demand
The Ovambo-Nkhumbi population zone forms an island of dense settlement near the northern
edge of the vast Kalahari basin. Largely waterless during the dry winter, in the mid 19th century
the Kalahari sandveid was occupied, except along the few perennial rivers, by dispersed bands
of nomadic hunter-gatherers and cattle-pastoralists. During the 1840s and 1850s itinerant traders
rapidly established a network of routes and exchange relations throughout the interior.
Ovamboland became the interface between three such routes, based on Walvis Bay,
Mossamedes, and Lake Ngami and the "missionary road" through Botswana.
The agrarian societies of the interior were thus articulated by means of commercial ties to the
metropoles of world capitalism in an epoch of industrialisation. Yet for over half a century
thereafter, attempts to start up local production in capitalist enterprises were spasmodic, small
scale and mostly short lived. Such attempts included intermittent copper min ing in central
Namibia; guano (bird-dung) recovery and sealing along the southern Namib coast; fishing and
oasis plantation agriculture in the northern Namib (southern Angola); settler farming around the
southern Angolan escarpment; and caravan and later ox-wagon transport. Nowhere before the
late 1890s was potentiallabour demand substantial or regular. Nor, when it did exist, were either
the relations of production those of wage labour - slavery predominated in coastal Angola and
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quasi-feudal bonds in settler agriculturel51 - or the preferred sources of supply wholly or partially
internal to local social formations. Thus at the same time that the penetration of commodity
exchange was catalysing incipient class antagonisms within the Ovambo social formation which,
as will be shown, was generating a stratum of marginalised men, the local demand for wage
labourers remained insignificant.
From the late 1880s European and South African based corporate ca pita i dominated local
investment, if at first only negatively. Before the national uprising of 1904, its primary interest was
to speculate and to exclude competitors by securing exclusive concessions to land and mineral
rights. Only where major mineral reserves were proven - copper at Tsumeb (1906) and diamonds
in the southern Namib (1908) - did corporate capital move decisively into local extractive produc-
tion.
German colonisation policy, however, for political reasons outside the scope ofthis analysis, was
not exclusively or at times even predominantly tied to the interests of German "Grosskapital".
From the mid-1890s, the point at which the German imperial state assumed decisive control of
the colonisation process, a principal objectie was the establishment by state- and privately-spon-
sored schemes of capitalist settler agriculture on expropriated triballands in central and southern
Namibia. Colonisation itself necessitated fluctuating but often large scale expenditure both on
infrastructural projects, notably railways, and on administration and the forces of repression. After
the South African military conquest in 1915, military and infrastructural expenditure was
substantially reduced. On the other hand the pace of land settlement was stepped up, with greater
tolerance of peasant as opposed to capitalist farm ing by the incoming settlers.
The formation of the colonial economy thus falls into two broad stag es. Between 1894 and 1904 -
the years of piecemeal conquest - agricultural settlement was sparse, unstable and barely capital-
ist. An intlated bureaucracy and military establishment sustained large- and small-scale transport
and construction contractors and a mainly urban pett-bourgeoisie. After the uprising, a minority
of capitalist farmers were augmented by increasing numbers of marginally subsistent peasant
settlers; capital expenditure by the state continued at a high level for over a decade more; and the
territory's two large mines began full production.
The level of wage employment in the colonial economy is hard to gauge from the few available
published sources, though it is likely that it continued to tluctuate markedly after the national
uprising (1904-07). More significant for colonial recruitment policy was the gap between the
aggregate demand for local labour and the potentially available supply from that part of the
indigenous population subject to the coercive authority of the colonial state locally - broadly
speaking those living in the aptly-named 'Police Zone'. Prior to the uprising, the demand was
largely fulfilled except for brief periods on large-scale production projects. The methods of
recruitment ranged from free wage labour to the forced labour of prisoners of war. During the war
absolute demand expanded rapidly, and for a decade thereafter remained at a high though
fluctuating level. The national uprising marked the total collapse of the gradualist policy of
piecemeal expropriation and accelerated underdevelopment that had been offcially in force since
1894161. The disaster was compounded by the military intervention of the imperial power, whose
deliberate strategy of genocide decimated an estimated 60 per cent of the black population in the
Police Zone.
The result was a major and chronic aggregate labour shortage which conscripted labour and the
forced labour code of 1907 could do litle to resolve, even if they had been completely successful.
The prolonged passive resistance by the expropriated peoples - emigration, desertion, illegal
5. W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Slavery in coastal southern Angola, 1875-1913", J.S.A.S., 2(2), 1978; ''The thirstland
trekkers in Angola: some reflections on a frontier society", ies SSA, Nov. 1974.
6. Bley, SWA, parts 1 and 2.
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mobilit, collectie celibacyl71- ensured that this optimum was not attained and deepened the crisis
of labour supply, a crisis which equally confronted the South African regime after 1915.
The crisis was, at least after 1904, in no way open to resolution by varying the wage rates or
working conditons. The major employers were therefore compelled to seek to recruit outside the
politcal domain of it state. Neither companies nor administration were well placed economically
or politcally to compete on the world market for indentured labour. Most attempts failed, except
within southern Africa, which was in any case an uncertain source of supply owing to the
overriding sub-continental power of Rand min ing capita!. At the height of railway building in 1913
the number of 'Cape Boys' (mainly Transkei Africans) employed in Namibia reached a temporary
peak of 11,000 - about 25 per cent of the entire wage labour force. In 1923-24 Consolidated
Diamonds Mines (CDM) could manage only with diffculty to recruit labourers elsewhere in
southern Africa to break an Ovambo boycott. It had, however, been recognised as early as 1904
that Ovamboland was to be the principal external source of labour power, whose form, both at its
inception and throughout its institution, was to remain that of recurrent labour migration on fixed-
term contracts.
The migration of Ovambo men as wage labourers, however, did not simply 'happen' . It is the task
of the remainder of this paper to pro pose explanations for several of the principal outstanding
questions. First, why did the initial dem and for labourers between 1905 and 1909 meet with so
massive aresponse when even the rudiments of a recruiting organisation and of means of direct
inducement and coercion were lacking? Explanation must be rooted in the specific trajectories of
social transformation in the Ovambo social formation, particularly in incipient class antagonism.
Second, when the supply of labourers continued to fail to meet its aggregate requirements, why
did the German colonial state not move to complete the forcible dispossession of the peoples
within its allotted domain? Why too, did the post-1915 South African regime, which did bring
Ovamboland under it direct administration, perpetuate the policy? Third, what were the concrete
conditons of struggle for labour migrants within both modes of production, and how successfully
did they exploit them? In partcular, why was it necessary for the South African administration, ten
years after the conquest, to bring the recruitment and distribution of all Ovambo labour migrants
under the control of a monopoly labour organisation?
Ecology and the Ovambo social formation
Precise specification of the Ovambo mode of production prior to its penetration by commodity
exchange relations is not possible here, for lack of detailed contemporary descriptive accounts,
anthropological studies, or oral evidenceiai. It is apparent, however, that the local ecology
established particular limiting conditions given a low level of development of the production
forcesl91. Average rainfall allows adequate pasturage for cattle pastoralism over much of the sub-
continental Kalahari basin and suffces over the northern half for dryland cereal cropping, which
becomes marginal below about 450mm per annum. But the deep Kalahari sands restrict the
potential of each, in the case of the former by phosphorous deficiency, of the latter by low organic
7. H. Bley, "German SWA" , in R. First and R. Segal, South West Africa: travesty of trust, (London, Deutsch, 1967);
also Drechsler, SWA.
8. For a preliminary analysis, see Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment". A later paper by CIarenee-
Smith on the Nyaneka points to the possibilit of a more rigorous interpretation of contemporary sources: "Capitalist
penetration among the Nyaneka of Southern Angola, 1840-1918", (Lusaka, Univ. of Zambia, History Seminar,
August 1976).
9. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.A.H.), pp.365-7 and sources listed in note 2. For a more
detailed analysis of c1imatic factors, Moorsom, "Contraet labour"; J.H. Wellington, SWA and its human issues,
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967); Clarence-Smith, Notes on drought in SW AngoJa/N Namibia, SOAS African
History Seminar, 1974.
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content, and of both, crucially, by the lack of surface water, which is almost totally absent through
the rainless winter.
Ovamboland forms the level flood-plain of one major and several minor wet-season rivers rising
to the north, whose flood-waters combine with local run-off to percolate through a maze of
shallow channels (oshana) towards the Etosha Pan. It therefore benefits in two respects: alluvial
sediment, although poor, slightly increases the potential crop yield; and a leached impervious sub-
soillayer improves the retention of fresh water above the deeper saline groundwater. Water is
thus generally accessible for approximately half the year on the surface and for the remainder of
the year underground at shallow depths. These advantages are qualified by the general unreliabil-
it Y of annual rainfall; by drought being usually worsened by the simultaneous failure of the
seasonal flood-waters (efundja); by the unpredictable incidence of rainfall across the growing
season; and by it uneven regional and local distribution. Furthermore, those indices of unreliabil-
it Y increase from north-east to south-west as the average rainfall decreases and the external
f100dwater catchment area shrinks. The southern margin of the floodplain coincides roughly with
an annual rainfall of 400mm, submarginal for cropping.
The precise linkage between these ecological constraints and the overall settlement pattern is at
present obscure. In the mid-19th century, as at colonisation in 1915, the Ovambo population was
clustered into continuously and densely settled pockets, separated by uninhabited swathes of
virgin woodland and pasture. The territory of each cluster was defined, as we shall see, by a
unitary political system, though its precise form varied. Few significant ties of reciprocity existed
between clusters at either the ideological or the economic level. The major exception was trade
in three principal manufactures (copper and iron a rtifacts , and salt), the production of which was
dominated by single or associated clustersi10I, and more irregularly, in foodstuffs, handicrafts and
war captives.
Most ofthe c1usters lay astride a major oshana, emphasising the critical importance of dry season
water supplies. Furthermore, cluster size decreased dramatically from north-east to south-west.
The source of this systematic variation is not to be sought in the nature or the level of the
productive forces, which appear to have been similar across the whole social formation. Instru-
ments manufactured by handicraft were the principal means in all branches of production, both
direct (hunting, fishing) and processing (crops, animal products), except one (gathering of wild
plants); as well as in household production. Given an iron age technology, the principal
instruments of production (spear, bow, knife, hoe) and storage (stockade, potte ry, basketry) were
probably near full development and were widely distributed through the social formation. The
reasons for the variation in scale and for the c1ustering itself, which the ecological conditions made
possible, must therefore be sought in the social relations of production within each cluster.
At first sight, the dominant mode of production in Ovamboland appears straightforwardly enough
to be a lineage mode, or in terms of Hindess and Hirsts categories, the complex redistributive
variant of primitive communism. The social product was appropriated to a limited extent
individual ly, notably cow's mil k by herders while on seasonal migration, but for the most part
communally through a variety of overlapping mechanisms coinciding generally with the major
sources of subsistence. Surplus labour felliargely into the second category; and the whole was
anyway determined at the ideologicallevel by hierarchies of kinship ties which constituted the
relations of production. The primary unit of production was the extended family, settled in a single
stockaded homestead situated in the midst of its own fields. Distribution of the main food staples
(m il et meal and sorghum beer, and domestic animal products, especially from cattle), as well as
subsidiary and seasonal supplements (game, fish, wild herbs and fru it) was organised according
to complex social rules within this social unit under the overriding authority of the usually male
homestead head.
10. Iran smithing Ukwanyama; copper smithing Ondonga; salt proeessing Ukwambi and Ongandjera.
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Table 1. Climatic and harvest data, 1868-1937
1868-9 Farn
1872-5 o
1878-9 o
1879 o H-
1880 Farn
1881
1882
1883
1884 113
1885 132
1886
1887 129 Fl
1888 58 OX
1889 61 Ox
1890 84 N
1891
1892 143 Fl
1893 174 Fl
1894 83
1895 65
1896 50
1897 125 p'
1898 129
1899 126
1900 87 o
1901 68 o
1902 82 o
1903 61 o
1904 111
1905 101
1906 92
1907 103 p' Fl N
1908 68 Farn o Ox o
1909 160 Fl H Fl Fl
1910 122 N N
1911 42 Farn Ox Ox
1912 122 N o
1913 54 H- N o H- Ox
1914 82 P" o H-/Hx
1915 81 Farn Farn Ox Hx Farn
1916 51 Ox Farn
1917 139
1918 106 o H-
1919 56 o H-
1920 91 o H-
1921 123
1922 43 OX
1923 133 N H+
1924 71 o H- H- N Ox
1925 164 Fl H+ H Fl
1926 74 H/H-
1927 93 o H
1928 88 o H- H
1929 55 Ox Farn H- Hx Hx
1930 56 Ox Farn H- Hx Hx
1931 87 H/H+
1932 56 Ox H-/Hx Hx
1933 50 Ox H-/Hx H- H-/Hx H-/Hx
1934 211 Fl H/H+
1935 84 N H Ox
1936 93 N
Notes: a) RinderpesL. b) Locusts. e) Caterpillars.
"Regional rainfall is taken from Wellngton"s table of annual mean rainfall for Namibia north of Windhoek. For
OVamboland" the figures are here related to a long-term regional mean of 450 mm. However, in many years rainfall
figures are laeking or incomplete and descriptive information has been used where available.
Symbo/s:
Rainfall: FI- floods (over 150%); N - normal (85-150%); D - drought (under 85%); Dx - severe drought (aO%);
p - pestilenee (rinderpest, loeusts, inseets etc).
Harvest: H+ - in surplus; H - adequate; H- - poor; Hx - erop failure; Fam - famine.
Sources: J.H. Wellngton, Sout West Africa and it human issues, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967), p.43; published station
reeords; contemporary deseriptive accounts, mainly from missionary resourees.
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Butwider networks of circulation also operated. Locality-based working parties would be calledin
against the standard rewards in food and drinks at points of peak labour input in the cropping
cycle (field-clearing, harvesting) and for the necessarily frequent resiting of the homestead. Social
and riual celebrations as well as hospitality also redistributed surplus labour within a wider social
network, framed by both neighbourhood and kinship ties. Kinship relations were organised into
matriclans, which for the purposes of redistribution served three main functions: firstly, the
allocation of cattle on a share-cropping basis; secondly, the inheritance of non-personal movable
propert, notably cattle; and thirdly, by the rule of elan exogamy, the exchange ofwives. In both
cases, the combination of matrilineality with patrilocal residence entailed the broad territorial
dispersal of means of production and subsistence, principally cattle, and a framework of social
relations defined at the level of the population e1uster.
The advantages of extended and complex reciprocity, given a high incidence of both local and
regional e1imatic fluctuation and the devastating coincidence of deficiencies in natural resources
induced by drought, do not require elaboration. Food storage precautions within the primary
production unit, notably the basket granary capable of holding up to five years of grain supplies,
bear additional testimony. The survival of small e1usters on the marginal south-western edge of
the f100dplain suggests that lineage social relations were a suffcient condition for the long-term
reproduction of the social formation. However, occasional sequences of severe drought, on
average once in about 30 years, could kili an appreciable proportion of the population by both
food and water faminel11J.
There are, nevertheless, aspects of the social formation for which lineage relations of production
cannot fully account. In the small and even the medium-sized clusters, for instance Ombalantu
and Ombadya, it is probable that such relations could structure real appropriation in its variety of
forms to the limil of its general ecological potential. But although it is not possible on the available
evidence to posit an optimum cluster size, the proposition becomes increasingly untenable for the
largest clusters. This conclusion presumes a generally uniform instrument technology and the
universalit of the dispersed settlement pattern, which did in fact continue to hold until at least the
late 1950s.
The tenacit ofthe resistance to village-formation cannot be fully explained on available data, but
may well be associated wih firstly, field manuring by rotation of the homestead site and secondly,
in view of the concentration of sites in oshana margins, optimal articulation between the principal
sites of labour. Any substantial increase in the size of a population cluster therefore, entailed a
lateral expansion in its settlement area, which beyond a certain point would begin to impede
access, for households near the centre, both to important directly appropriated natural resources
and to cattle pasture, to an extent beyond the capacity of lineage reciprocity to compensate.
By-passing the theoretical controversy on this pointl121, we may specify the social relations which
integrated these larger communites as a tributary mode of production. In the two large (Ondonga
and Ukwanyama) and some of the medium-sized clusters (Ongandjera, Ukwambi, Ukwanyama),
the heads of particular matrielans had, by the mid-19th century, inserted themselves at the
ideologicallevel by claiming religious and ritual powers, most critically to make rain, and at the
politcallevel by assertng the hereditary transmission of the rights to govern, to make war, to exert
judicial and limited legislative authority, to exact customarily defined tributes, and to apportion
land. The tributary mode did make possible a limited development of the productive forces,
though more by increasing labour productivity and insurance against climatic uncertainty than by
instituting new methods of production. It was distinguished by the conservation of natural
11. For a harrowing description of such a famine, see S. Pritchard, Report on the tour to Ovambo/and by Major
Pritchard, (Cape Town, Government Printer, 1915. UG 38-15).
12. See P.L. Bonner, "CIasses, the mode of production and the state in pre-colonial Swaziland", ies SSA, 10 February
1977
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resources (wood, certain fruit trees, dry-season cattle pasture) and especially of the wells which
guaranteed dry-season water supplies; and by the central regulation of the timing and articulation
of the seasonal production cyele(13J. It was precisely in Ukwanyama, the largest e1uster, in which
the regulatory and military powers of the state were highly developed, that systematic exploitation
ofwet-season pastures outside the floodplain through large-scale seasonal cattle migration was
the most advanced.
It is uncertain to what extent surplus labour was expanded under the incipient tributary mode. It
was, however, under centralised kingships, and again to the fullest extent in Ukwanyama, that
strata of specialist trader-artsans formed. Tightly controlled by the kings - a controllater exercised
over European traders - these strata remained part-time specialists despite establishing long
distance networks of exchange. Nowhere in the Ovambo social formation was e1ass formation
more than incipient, and hesitantly so.
The postulation of a tributary mode implies its co-existence with the lineage mode. Despite the
obvious political dominance of its hereditary governing stratum, it is not possible, for reasons of
evidence cited earlier, to specify either the precise balance in relations between the two, or the
main historical trend in the transformation of that balance, except that it was slow and irregular.
Appropriation of surplus labour through the exaction of tribute was irregular, ill-defined and small-
scale. The bulk of the product atthe king's disposal was produced directly by his own household,
which differed from others only in scale and its elaborate functional social organisation. Indeed,
the king's right to communallabour for field work and for resitng the royal kraal can be interpreted
as the exploitation of standard lineage reciprocity.
Kinship tensions within the royal elan and the continuing de facto authority of leading members
of other e1ans severely inhibited despotic tendencies. This was expressed at the level of the state
by, in particular, customary restrictions on the king's marriage policy and by commoner
representation through a consultative counciL. In executive functions, it limited the king's role as
war leader and allowed elan leaders to assume formally delegated royal prerogatives such as
land allocation. That contradictions in the co-existence of the two modes did exist occasionally
found dramatic evidence in moments of crisis in a medium-sized e1uster, when the failure of a
majorfunction of the tributary politicalleadership, often rain-making, could lead to its overthrow.
Patriarchy formed the third mode of production to be found in pre-colonial Ovambo society, and
its social relations were more pervasive than those of the tributary mode. It was founded on the
monopoly of male household heads over the life-time use-right to the family homestead and
fields. Women could survive only as wives or as subordinate kin in the households of male
relatives, and only in rare cases had direct access to land, whether household or commonage.
Men appropriated women's labour mainly in the form of services within the household (house
maintenance, food preparation, fetching water, care of young children), but also from productive
agricultural labour. This was divided according to sex, men controlling hunting and cattle, the
principal source of animal protein and store of wealth, leaving women to undertake the cultivation
and gathering of grain and vegetables(141.
A fair measure of reciprocit nevertheless remained in the consumption of the products of men's
and women's labour, as also in the training of children to their adult gender skiIIs and social
identity. Furthermore, women were able as of right to appropriate much of their field and
13. Notably the first planting, which with the ofte n premature onset of the first rains depended on experienced
judgement, in which the king had greater resources, sometimes in the form of professional rainmakers. See
Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (JAH.), p.369; and M. Salokoski, "Rain making and power
in pre-colonial Ovamboland", paper delivered to the 20th Nordie Congress of Historians, Reykjavik, 9-15 August
1987.
14. The principal exception was fishing, an important source of protein during the summer floods, although men and
women cooperated separatelyand used different techniques.
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handicraft labour and to engage in trading. In particular, women worked their own fields as well
as the husbands', and appropriated the product directly for the consumption of their immediate
family and for exchange when in surplus. Furthermore, since there was no bridewealth, although
marriage was inescapable, women retained the possibility of mobility for themselves and their
children, and thereby real bargaining power. In both household and agriculturallabour and in the
field of matrilineal kinship relations, women also retained a substantial degree of autonomy,
probably more so than in the Nguni societies of south-eastern Africa. Nevertheless, men's
managerial authority and controlover accumulated wealth remained dominant. The acquisition
of women as field-workers, housewives and mothers was the chief mechanism by which male
household heads expanded household production and their own personal consumption, and
polygamous marriage was the usual method of exchange of women's labour.
Little attention has thus far been devoted either to the technical division of labour or to forms of
co-operation in the labour process. Where the labour processes of two modes of production are
artculated, it is the dominant mode which, although modified by e1ass struggle, will be able in the
main to structure the subordinate process to its requirements and to exploit its internal
weaknesses when the two are dissonant. Of concern here is not the long-term disruptive impact
of articulation with capitalism on the non-capitalist mode as such, but the space for struggle by
migrant workers subject to the structural determination of such articulation. Capital and the
colonial state called forth, specifically, young to middle-aged men as wage-Iabourers. As we will
see, it was precisely this category whose role in the labour processes of both modes of production
of Ovambo society was the most drastically modified by the catalytic intrusion of commodity
exchange relations.
The forms of cooperation bear a different significance. No peasants suddenly proletarianised,
whether temporarily or long-term, enter the new relations of production with a blank con-
sciousness. Their past socialisation will modify their abilit to develop new tactics of struggle under
new antagonistic social relations. In particular, experience of cooperative labour, whether or not
productie, may provide models for building collective methods of resistance where of necessity
a proletarian tradition is still embryonic.
Externa/ trade and c/ass po/arisation
The first Portuguese traders reached Ovamboland from the north in the late 1-840s. Within a
decade, regular trade relations through Mossamedes and Walvis Bay, and from the late 1870s
through the central Kalahari, had brought Ovamboland into the global sphere of commodity
exchange. Although control of trading and of trade credit was soon highly centralised, throughout
the pre-colonial period it scope was restricted by fluctuations in the pattern of industrial capitalist
demand, by the distance and diffculty of the trade routes and by the carrying capacity of ox-wagon
transport. Thus traders sought raw materials in commercial demand with a high price-to-weight
ratio, such as ivory, and a market for field crops never developed. Limited and unstable local
markets also developed for cattle and slaves, whose particular advantage was that they could
transport themselves to the market.
It is impossible for lack of data to make any precise calculation of the scale of the tradei15).
Nevertheless, its general course is reasonably e1ear. Between the 1850s and early 1880s, the
principal export commodity was ivory, to a lesser extent ostrich feathers. In return, the Ovambo
kings, victims between 1859-63 of armed incursions from the west by a Portuguese military
expediton and from the south by the Oorlam ruler, Jonker Afrikaner, demanded arms. The power
ofthe tributary states was suffcient to enable them to regulate ivory hunting by foreign traders and
impose a substantiallevy on its proceeds. Fire-arms, initially sought for defence against external
15. For a detailed empirical treatment, see Siiskonen, Kunikaiden kauppa.
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aggression, were turned also to productive use as the kings themselves accumulated ivory for
sale. Since elephants were not an existing subsistence resource and the locallabour diverted into
hunting them was minimal, the relations of production were barely affected.
However, the kings' ability to extend the control they exerted over their own specialised artisan-
traders to the commercial agents of capitalism strengthened their political and economic power
in crucial respects. Besides extracting a substantiallevy-in-kind in desired commodities, they were
able to regulate both the scale and to a certain extent the content of direct exchange between
traders and peasants. Thus in the first phase fire-arms were reserved as a royal monopoly, and
barter trade was restricted principally to luxury manufactures in return for ivory and cattle. Fire-
arms greatly increased the potential productivity of royal hunting and were directly appropriated.
The king's monopoly over the principal trade commodity tied the content of capitalist
manufactures forwhich theywere willng to exchange it to their own luxury consumption. Together
with the large subsistence resources at their disposal, it enabled them to expand their political
power through mechanisms of patronage.
The Ovambo kings, however, permitted hunting on a scale far beyond the animals' natural
reproductive capacity, and by the early 1880s the elephant and ostrich population had been all
but wiped out. By now, although evidence is sparse, the kings were already substantially
dependent on imported arms and luxury goods, the former for general defence against external
aggression and for the competitive local pett raiding that had long been traditional, the latter
principally as means of politcal patronage and both for prestige. Lacking alternative raw materials
in demand on industrial capitalist markets, they were compelled to resort to the only commodities
saleable on local markets, cattle and slaves. Cattle were used as feed stock in the trading and
missionary network. More particularly, f10urishing export markets had opened up by the early
1890s amongstthe emigrant Boers on the Humpata plateau, in the Atlantic plantation islands via
Mossamedes, and along Rhodes' Bechuanaland railway(161. Slaves could be sold to the
Ovimbundu in central Angola, although the trade in people was never large-scale.
Cattle werea principal subsistence resource, and the appropriation of both them and slaves as
trade commodites could only proceed by means of antagonistic social relations. To achieve their
ends, the kings transformed or redirected several pre-existing methods of surplus appropriation.
Probably anxious to minimise the risk of internal resistance, they channelled their newly acquired
militarytechnologyinto external raiding. Small-scale inter-tribal raiding, seizing cattle and people,
who were ransomed or incorporated into lineages as debt slaves, appears to have intensified
generally during the 1880s and 1890s. Simultaneously, long-distance raiding, of which
Ukwanyama was the leading exponent, developed to the north for cattle and slaves, who were
either absorbed or sold to traders.
But increasingly the kings resorted to internal expropriation, mostly in the form of cattle. The
frequency of witchcraft accusations and "judicial raids", traditionally sanctioned instruments of
politcal policy and taxation on wealth, exceeded their ideologicallegitimacy to become arbitrary
exactions. Above all, the okasavu, formerly "the traditional ritual seizure of cattle for the king's
court, became a harsh and arbitrary tax"(17), its voluntary nature superseded by military force.
It is important to note that intensified surplus appropriation by the tributary state was firmly
established before the rinderpest disaster struck Ovamboland in 1897. The dia ry of the Swedish
traveller Möller, who crossed the area in 1895-96, mentions Ovambo refugees settled in the
16. In add~ion to references in Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.A.H.), note 19, see PA Möller,
Journey into Africa through Angola, Ovampo/and and Damaraland, (Cape Town, Struik, 1974, trans!. from the
Swedish ed~ion of 1899), pp.7, 32; entnes in E.C. Tabler, Pioneers of SWA and Ngamíland, (Cape Town, Balkema,
1973); N. Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana, 1844-1930", in R. Palmer and N.
Parsons, The roots of rural povert in central and southem Africa, (London, Heinemann, 1977).
17. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.A.H.), p.376.
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middle Kunene, mainly from Ukwanyama and Ukwambi. Most "have left their tribe to escape the
oppression and system of plunder that the despotic chiefs exercise towards their people. It is
particularly the cattle that the chiefs extort for themselves...". An accurate reporter, Möller's
assessment of Ukwanyamal18J, less than two years before the rinderpest catastrophe, is
suggestive. Weyulu, the king, himself owned "about 20 excellent modern guns", and "about as
many horses", the latter bought for about 60 oxen each. He was able to offer £25 in gold coins
for Möller's repeating rifle. Weyulu hinted in conversation that long-distance raiding was the
principal means of supportng such an investment; but still found it necessary, according to Möller,
to "tax his people very heavily in their cattle". Despite the constant circulation of functionaries
between court and country, he did not possess suffcient "iron discipline" to prevent a constant
trickle of emigration.
Initally the embryonic tributary state lacked even a rudimentary apparatus of coercion outside the
royal entourage. However, the escalation of raiding, especially of regular long-distance expedi-
tions, "...Ied to the formation at court of a permanent group ofwar leaders, the elenga, each of
whom received a horse (an extremely expensive and short-lived animal) and a number of rifles
from the king and led a body of about 100 men on raiding expeditions"1191. This new stratum of
military leaders, normally recruited on grounds of ability rather than lineage authority2ol, built up
personal wealth and a body of retainers proportionate to their success in royal service, to
counterbalance as the state possessed neither an administrative bureaucracy nor ideological
legitimation for its oppressive role. To a limited extent the elenga could therefore exploit the
contradiction between the king's needs to increase the rate of appropriation and his delegating
the power essential to achieve it in order to consolidate their relative autonomy. One instance of
the ideological expression of this tension is given by Möller, who noted the use in Ukwanyama of
insignia of rank and rewards for bravery211.
The rinderpest epidemic, from which drought and pestilence hindered recovery, devastated raider
and victim alike, and destroyed the Bechuanaland market. In Ovamboland, the mortality rate
reached as high as 90 per cent. Long-distance raiding was already subject to diminishing returns
as the tri bes under attack developed defensive techniques, broke up or moved north. After 1904,
and more particularly after 1907, when the Portuguese established a ring of forts around the
northern perimeter of Ovamboland, raiding became militarily more hazardous too. At the same
time, the growing military power of colonial regimes on both flanks, especially after 1904,
enhanced the need for defensive rearmament. It is thus not surprising that the elenga were
progressively redirected into collecting the okasavu, and were able - possibly because the kings'
means of patronage were reduced - to appropriate an increasing proportion of the proceeds of
this and other forms of arbitrary exaction to their own use. By these means and through external
and inter-tribal raiding, they built independent clientage networks.
Although the evidence is fragmentary22J, it is likely that the level of peasant consumption declined
in the 30 years before colonisation (mid-1880s-1915). Not only were cattle stocks decimated by
natural catastrophe, butthe rate and generalit oftaxation began to exceed the capacity of lineage
18. Möller, Journey, pp.110-13. He may be partially refleeting the views of the veteran trader Eriksson, with whom he
was traveIlng. See also the account from oral tradition in E.M. Loeb, In feudal Africa, Supplement to Internat. J.
Am. Ung., part 2, XXViii No.3, July 1962, chapter 1.
19. Cf Schinz's description of areturning Kwambi war-party in 1885 (H. Schinz, Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika, 1884-7,
(Oldenburg/Leipzig, Schulz, 1891), p.236).
20. Möller, Journey, p.126; w'G. Clarence-m~h, "Mossamedes and its hinterland, 1875-1915", SOAS African History
Seminar, 1 May 1974, p.3.
21. Möller, p.126; H.E. Schoch, diary 20/6/20 (WU Arch, A839/Ja2); Pritchard, Report, para 85.
22. Schinz, DSWA, pp.298-9, 311; H. Tönjes, Ovamboland, (Berlin, 1911), p.69; G. Nilsche, Ovamboland, (PhD, Univ.
Kiel, 1913), p.130.
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reciprocity to compensate. It is possible that limited forms of peasant resistance - holding back
crop and stock production, even emigration - reinforced the tendencyl231.
The mediation of patriarchal social relations made the impact of impoverishment in fact more
specific. For a minority of households, the survivors of inter-tribal raiding or of "judicial raids", all
had no option but to f1ee and/or atlach themselves as e1ients to powerful elenga lineages. For the
rest, the material and cultural shock at the sudden seizure of cattle lay particularly heavily on the
men. Furthermore, game-hunting became an aristocratic monopolyl24J. Younger men were
recruited as retainers and for military expeditions. Even so, a substantial num ber faced either
social dislocation or in the sudden appropriation of their cattle,the loss not only of means of
subsistence but also of social wealth.
The partcular forms of surplus appropriation under tributary relations of production thus affected
women rather less, since taxation in cattle did not seriously damage either social reproduction or
crop output. Although the more violent methods of appropriation - judicial raids and inter-tribal
raid ing - often did entail the complete dispossession, capture or death of whole households, their
victims were a minorit of the social formation , and their intensification was a product of the post-
rinderpest crisis in the tributary mode itself.
The impact of embryonic e1ass formation on and through patriarchal social relations led to
modifications in the forms of cooperation in the labour process whose ideological spin-off
influenced the tactics of organised struggle developed by labour migrants. In the long term they
also strengthened the managerial autonomy of women in rural production. The annual cattle
migration, restricted to men and boys, and undertaken in a diffcult environment, had long
ingrained techniques of cooperation and improvisation at the level of groups comprising lineages
or a number of homesteads. The deployment of tribute labour into raiding parties, as many as
100-150 strong, assisted in welding a strong, all-male tradition of group solidarity.
It is suggested therefore that in the years following this the tributary state was already approaching
a crisis; that peasant consumption was being depressed to the margins of subsistence on too wide
a scale for the compensatory mechanisms of lineage social relationsfully to compensate; and
that the specific form of tributary state surplus appropriation and labour conscription had a
particularly adverse impact on younger men in the divided labour process.
Migration statistics from the last five years of German rule point to the scale on which Ovambo
households were turning to migrant labour out of necessity251. Over the four years (1910-1913),
outgoing migrants exceeded those returning by as many as 8,145 out of 36,480, or 22 per cent,
and even after the shutdown of most businesses in late 1914 a net surplus of over 5,000 (11 per
cent) remained. It is during those years that permanent urban Ovambo settlements were first
noted. The fact that peasants could opt to settle under a savagely labour-repressive colonial
regime is further evidence of the deterioration of economic and political conditions in
Ovambolandl261.
Figures for individual e1usters in the year ended June 19111271 tend to confirm the differential
development ofinternal c1ass-formation. Although population estimates at this time were no more
23. Schinz, DWSA, p.298; Dr. Gelber, (1902), reported in T. Leulwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch
Südwestafrka, (Berlin, Mitier, 1906), p.201; Loeb, In feudal Africa, p.31-2; A.W. Urquhart, Patterns of settement
and subsistence in South West Angola, (Washington, 1963), p.111.
24. Tönjes, Ovamboland, p.69; Möller, Journey, p.115; V. Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen in Südwest- und Südafrika,
(Leipzig, Karl W. Hirsemann, 1934), vol.2, p.190.
25. Cf. E.L.P. Stais, "Die aanraking tussen Blankes en Owambos in Suidwes-Afrika, 1850-1915", Arch. Yearbook for
S.A. Hist., 31(2),1968, pp.333-4.
26. O. Köhler, DistrictofKaribib, (South Africa, Dept. of Bantu Administralion and Development, Ethnological Publica-
tiens Series, 1958-9); NA 43/639, Imperial Native Commissioner, Windhoek, report for year ended March 1913.
27. Nitsche, Ovamboland, p.134. NB this was a famine year.
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than informed speculations, it appears that labour migrants formed about 10 per cent of the
Ndonga population - or about 30 per cent of active men, a remarkably high proportion even for
a famine year - as against 7 per cent, 5 per cent and 2.5 per cent for Ukwambi, Ukwanyama and
Ongandjera respectively, with very few from further north and westl281. In general, the great
majority of migrant workers came from the larger clusters, ruled by kings and subject to more
definite social differentiation. The evidence is incomplete, but it can reasonably be concluded that,
exacerbated by prolonged drought and by increasing internal social dislocation and surplus
appropriation, appreciable numbers of peasants had been pushed to the margins of subsistence;
and that the massive wave of labour migration after 1908 was a direct response.
The colonial stand-off and labour migration
The year 1904 marked the beginning of both the national insurrection in the Namibian 'Police
Zone' and a more determined Portuguese attempt to conquer northern Ovamboland.
Simultaneously the rate of labour migration began to rise. Yet the greater part of Ovamboland was
not subjected to colonial rule before 1915, and then only fortuitously as a result of a change in
colonial regime. And it was another decade before the new colonial power established total
controlover labour migration through a monopoly recruiting system. Although the outcome of this
transitional period was predictable, its form and timing were strongly modified by the conflicting
interests and strategies of Ovambo political leaders, the three colonial governments, and the
labour migrants themselves.
The growth of labour migration can be charted with reasonable accuracy. Small numbers of
Ovambos worked in the interstices of the trading network in both Namibia and Angola during the
1880s and 1890S1291, and on the smaller mines and guano workings in Namibia after 1892 13~1
Hundreds were recruited for the Swakopmund harbour works (November 1893-1903) and the
railways to Windhoek (September 1897-June 1902) and Otavi (October 1903-December 1906)1311.
Up to 1907, however, there were probably never more than about 1700 in the Police Zone at any
one timel321. Yet, by 1910 the annual total of incoming migrants had shot up to over 9,000, or,
assuming an average migrancy cycle of 8-9 months each, a labour force of over 6,000; and this
high level was maintained until 1914(331. After the temporary shutdown in 1914-15, the rate of
recruitment probably equalled its pre-war levels for the first five years (statistics are scarce), and
setlled back to an annual 3,500-4,500 for the second(34I. There are no precise statistics for Angola,
but recruitment for the Mossamedes and Benguela railways from 1904, mostly from conquered
areas subject after 1907 to hut tax, probably never exceeded an annual 2,0001351.
The broad outlines of Portuguese and German colonial strategies are fairly clearl361. The former,
intent on imposing "direct rule" and taxation, embarked on the military conquest of the southern
28. Possible reasons why the Ondonga rate was double that of Ukwanyama are the former's proximity to the migration
routes, ils more advanced penetration by missionaries, and the greater marginality of both its water supply and its
adjacent grazing areas.
29. Tönjes, Ovamboland, p.88; Tabler, entry Björklund; Möller, Journey, pp.15, 46.
30. E. StaIs, pp.323-4; R. Gordon, "A note on the history of labour action in Namibia", SA Lab. Bull., April 1975, p.9;
K. Dove, Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika, (Berlin, 1903), p.186.
31. H.E. Lenssen, Chronik von Deutsch-Südwestafrika, 1883-1915, (Pretoria, 1953), pp.7, 171; J. Irle, Die Hereros,
(Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1906), p.219; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.323.
32. Nitsche, Ovambo/and, pp.130-9.
33. Stais, p.333. A nine-month average per worker allows for longer-term contracts and re-hiring, but it is a very rough
estimate. Assuming that very few workers would migrate more than once a year, the annual recruitment statistics
are the betler guide to the actual num ber involved.
34. South Africa, Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Owambo, (Pretoria, 1971), p.20; SWA Administrator, Annual Reports of the
Administrator for SWA to the League of Nations.
35. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.A.H.), p.3??
36. On the Portuguese, Clarence-Smith, Slaves. On the Germans, Stais, "Die aanraking"; F.R. Lehmann, "Die
politische und soziale Stellung der Häuptlinge in Ovamboland", Tribus, 4-5,1954-5.
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interior, occupying Ombadya (1907), after a crushing initial defeat (1904), three small northern
Ovambo c1usters (1908-10), and the Okavango RivelP71. But fear of Kwanyama military power and
their need for railway labour deterred the Portuguese from completing the process of subjugation.
Ukwanyama, straddling the disputed border and well wihin the German "sphere of interest" under
the secret Anglo-German partition treaty of 1898, now became the centre of rivalry between
German and Portuguese diplomats, labour recruiters and tradersl381.
The newly established German regime (1894-95), on the other hand, remained pre-occupied with
the colonisation of the Police Zone until the collapse of its treaty system in 1904. The imperial
government baulked at the anticipated military and, after 1904, political cost of conquest; and
steadfastly rejected any local initiative both before and after the war to intervene militarily and
establish a direct administration, to the extent that even retaliatory raids were banned.
Nevertheless, Ovamboland, now that it was a major supplier of essentiallabour, was the object
of close political attention as the Germans tried to maximise the supply through diplomatic ties
with the politicalleaderships(391.
After 1904 the scope for strategic manoeuvre for the Ovambo kings narrowed. The Portuguese
occupation of their perimeter made long-distance raiding hazardous for the Kwanyama. The
incidence of internal inter-tribal raiding was probably increasing, with smaller clusters the chief
victims; yet none was able to secure any significant military ascendancy, and the mode of warfare
changed litle, despite the increased effciency of imported arms technology!40I. The tributary states
were therefore increasingly forced back upon internal methods of surplus appropriation.
Realisation through trade of it proceeds, however, was becoming more diffcult and less reliable
as colonial occupation of trade-routes placed controls on access to markets and to essential
commodites. By the mid 1890s, both the Germans and the Portuguese had banned trade in fire-
arms; when rinderpest reached Namibia the Germans stopped the entry of all cattle from
Ovamboland; from 1906 they allowed traders access only by licence; and at about this time the
Portuguese banned trade altogether411. Although smuggling was possible through Hereroland
before 1904 and through Angola up to and beyond 19151421, it was subject to considerable risk
during the last decade of independence.
Given the tightening constraints of their strategic situation, the Ovambo kings were relatively
successful in exploitng colonial rivalries and the misperceptions of colonial agents. In 1908, after
more than a decade of almost open hostility before and during the genocidal suppression of the
insurrection, the Ovambo kings allowed their political relations with the Germans to be formalised
in "protection treaties". In practice, most succeeded in keeping their distance. At least one
maintained an effcient intellgence networkl431; and visitors, missionaries and migrant workers were
used as ongoing sources of information. Though good relations with traders were indispensable,
very few were allowed either to settle permanently in tribal territory or given the freedom to
37. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.AH.), p.375.
38. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.AH.), p.379.
39. Lehmann, "Die politische", for details from German records; also Leutwein, Elf Jahre, pp.175-6, 92; Stais, "Die
aanraking", p.290.
40. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.282-3, 293, 295; Südwest, 4/2/13: Mbadya v. Ukwanyama (in NA 1161/179). For
effective resistance by "kingless" tribes, NA 4994/1227, Res.Comm. - SWA Sec.1/3/16; Schoch, diary 24/6/20. For
earlier descriptions of border cattle-raiding, eg Schinz, DSWA, p.320; P. Serton (ed.), Narrative and journal of
Gerald McKiernan in SWA, (Cape Town, Van Riebeeck Society, 1954), p.109.
41. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.291; Möller, Journey, p.33; Landeshpt. Enactment 29/3/97 para 4 and regulations under
Proc. 9/10/07; Ovamboland Proc. 25/1/06; Lehmann, "Die politische", p.289.
42. Between the turn of the century and 1915, the quantity of arms in Ovamboland appears to have increased
considerably: compare Möller, Journey, p.102, 23 and Nitsche, Ovamboland, p.147, with Pritchard, Report, para
39, and NA494/1227 Res. Comm. - NA Windhoek 10/1/16 (report), Res. Comm. - Dep. Sec. Windhoek 6/8/16.
On arms smuggling after 1915, Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen, p.208.
43. Eg Lehmann, "Die politische", p.274 (Nehale, 1902).
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operate outside royal control. As late as 1911, when Portuguese traders tri ed to exploit famine
conditions by overcharging, the Kwanyama king Mandume expelled them from his territory44J.
This notwhstanding, the kings could not escape the contradiction which bound them: that internal
taxation on cattle was yielding diminishing returns from a static subsistence productive base. Not
only was the power of the state threatened for lack of adequate means of exchange for the
instruments of appropriation, which indigenous metal technology could not reproduce, but also
the stability of the kings' alliance with the new stratum of functionaries (the elenga), which its
methods of surplus extraction had called into being. Increasingly the kings were losing exclusive
controlover the possession of guns and horses, and the elenga were channeIling appropriated
cattle and people into their own retinues. In general, the price of royal supremacy over the elenga
seems to have been regular dispossession, judicious marriage and patronage strategies, and an
authoriarian personal rule dependent in varying degrees on a court-based military contingent451.
Inevitably, the effciency and articulation of the tributary state were impaired.
In this context, the suddenly urgent colonial demand for labour after 1904 held advantages for the
rulers of the tributary states. It was the only substantial bargaining counter they possessed against
colonial encroachment, particularly from the German side, as the degree of offcial involvement
in recruitng effort must have made plain. It was certainly a means of obtaining regular trade and
politcal information, and possibly of smuggling in armsi46J. It provided an outlet for the victims of
their more arbitrary methods of surplus appropriation and alleviated the burden of providing relief
after bad harvests. It was an alternative to raiding which the elenga would not oppose and would
possibly assist in supervsing, a politically valuable point since the elenga seem generally to have
been more hostile to diplomatic relations with the colonial powersl47J, understandably in view of
their stake in raiding. Above all the export of labour under offcial direction offered the kings a new
opportunity for taxation through levies on the goods with which the workers returned.
Despite the scale of their requirements, the German authorities went little further than to set up
border control posts on the two main migration routes and, from 1906, to restrict entry to approved
recruiters. They resisted pressure from recruiters for open access and from the diamond
companies for a recruitng station inside Ovamboland. The colonial government, having adopted
a policy of co-option, was anxious to maintain harmonious relations with the kings - thus serving
political as well as economic ends - which competition between recruiters and unscrupulous
practices on the latters' part might jeopardise. Instead, offcials toured the country with increasing
frequency to persuade the kings to encourage labour migration. In 1911, private recruiters were
barred altogether and a "Natie Commissioner", symbolically the veteran Ovamboland missionary
Tönjes, was appointed at Lüderitz.
To a considerable extent, the disadvantages to the Germans of not having permanent
representatives or administrators at the royal capitals was offset by the network of mission
stations, which were generally located, both geographically and politically, near the centres of
state power. Missionaries of the Finnish Missionary Society, established in the area since 1870,
and the Rhenish Missionary Society, strategically located in Ukwanyama since the early 1890s,
prove d willng and reliable sources of intellgence and, on balance, influential surrogates for
colonial political advisorsi48J.
44. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.289.
45. Mandume was perhaps the c1earest example of a strong reforming ruler, nevertheless laeking the means to
transcend his dependence (see Lehmann, "Die politische", pp.288-91; NA 4994/1227, H. M. Consul, Lüderilzbucht,
Memo. January 1912, also NA 1161/179, Consul- Sec. NA 16/7/2.
46. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.270 (1905), p.298 (1912).
47. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.286 (Ukwanyama 1901), p.283 (Ukwambi 1911/12).
48. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.272, esp. p.278; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.334; Pritchard, Report, para 23; NA
4994/1227, Res. Comm. - SWA Sec. 1/3/16, memos by Rautanen and Wulfhorst; Consul, memo., January(?J
1912.
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Within these limits the Germans exploited their opportunities to the fulL. The years 1907-16
winessed an unparalleled sequence of bad harvests (1910 and 1912 were the only exceptions),
culminating in the devastating famines of 1911 and 1915. In 1908, the year in which Hauptmann
Franke was sent north to secure protection treaties and encourage labour migration, the Germans
sent 80 tons of relief supplies, via the Finnish Mission, for "free distribution", a practice which
became regular in succeeding years and a powenul inducement to royal goodwilll491. Government
representatives distributed gifts judiciously, and sensing the structure of power in matrilineal
succession, cultivated the more powenul of the king's female relativesl50I. Ondonga, with its
troubled royal succession and unfavourable situation for raiding, came in for special attention. The
government intervened directly in its succession dispute, and plied the half-blind and alcoholic
Kambonde Il (1884-1909) with liquor and a sizeable bribel511. In the last year of their regime the
Germans took the first rudimentary steps to improve the conditions of travel for migrants on the
hazardous, waterless ro ute to the Otavi railhead by driling boreholes and starting a railway from
O~iwarongo to Ondonga. Whether military or economic motives were the foremost consideration
in the latter venture, the First World War brought the project to an abrupt and permanent haltl521.
The struggle for controlover labour migration
Although the Germans held back from both indirect and direct coercion in seeking to secure
large-scale labour supplies, the Ovambo kings at the minimum never seriously opposed the
growth of labour migration after 1907. By the turn of the century an increasing number of Ovambo
men were being reduced to the margins of subsistence and deprived of status and employment
by the appropriation of their cattle. Wage labour was one among several alternative forms of
subsistence, whether as a temporary means of recovery or a permanent change in e1ass position.
Its explosive growth might be interpreted as an independent response by the more impoverished
peasant households to their material and political circumstances, aresponse which their rulers
were powerless or disinterested in opposing. The extent to which the tributary states exceeded a
merely passive role in either promoting labour migration or regulating its form is important in
determining the margins and context of struggle available to labour migrants.
Hauptmann Streitolf, who visited Ovamboland several times on recruiting missions, concluded
in 1913 that verbal commitments by the Ovambo kings to itinerant German offcial made little
impact on the trend of recruitmentl531. Whatever negotiating tactics the kings may have employed,
there is evidence that they did in fact take an active part in both promoting and regulating the f1ow.
Schletlein gave an explicit description of the mechanics of state control in 1907(541:
The chief chooses the men and sends them out under a fore man to acquire
clothesand other useful articles. The final date by which such a part has to be
back is precisely stipulated, and woe betide anyone who doesn't return at the
correct time... With their earnings the men must buy goods, all of which they are
required to set down before their chief. The chief then takes for himself whatever
he likes, and disposes of the rest quite arbitrarily.
49. On 'gifls' eg NA 4994/1227, Consul - Sec. NA (Personal), 6/6/12, citing 'Iecture' by Tönjes; on relatives, Lehmann,
"Die politische", passim.
50. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom, "Underdevelopment" (J.AH.), p.378; Lehmann, "Die politische", passim, esp. on
Ondonga; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.299.
51. Lehmann, "Die politische", pp.269-73.
52. NA 4994/1227, Consul- Sec. In!., 1412/13 and 19111/13 (enclosure); Pritchard, Report, para 13; South Africa,
Memorandum on the country known as German SWA, (Pretoria, 1915), p.86.
53. Lehmann, "Die politische", p.284; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.333, a view which Stals endorses.
54. C. Schlettein, Der Farmer in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika, (Wismar, 1907), p.255, author's translation.
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That the king was able to levy a tax-in-kind on returning workers was confirm ed by a second
observer twenty years later55):
Every black who returns from the mines must report immediately to the chief and
give a detailed account of everyhing that happened and hand over the gifts
expected of him.
Fragmentary evidence from the early years of labour migration tends to confirm Schletlein's view
thatthe king also controlled the call-up and dispatch ofworkers, though the criterion of selection
is not clear. In 1896 Möller reported of the Kwambi kingl56J:
Nezumbo rules his people with an iron hand but also with wisdom. He wants
absolute obedience from everybody; before they marry the young men must
work wih the white people on the other side of the Kunene and from there bring
back a cow as payment.
Clearly the divding line between the redeployment or extension of tribute labour by the state and
the dispatch of sub-marginal peasants as labour migrants was delicate and by no means ab-
solute. Similarly, the extent to which forcible methods of appropriation of cattle and people were
specifically translated into conscription for labour migration cannot be determined on the available
evidence.
1910:
to 1436 2501 702 537 432 573 1351 674 425 215 241 268 9355
from 443 727 695 589 235 134 505 991 726 692 440 628 6805
1911:
to 1144 615 591 1532 1581 626 393 383 553 623 603 649 9284
from 438 225 197 560 432 100 588 1164 593 680 667 935 6579
1912:
to 646 160 135 540 625 798 550 547 623 611 498 343 6076
from 491 229 341 413 504 197 570 340 108 424 569 587 4773
1913:
to 1049 1364 1558 1404 1271 860 745 1115 719 630 538 511 11764
from 730 436 572 721 737 986 589 1121 824 1275 1015 1171 10177
1914:
to 1167 1064 1246 977 400 1531 1430 403 46 31 39 508 8824
from 560 735 910 508 875 460 664 4543 300 749 292 447 11023
1915:
to 776 49
from 453 1108
Note: The figures indicate the num ber of migrant workers passing the two northernmost border posts.
Source: Stais, "Die aanraking", p.333.
It is pro bable that the stronger kings adapted the institutions of the raiding part to labour
migration. Several times between 1900 and 1925 it was reported that Ovambo migrants travelled
in groups and refused to be broken upi571. Indeed, one Omaruru farmer on the route put the
average number of each at 100-150, a size equivalent to the raiding part. Migration statistics for
55. Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen, p.219, also p.209.
56. Möller, Journey, p.117.
57. Lenssen, Chronik, p.171 (1904/5); Nitsche, Ovamboland, p.135 (c.1910/11); Stais, "Die aanraking", p.325 (1910),
also p.331 for possible government reinforcement oftnbal authority; SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1921, p.12.
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the period 1910-14 tend to confirm that the six month maximum period of absence usually
stipulated by the kingi5B1 was being observed by many workers. In 1904-5 one Ovambo king,
Nehale, was strong enough to enforce a ban on migration after German provocationl59J. In
Ukwanyama, the continuing ability of the king to bargain with rival Portuguese and German
recruiters indicates a degree of regulation over outgoing workers. It may be tentatively coneluded
that the Ovambo kings attempted to retain some controlover this new source of revenue by
putting migrants under their own representatives, by limiting the period of absence, and by
sanctions against those who disobeyed royal injunctions.
It is not likely, however, that after the four-fold increase in the annual rate of migration between
1907 and 1910, the kings could continue to exercise detailed personal supervision over the
recruitment, dispatch and return ofthe labourers. Schletlein's description was written before this
escalation; nor is it known whether most or all migrants travelled in groups, or whether those who
did were always led by tribal officiais. As early as 1902, a drought year, the northern recruiting
station reported a surplus of new arrivals over demand, and according to Stais, "many Ovambos"
at this time were coming "on their own initiative"i6ol. Later, while the five to seven months lag
between emigration and return may indicate observance of the royal injunction, it also conformed
roughly to the rhythm of peasant production, the men returning in time either for field preparation
in spring or for cattle pasturingi611 and the harvest in late summer.
Interpretation of the migration statistics for the period 1910-14 is not easy, since at leastthree out
ofthe five years saw bad harvests, and short-term variations were at times strongly influenced by
local hostilities and anti-colonial resistancei621. In general, however, they support the view that
periods of labour migration were integrated with the seasonal cyele of subsistence production.
Peaks of emigration tended to follow closely periods of heavy dem and upon male labour-time,
or to coincide with crop or pasture failures. Comparison of the out-migration figures for 1912, a
year of good rainfall, with those for 1911 and 1913 shows, predictably, that the seasonal peaks
were much reduced in expectation of good crops and pastures. It also reveals that the total for
1912 was still 60 per cent of the average for 1911 and 1913, indicating the scale on which labour
migration was by this time structurally necessary.
In general, the statistical evidence remains ambiguous on this question. For the purpose of
preventing permanent emigration and the loss of both labour-power and revenue, a short
maximum period of migration was as much in the king's interest as was continuous supervision
of the migrants. Since both maximising the output in cattle and securing tribute labour and military
servce remained principal state concerns, it is likely that the king's policy would have reinforced
the tendency to artculate migration with the seasonal production cycle. Nevertheless, the steady
flow underlying the seasonal climatic peaks indicates that such articulation was of lesser
importance to a substantial number. When taken together with the gaps between the kings'
promises to recruiters and their actual fulfilment, it also suggests that tributary states could do little
more than organise peasants acting in their own interest.
58. Nilsche, Ovambo/and, p.136; Lüderilzbucht Chamber of Mines, Annua! Report, 4/3/11, (in NA 4994/1227 Consul
- Sec. NA 29/8/11), p.3.
59. Cf. Lennsen, p.171; Leulwein, p.195-6.
60. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.326.
61. Many migrants not possessing cattle could expect subsequently to build a herd through kinship mechanisms or
through barter exchange using purchased goods.
62. These remarks apply particularly to Ukwanyama (Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.334-5; see NA 4994/1227, Consul,
memo. January 1912; memo 14/2/13, press exlracts).
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Indirect rule
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 intruded abruptly upon relations between the colonial
and the tributary states. After a brief skirmish wih a German force the Portuguese abandoned the
whole of southern Angola in panic. The Germans, however, soon had to confront an invading
force from South Africa. In the brief hiatus that followed, the Kwanyama king Mandume, who had
since his accession in 1911 substantially reasserted royal ascendancy over his elenga by
combining autocracy with populist measures, attempted to establish Ukwanyama as the leading
military power in Ovamboland. This embryonic paramountcy can be seen as a new stage in the
uneven evolution of the tributary states.
But the tendency lasted barely long enough to reveal its form. In mid-1915 the Portuguese
returned in force to inflict a total and bloody defeat upon Ukwanyama, and the leadership and
sections of the surviving population fled across the border. Representatives of the South African
invading force, arriving at the same time from the south, found Ovamboland in the grip of severe
famine and were able to establish an administrative presence without opposition. From this point
the character of colonial rule north and south of the border diverges, and I will be concerned for
the most part only with the latter.
From the outset the new colonial power applied to its northern reserves the standard principles
of indirect rule: a skeleton administration, relying on the personal and paternalist influence of white
officiais, and backed where necessary by overwhelming military force; minimalinterference in
tri bal affairs; and the least possible state expenditure. Politically, the government attempted, with
some success, to secure the collaboration of the e/enga by recognising their executive authority
and by setting up councils of headmen as the subordinate judicial and political authority where
kings were non-existent or deposed. Relations with the kings, still potential symbols of resistance
within their communities, and occasionally on a broader front, were often uneasy and two were
deliberately deposed by forcel631. Aside from the obvious advantages of collaboration, the elenga
had litle option but to cooperate: raiding and violent methods of extortion, their principal revenue-
earners, were suppressed and trading was reduced to an illegal tricklel641. There were no
permanent stores before 1925 and very few itinerant traders, while barter exchange across the
Angolan border remained on a small scale.
Collaboration, on the other hand, formalised their delegated local powers of land allocation, their
rights, sometimes usurped from deposed kings, to taxation on grain and cattle and to tribute
labour, and their controlover mig rant labour. The price of confirmation in their executive and
taxation rights was subordination as administrative 'headmen' to the overlordship of colonial
offcials, whose chief priority now lay in the labour requirements of the colonial economy.
The form of colonial intervention struck at the core of the tributary states by either removing or
emasculating their central political and ideological institution, the kingship. The power of the co-
opted elenga was confined to more or less fixed districts within each cluster. The social formation
was now artculated at the level of the reserve administration in the overriding interest of colonial
capital.
Under the pragmatism implied by the policy of co-option, particular variations between clusters
were occasionally considerable. In general, however, lineage relations of production, with which
the patronage mechanisms of headmen tended to mesh, strengthened at the expense of
antagonistic methods of surplus appropriation, which were in any case limited and standardised
by the colonial administration. Cattle levies were substantially reduced and their principal trading
63. Mandume of Ukwanyama (1917) and lpumbu of Ukwambi (1932); on the former, see NA 4994/1227,
correspondence March-September, 1916.
64. NA 4994/1227, Res.Comm. - SWA Sec. 1/3/16, Report; Schoch, diary 24/6/20 (Ombalantu).
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purpose, the acquisition of arms, was banned as were most of the arbitrary methods of
expropriation such as 'judicial raids'. Colonial taxation was not introduced unti11929, and even
then could be paid in kind. The trend in the use of tribute labour was unclear, but demands by the
colonial administration were small and periodic, while one major activity employing younger men,
raiding, was now ended.
The sudden ending of inter-tribal raiding removed one major disincentive from colonising the
forest belts or from exploiting them more freely for raw materials. Ukwanyama is likely to have
been an exception to this general conelusion, however. Refugees from the Portuguese military
conquest in 1915, from the redrawing of pre-colonial boundary further south in 1926, and from
Portuguese repression and taxation, continued to settle on a narrow strip of territory adjoining the
border in substantial numbers. The incidence of labour migration, in contrast to the pre-conquest
years, was if anything slightly above the regional average in the mid 1920s, when Kwanyama men
accounted for 60 per cent of all contract workers from Ovambolandl65).
For lack of direct evidence any assessment of the impact of these changes in sodal relations on
either the level of production or the labour process must remain speculative. With traders barred
before 1925 and the export of cattle banned, the only means of access to capitalist-produced
commodites was through wage labour by migration. For the kings and headmen, the taxation-in-
kind of returning migrants, whether formal or informal, was thus their only means other than
government subsidies of acquiring items of luxury consumption or prestige. For peasants, on the
other hand, direct dependence on external commodites was still small, except where ideologically
induced as amongst the growing num ber of Christians. Indigenous smiths continued to produce
the bulk of the instruments of production well into the 1920s, although their long-term fate was
sealed by the loss of their ore sites at Otavi and Kassinga to capita list concerns.
Note a For 10 "months", the earning is approximately 300 shifts, or nearly one calender year. This figure suggests a rate
of 2/- per shift, rather high when compared with the minimum rates then prevailing.
Source: Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen, p.219.
But stock levels were undoubtedly generally lower following the devastating drought of 1915-16.
They were also more unevenly distributed in the aftermath of heavy taxation and raiding. Trade
goods bought wih wages were one ready means of acquiringcattle by exchange. An assessment
in the late 1920s of the ave rage expenditure pattern of Ovambo migrants points to such a
tendency: out of an annual wage of £30, fully one-third was spent on "purchases", and a further
£4-5 at the mine store by then established in Ovamboland. Aside from taxation ('gifts' to tribal
functionaries), much of the remainder went on the worker's own reproduction costs. The lower
and fairly stable rate of migration throughout the 1920s suggests that subject to the determining
framework of long-term or periodic impoverishment and of pressures by headmen, the principal
objectives of migration were two-fold: first, to acquire items of exchange for means of production,
particularly the case with younger men establishing a homestead; second, ideologically
determined consumption, fulfillng household, prestige or religious needs. But in view of the scanty
evidence, this must remain a tentative hypothesis.
65. Pritchard, Report Loeb, In feudal Africa, pp.37, 43; SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1926, pp.34-35.
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The gen der economy of labour migration
Finally, the question, although often taken for granted, must be asked: why was labour migration
an exclusively male preserve? Much of the answer has already been implied. Men monopolised
the long-distance seasonal migrations to the cattle posts, an annual experience for many from
boyhood onwards. The cooperation and shared solidarity of men in groups drawn from a number
of homesteads was reproduced in a more intense form in the long-distance raiding parties of the
30-40 years before colonisation in 1915.
Correspondingly, the increasing loss of cattle through taxation, judicial raids and inter-tribal
warfare hit at the foundation of male economic power and social prestige. On the other hand,
although a minori were severely victimised by raiding, women's labour and its products were less
general ly affected by the increased surplus appropriation, the absolute decline in cattle
production, and the heavier demand for tribute labour. The first phase of labour migration can be
interpreted in part as a period of uneasy cooperation between younger men and the rulers of the
tributary states, transferring the ideological prestige, the tradition of male solidarity, and the
organisational experience of the raiding part and the cattle trek to the long-distance work-gang.
By the time South Africans took over, the pattern was entrenched. For women, land for fields
became more accessible. For men, although surplus appropriation and tribute labour were
reduced, they were not ended. Labour contracts remained a principal means whereby younger
men paid tribute and accumulated the savings in cattle needed to marry and establish a
homestead. Women, who had in any case been excluded from the start from the colonial regimes'
recruiting mechanisms, continued to reach the towns in small numbers after 1915 as before,
despite the extreme hardships and iIegalites of travel. But they were totally barred from the large-
scale employment on the mines, public works, and railways, to which at that time contract workers
were exclusively directed.
The intrusion of the wage relation strengthened the articulation of productive and reproductive
roles. Male labour power was now removed from the agrarian production cyele for long,
continuous periods. Despite attempts by both peasants and the tributary states to render the
articulation non-antagonistic, the reduction in available labour time, as opposed to means of
subsistence, decreased both the forms of output for which men were alone responsible (cattie,
hunting) and also heavy labour inputs at points of peak seasonal demand, as well as small kinds
of craft and repair work. Since wages were calculated at little above the worker's immediate
subsistence, this loss could only be compensated, and even then only partially, by an
intensification of women's labour and an extension of their role in the labour process.
Worker consciousness and labour action
Up to this point I have considered tendencies towards class-formation within the Ovambo social
formation, forms of surplus appropriation, their impact on the direct producers and the technical
division of labour and the space for tactical manoeuvre remaining to peasants to cope with the
resulting pressures. The structural constraints left mig rant workers little scope - though probably
rather more in the 1920s - for exploiting tactically the duality of their e1ass position, although the
evidence suggests that the kings reinforced for their own ends attempts by peasants to integrate
wage-Iabour with the agricultural production cycle. It remains to be seen to what extent labour
migrants exploited that scope as wage-Iabourers, and the forms of consciousness and collective
action they developed in struggle within capitalist relations of production.
A number of general factors operated to condition the manner in which labour migrants came to
experience wage-Iabour. The length and diffculty of the migration routes was not the least of
these. The tracks to Okaukuejo and Namutoni were almost waterless during the dry winter
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months, as were long stretches of the roads in central Namibia, where water-holes had become
private propert. Food for the trip had to be carried. In the early years mortality was highl661.
Although railway travel and offcial measures in 1911 improved conditions in the Police Zone
somewhat, contemporary accounts make it plain that the journey was an ordeal not lightly to be
undertaken. The Lüderitbucht Chamber of Mines complained bot h before and after 1915 at the
number of migrant workers who had to be hospitalised on arrival. In the late 1940s workers were
stil cooped up for days en route in cattle trucks without food or waterl671.
Whether or not parties set out under the discipline of the kings' delegates, such conditions were
conducive to group solidarity, notably for protection against robbers on the return leg1681. Since
most workers came on fixed-period contracts with large employers, the travel-part is likely to
have held together through the employment period and the return journeyl691. In an environment
both unfamiliar and hostile, the traditions of male group solidarity reinforced the cohesion of the
traveIlng and working part.
Conditions at the rough construction and mining camps were generally, though not uniform ly,
harshl70I. The sharp temperature variations in land and particularly the cold and damp climate of
the coastal desert rendered workers from sub-tropical Ovamboland vulnerable to disease.
Accommodation was often primitive, sometimes non-existent; company rations were commonly
insuffcient for basic survival in good health and alternative shop supplies were rare ly available.
On the isolated diamond fields and railway construction sites, labour supervision, necessarily self-
reliant, was frequently violent. Workers too had little protection from swindlingl711.
In such circumstances, avoidance of the worst locations and the most notorious employers, as
well as tactics for self-defence on the work-sites, were at times a matter of life and death. The
work itelfwas heavy and dangerous in construction and underground mining, lighter but tedious
in diamond recovery. In all cases large bodies of workers were concentrated in the production
process and residence, an environment which facilitated communication and collective forms of
action. Wages on the diamond fields were relatively high by the standards of a forced labour
economy, but the fact that thousands of contract workers from the Cape earned two-and-a-half
times as much on the railways must have been well-knownI721. Taken overall, the contrasts
between the work environments and routines of agrarian production and wage-Iabour could hardly
havebeen more extreme. On the other hand, workers could draw on a number of organisational
and ideological resources to strengthen their tenuous bargaining position.
At the most general levellabour consciousness in a workforce finds expression in patterns of
communication and common response. In Namibia, the constant circulation of labour migrants
between isolated cent res of peasant and capitalist production fostered communication networks
which could be put to effective tactical use. A particularly e1ear instance of such a network in
operation occurred in 1924-25 on the diamond fieldsl731. Conditions on the fields at this time were
so bad that in 1924 there were no fewer than 296 cases of scurv, an incidence of 50 per 1,000.
As many as 52 actually died; and overall mortalit was an astronomical 437, or 74 per 1,000. Very
66. Schoch, diary 17/6/20; Sta Is, "Die aanraking", pp.324-5.
67. Cf eg Sec. State FA - Consul 5/6/12 (enclosure); LCoM, Annual Report 1910/11; LCoM - 1M 16/10/16, and IM's
comments (1M 10/16); V. Ndadi, Breaking contract, (Oakland, Cal., LSM Press, 1974), pp.20-1.
68. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.324; A. Graham, The response or Arrican societies in Namibia to white administration,
1915-39, (MA, London, SOAS, 1971), p.11.
69. Cf Nitsche, Ovamboland, p.135.
70. For details, Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.334-343; NA 2410/1227 (c1910-12); after 1915, 1M reports. After new
regulations came into force in March 1911 and January 1912, conditions of employment and travel improved some-
what, but were still bleak (see MM 2070/17, Herbst, memo 17/5/17).
71. NA 4994/1227, Consul, memo 30/6/10; MM 2070/17, NA Offcer, Lüderilz - SWA Sec. 8/5/17. On the forced labour
regime generally, Bley, SWA, part 3.
72. A.F. Calvert, SWA during the German occupation, 1884-1914, (London, TW. Laurie, 1915), p.23.
73. Statistics from 1M reports and SWA Administrator, Annual Reports.
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few of these deaths can have resulted from accidents at work. At the same time, the average
monthly Ovambo workforce dropped from 3,565 in May 1924 to a low of 1,513 exactly a year
later. New arrivals totalled a mere 214 in the last half of 1924, compared with 1,901 for the same
period in 1923. Furthermore, assuming the one-year contracts which were then
standardl741, departures in July 1924 exceeded arrivals in July 1923 by the abnormally large figure
of 224.
Since the respective harvests can have played little part - good in 1922/23 and below normal in
1923/24 - the figures suggest a concerted boycott as migrants returning in the first part of the year
warned their comrades of this death-trap. Indeed in the following year, while overall recruitment
from northern Namibia remained the same, the number actually on the mines fell by 22 per cent
over the 1924 average, and on the diamond fields themselves by 38 per cent. Conditions were
so extreme that a group of 163 Xhosa contract workers, who, the South-West African
Administrator complained, "had a mania for making complaints", made a suicidal bid to escape
to South Africa across the Namib desert, in which at least 14 died(75).
The evidence is too fragmentary to permit e10se analysis of types of worker action during these
early years. Nevertheless, migrants appear to have discriminated actively over terms of
employment in away which presumes a degree of consensus over tactics. Conditions on farms
were notorious and they were effectively boycotted from an early stagel761. Workers resisted
contracting for periods which would interfere wih the next season's agrarian production, and when
deceived insisted on terminating before completionl77l.
As early as 1909-10, they were suffciently alive to tactical openings to use the Tsumeb copper
mine as a temporary stag ing-post en route to the diamond fields. At a time when migration to the
south had reached full flood, the Tsumeb mine was so undermanned - "because a pronounced
emigration of Ovambos to the Lüderitzbucht diamond fields became disturbingly notic.eable"(78)
- that it had to import 250 expensive 'Cape Boys' to maintain production. At this time the fields
were offering better wages and hours, and the work was lighter and above groundl791. Tsumeb was
soon notorious amongst Cape workers as well, although a German offcial later reported a
considerable improvement in conditionsl80I. At the end of 1917 it is interesting to note that the
positons were reversed: wih wage-rates now equal, Tsumeb now had a full labour complement
at the same time that the fields were over 1,000 men ShOrt811.
In general, choice of employer could often be a matter of life and death. It is perhaps significant
that at the same time that the mortalit on the diamond fields rose to an incredible 149.6 per 1,000
(year to March 1911), both the total number of incoming migrants and the average fields
workforce changed little between 1910 and 1911, respectively years of good rainfall and dire
famine. Similarly, the year to March 1913, with the new labour regulations in force and a mortality
rate down to 41 , saw the fields workforce increase by 38 per cent over 1911/12 and by 6 per cent
of the total recruited over the same monthsl821.
74. Arrivals and departures correlate fairly c10sely at a lag of one year during 1923-25.
75. SWA Administrator, Annua! Report 1924, pp.22-3, which also describes CDM's desperate recruiting drive
throughout southern Africa for alternative labour supplies.
76. United Kingdom, Foreign Offce, South West Afr/ca (London, 1920. Handbook no. 112), p.43; SWA Administrator,
Annua! Report 1921, p.12.
77. Lüderilzbucht Chamber of Mines, Annua! Report 1910/11; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.330.
78. Nitsche, Ovambo!and, pp.135-6, translated. His figures for the black complement at Tsumeb, which established
large short-term variations, suggest that the tactic was established practice.
79. Calvert, SWA, p.23; Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.348, 343; NA 4994/1227, Consul, memo 30/6/10.
80. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.341; NA 4349/639, Consul- Gov. Gen. 9/10/11.
81. 1M, Annua! Report 1917. Other factors also probably influenced the workers' preference see below.
82. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.337.
Contract Labour System, 1900-1926 Page 38
At the point of production there is some evidence of considerable resistance to intolerable
conditons by workers acting indMdually or in small groups, mainly by desertion and by complaints
to offcialdom(831. The penalty for desertion, if not recapture, was frequently hardship or death on
the road, and for "false complaint", arbitrary imprisonment or flogging(841. Neither option was to be
lightlytaken. Nevertheless, a minorit ofworkers could, and did, take advantage of the willingness
of some employers and recruiters in conditions of chronic labour shortage to take on workers
illegally, by re-engaging or signing on outside state supervision(851.
IndMdual action - "beating the system" - and passive resistance in a variety of forms are likely to
have been the dominant modes of self-defense, particularly before 1912, in a work and social
environment which was dehumanising and disorientating. Little is known of the extent or forms of
collective action amongst Ovambo migrants before 1915. Ovambo workers were, however,
involved as early as December 1893 in a strike for higher wages by the ethnically mixed workforce
at SWACO's Gross Otavi mine, against a background of passive resistance which reveals, Gordon
considers, a sharp appreciation of labour tactics(861.
The reports of the government mining inspector between 1915 and 1925, on the other hand,
provide ample evidence of the militancy and flexibility of workers' tactics, particularly on the
diamond fields, where, as we saw earlier, conditions remained primitive and dangerous to life
before the mid-1920s, with epidemic disease endemic. Workers exploited the demoralisation of
the largely German field supervision after conquest, the reduced police cover, and the restrictions
on arbitrary and corporal punishmentl871, to protest specific grievances and more generally to
break up the discipline of capitalist production(881. Their principal tactics were the flash strike and
the go-slow891; and both were widely used in a protracted struggle against the deferred pay system
which the South Africans imposed in late 1915(901.
Even at this early stage workers were able to generate a grass-roots leadership and a tradition
of solidari on which it could rely for effective support91J. By 1917 workers were operating "a kind
of mutual benefi society" to indemnify those victimised in labour actionl92). It is probable, to judge
from official concern, that the politically conscious Cape workers who were employed in large
numbers on railway building and, in the early 1920s, on the fields, materially aided byexample
and contact the raising of Ovambo worker consciousness(931. The Administratorl94) could describe
Lüderitz as being in the early 1920s
83. Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.334-43 passim; cases are also scatlered through the 1M reports.
84. For the treatment of 'privileged' Cape workers who complained, see NA 2410/1227. For a detailed historical
analysis, W. Beinart, "'Jamani': Cape workers in German SWA, 1904-12", in W. Beinart & C. Bundy, Hidden
struggles in rural South Africa, (London, James Currey, 1987), pp.166-90.
85. Cf Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.327, 329.
86. Gordon, "A note", pp.8-11.
87. Many 1M reports, esp. MM 2070/17 Herbst, Memo., 17/5/17, p.2, 5, and Miltary Mag., report 2/2/17; 1M LO 8/17,
Annual Report 1917; 1M 9/24.
88. 1M 5/16, 1M LO 10/24.
89. On strikes, 1M 8/16; LCoM -1M 16/10/16 (1M 10/16); 1M LO 6/17, 8/17,12/24,2/25,9/25. On go-slows, MM
2070/17, MiL. Mag., report 2/2/17, NA Officer, Lüd. - SWA Sec. 8/5/17; 1M LO, Annual Report 1917,10/24,2/25;
1M 9/24, 2/25.
90. 1M reports and memos, 1916-17. The system had been abolished by October 1917 to 'humour' the workers (1M
10/17).
91. 1M 8/16; 1M LO 8/17, 12/24; 1M 8/16, 10/16; MiL. Mag., report 2/2/17; 1M LO 8/17. For a synopsis of her research
based on the Windhoek Archives, see E. Thompson, "Organised labor activities among Namibian workers, 1910-
1950", paper presented to the International Conference in Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Namibia,
Paris, 1980.
92. (M LO, Annual Report 1917.
93. Eg NA 4349/639, NA Dept., memo 8/15, enclosure: Minutes of Landesrat 14/5/12.
94. SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1924, pp.27-8. As a fishing port, Lüderilz had already atlracted Cape fishermen,
who were politically active. The results of exlensive research on the UNIA/ICU movement in the early 1970s is to
be found in G. Pi rio, The role of Garveyism in the making of the southern African working class and Namibian
nationalism, paper, Univ. of California, 1982, and A.B. Emmetl, The rise of African nationalism in Namibia (1915-
1966), (PhD, Johannesburg, Univ. of the Witwatersrand, 1987).
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the centre of the Native political movement in this country. Several Unions were
in existence there, the chief of which were the Universal Negro Improvement
Association and ... the International (sic) and Commercial Workers' Union.
Nor was militancy confined to the fields. At Tsumeb, a strike by black workers in 1920 followed
one by their white counterpart, who were unionised and militant until broken by the management
in 1925(951. A description in 1925 of Tsumebl961, where workers, mostly Ovambo, were taken on at
the mine rather than recruited through the contract labour administration, highlights the degree
of relative autonomy which workers had secured:
From the 1stto the 8th of every month the underground complement is depleted,
the naties absenting themselves from work; some stay in the compound or do
a round ofthe 30-odd stores in the vilage, others go away into the bush for a bit,
and others even, without word or sign return to their homes.
During the six months (September 1924 - February 1925), the last week's complement was an
ave rage of 36 per cent greater than the first week's in any one month; and the management
admitted that it had little option but to acquiesce. Most workers also preferred to build their own
houses rather than live in the compound, 50 as to bring their families with theml971. Even the few
Ovambos on farms were asserting their intere5ts by deserting after six to eight months(981.
Table 4. Monthl totals of workers recruited in Ovamboland
1926:
av. 250 344 603 541 316 290 454 382 395 144 173 141 4033
Ang. 70 97 170 152 90 81 140 60 109 44 72 49 1134
1927:
av. 408 554 1062 361 325 335 356 308 159 101 97 145 4211
Ang. 56 82 222 101 204 117 150 137 66 106 57 105 1403
1928:
both 319 604 648 690 621 432 469 300 179 209 184 246 4091
1929:
av. 383 301 390 588 475 218 240 230 117 106 65 158 3271
Ang. 106 54 121 232 321 224 218 216 115 79 117 82 1905
1930:
av. 242 428 355 154 491 287 307 107 19 9 16 92 2507
An . 125 150 153 97 182 247 316 191 33 29 42 84 1649
Note: The rows distinguish workers arriving from south ('Ovamboland) and north ('Angola') of the border with Angola.
Source: SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1926-30.
It will be apparent that the conventional image of mig rant workers as 'docile' and helpless labour
units is a poor parody of the reality; that isolation did not prevent them developing a labour
consciousness and tactics of struggle appropriate to their circumstances; and that this
consciousness did not grow in simple linear proportion to length of industrial experience. These
points do not, however, shed light on the general trend in the formation of e1ass consciousness
as peasants or workers in labour migrants. That a constant trickle of migrants continued to settle
permanently in Police Zone towns; that women as well as men fled to the south from the 1915
95. Schoch, diary 12/7/20; 1M 10/24,8/25.
96. 1M 3/25, cf also 10/24.
97. 1M LO, Annual Report 1917; SWA, Report of the Drought Investigation Commission, (Windhoek, 1924), para 299.
98. SWA Drought Investigation Commission, para 295, evidence of K. Altman (from central Namibia), 3.
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famine(ggi; and that a semi-permanent settled community formed at Tsumeb, which for long
remained largely outside the contract labour system, suggests a commitment to their proletarian
status by a minority. But it is unlikely to have been an attractive option, even in the towns, except
for those whose returns from subsistence production were becoming regularly sub-marginal.
In the early 1920s the impact of evangelical Christianity, reflected in the inculcation of the work
ethic, the costs of church maintenance and new cash essentials (such as clothes, compulsory
under the Finnish Mission), was stil slight, albeit increasing. In 1913-14, the Finnish Mission
(mainly Ondonga) had 2,873 members and the Rhenish Mission (Ukwanyama) 729. By 1930, the
former had increased its members to 23,126(1001. Some migrants were stil trying to buy cattle and
horses(1011; and migration statistics for 1927 suggest that although the minimum contract period
permited was now usually a year, migrants were nevertheless timing their departure to follow the
planting and harvest seasons. The evidence, although of course inconclusive, does suggest that
most migrants exploited what limited scope their e1ass duality allowed them to assert the primacy
oftheir peasant interests; but that within the capita list production process they rapidly developed
effective tactics of common or collective struggle and a tradition of solidarity.
The formation of the contract labour system
Whichever of their class interests was dominant, the ability of labour migrants to exploit their
opportunities as workers presented colonial capital with a considerable challenge. Both the
German and the South African colonial administrations were pre-occupied with the task of
subordinating worker bargaining power to the exigencies of large-scale capitalist production.
Above all, with labour chronically short and its quantity rather than terms more important in the
first instance, they were concerned to ensure its distribution proportionate to requirements by
preventing a bidding up of wages in which not all concerns could compete equally.
Comprehensive labour-repressive legislation enforced by a strong works supervision and police
force would partially have achieved the first objective. Neither colonial regime was slow to take
legal powers - indeed, almost the first major South African enactment applied its domestic mining
labour law to Namibia(1021. But as we have seen, German controls were not fully effective, and the
local offcials compensated with arbitrary violence; nor before the mid-1920s, was South African
legislation effective either. Crucial to the South African system, both to eliminate the mobility of
labour and to establish round-the-clock social control, was compulsory residence in a bachelor
compound. It is likely that full implementation could only have followed the completion of major
new blocks by CDM in 1925 and by Tsumeb in 1926(1031.
The key to effective control, however, lay in regulating the circulation of labour. Both regimes
legislated for a compulsory contract system with criminal penalties for evasion, and for offcial
supervision of re-hiring. These laws were reinforced by a thicket of labour-repressive
proclamations, particularly pass and vagrancy enactments, applied to the black Police Zone
population(1041. Butthe Germans never stamped out ilegal recruiting, and despite tight restrictions
on licensed recruiters, never entirely eliminated the workers' ability to choose between them.
99. NA 4994/1227, Res. Comm. - SWA Sec. 1/3/16, report, part IV pA.
100. Stais, "Die aanraking", p.285; G.K.H. Tötemeyer, Die rol van die Wambo-elites in die poliUeke ontwikkeling van
Owambo, (PhD, Univ. Stellenbosch, 1974), p.82.
101. WU Arch, AB851 , Rev. Tobias, letler 14/12/24.
102. Mines and Works Proc. 3-17, specifically modelled on the gold mines (SWA Administrator, Annua/ Report1922,
p.16).
103. 1M 1924-5, esp. 11/25; SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1926, p.91.
104. Bley, SWA, pp.170-3; Stais, "Die aanraking", p.323ff; Moorsom, Colonisation and proletarianisaUon: an exploratory
investigation of the formation of the working class in Namibia under German and South African colonial rule to
1945, (MA, Brighton, Univ. of Sussex, 1973), chapters 4 & 5.
Contract Labour System, 1900-1926 Page 41
The South African administration in Ovamboland, on taking responsibility for recruiting, channelled
supplies of Ovambo labour to the mines and railwaysl105J. But whether or not it tried to cut out
worker choice, it was not successful in the early yearsi1061. However, in order to dampen down the
often extreme ciashes between the cyeles of peasant and capitalist production, it soon imposed
a standard length of contract - one year for the mines - thereby robbing the labour migrant of the
opportunity to articulate wage-Iabour with subsistence production.
The prolonged labour crisis in the diamond industry between 1923 and 1925 prompted the
colonial administration to act decisively to remove the worker's ability to discriminate between
employers. After previous attempts had failed, conferences of the large employers in 1925
(government, railways and mines) established early in 1926 a semi-offcial recruiting monopoly
in the form of the Northern and the Southern Labour Organisations, precursors of the South West
African Natie Labour Organisation (SWANLA)i1071. Henceforth, the only option allowed to labour
migrants was whether or not to mig rate; once recruited, workers were graded for job categories
according to a rough scale of physical finess, and assigned arbitrarily to employers. A more
complete mechanism for the reduction of workers to atomised units of labour power could hardly
have been devised. It was to last unaltered until the great contract workers' strike in 1971-72 for
the abolition of the contract labour system.
105. SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1919, p.5, also p.24 and p.21.
106. Eg Herbst, memo, 17/5/17, p.5; and discussion of Tsumeb above.
107. 1M 5-6/23, 9/23, 3-6/24; SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1922, p.14; 1925, p.28; 1926, p.36.
3. Underdevelopment, Contract Labour and Worker Consciousness in
Namibia, 1915-72(1)
Richard Moorsom
Introduction
In mid-December 1971, thousands of contract workers at Walvis Bay and Windhoek struck
against the contract labour system in Namibia. During the following month, the workers' rebellion
escalated into a general strike involving some 20,000 migrant labourers, which in the second half
of January 1972 sparked a half-stalled peasant insurrection in the densely-populated northern
bantustan of Ovamboland. The general outline and causes of the strike have been ably analysed
elsewherel2J. As yet, however, little attention has been devoted to the structural determinants and
historical evolution of worker consciousness in Namibia. The fact that the recent disruption of
South Africa's periphery of 'buffer' states has sharply widened the strategic options available to
the liberation movement in Namibia gives added priority to such an analysis. The purpose of this
essay is therefore to discuss some of the background factors conditioning the consciousness of
the Ovambo contract workers and to make a few tentative observations on the general
significance of the strike for its participants.
The analysis of systems of recurrent labour migration, particularly in social formations in which
capitalist relations of production have intruded upon, but only partially destroyed a pre-existing
peasantry, stillacks an adequate set of working concepts, let alone a coherent theory. Recent
work on southern Africa has highlighted the cost-saving function of mig rant labour to large
employers of unskilled labour in such a social formation, and the impact of capitalist exchange
relations and governmental coercion on subsistence or peasant societies. But labour migration
itself has largely remained the province of economists and anthropologists of the liberal school,131
whose descriptive generalisations, while reflecting some of the major issues, have only limited
explanatory power for the analysis of worker strategy and social consciousnessl41. Labour migrants
have been represented as a category of the peasantry, alternativelyas a mass of impotent labour
units, or, schizophrenically, straddling the logical chasm of the 'dual economy' as 'men of two
worlds' .
While Ilack space for theoretical digression, a few general clarifications are necessary. Labour
migrants, members of a social stratum in transiton from small-scale agrarian production to wage-
labour, possess an objectively divided class interest. In the former, they control the product of their
labour until consumed or exchanged; in the latter, they seil their labour-power as commodity.
When not coerced, workers' strategy, although most fundamentally determined by the relative
returns to labour, is modified by a number offactors. While thefamily remains the basic economic
and social unit, its active members are systematically aggregated not only in space but also in the
1. This paper can be taken as no more than a preliminary interpretation. The concluding section on the 1971-72
general strike must be regarded as provisional, since much evidence is not accessible, for obvious reasons.
Although I have avoided apartheid terminology so far as possible, the organisation of data in offcial publications
sometimes necessilates the use of its categories. In the text, 'Police Zone' refers to the area in which the German
colonial administration exercised authority, and 'Northern Zone' to the area outside'it, comprising principally the four
northernmost bantustans.
2. R. Simons, 'The Namibian challenge", pa per Namibia International Conference, Brusseis, May, 1972; J. Kane-
Berman, Contract labour in SWA (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, RR 30/72).
3. Amongst others, notable exceptions are Arrighi's study of the proletarianisation of the Rhodesian peasantry in G.
Arrghi and J. Saul, Essays on the political economy of Africa (Monthly Review Press, 1973); D. Clarke, Contract
workers and underdeve/opment in Rhodesia (Mambo Press, 1974); and C. van Onselen, Chibaro (Pluto Press,
1976).
4. For instance, a 1969 thesis on Ovambo mig rant labour, explicitly modelled on Schapera, could conclude that 'on
a large level, there have been few harmful effects' (p. 144); that while 'hardships' do exist, 'they are not considered
to be of paramount importance by the Ovambo' (p. 145); and that such changes as have occurred in 'tribal society
'have had stabilsing effect onaIlleveis of Ovambo cultural and sociallife' (p. 148) (P.D. Banghart, Migrant labour
in SWA and its effects on Ovambo triballife (MA, Univ. Stellenbosch, 1969).
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labour process and in working and living conditions. The respective conditions of material life
wihin a capitalist and peasant society and the frequency of migration itself wil therefore influence
the relationship between objective class position and ideological commitment. A further factor in
this respect is the rate and direction of transformation of the respective modes of production,
partcularly wihin the peasantry. Clearly visible deterioration in rural production within a migrants
working lifetime is likely to strain that acquiescence in the permanency of the system as a whole
on which ideological acceptance of its institutions depends.
Nevertheless the most fundamental underlying determinant of social consciousness rests in the
mode of acquiring means of subsistence. Within the peasant subsistence economy, necessary
cash income (beyond impositons such as taxation) is a function both of the ave rage surplus/deficit
in production for subsistence and of implements for production and household use available only
from capitalist producers. In general, the critical watershed in the balance of e1ass commitment
for labour migrants is likely to be the point at which with a substantial proportion of peasant
families indispensably dependent on income from wage-Iabour, such income becomes necessary
not merely for the migrants own subsistence and for household and production implements but
also to supplement the basic food requirements of his family as well.
Resource imperialism and raciallabour control
Any consideration ofthe situation of migrant workers in Namibia needs to be set in the context of
the politcal economy of the partcular kind of colonialism which 50 years of South African rule has
erected in that country. Namibia is a classic example of 'resource imperialism'. Investment means
of production has come overwhelmingly from foreign sources, and has remained under foreign
control. It has also been dominated by either transnational corporations or capitalists from the
colonial metropolis.
The Ovambo-Nkhumbi population cluster forms an island of dense settlement near the north-west
fringe of the vast, sparsely populated Kalahari basin. In the second half of the nineteenth century
it became the interface of competition between interior trading networks linked to industrial
capitalist metropoles. Before the turn of the century, however, capital formation in both Namibia
and South West Angola was limited to trading posts, scattered farming settlements, and land and
mineral speculation.
Mining has been the leading sector during most phases of the expansion of the productive forces.
In 1906 the Tsumeb copper mine, still by far the largest base mineral producer in Namibia, began
operations; and two years later the discovery of diamonds in southern Namibia triggered an
immediate rush. Between 1914 and 1946 production was periodically disrupted by wars and by
wild fluctuations in world demand, but since the Second World War there has been steady
expansion. These two min es still account for the greater part of mineral output today, in terms of
both value and labour power exploited. Simultaneously, and particularly in the past 15 years, a
wide range of small and medium-sized mines have been opened up. The latest project, now
under development, is the large-scale open-cast uranium mine at Rössing. Nearly all are owned
by South African parastatals. The entire product is exported to the industrial centres of world
capitalism, with no local manufacturing.
Settler farming, the second major capitalist sector in Namibia, was promoted by the German
colonial regime with only limited success; but under South African settlement programmes it
developed rapidly. In the centre and north cattle ranching for export was dominant; and in the arid
south the rearing of karakul sheep for lambs' pelts, much in dem and on the lucrative Western
fashion market, was developed extensively from the mid-1930s. Today, agriculture is dominated
entirely by commercial settler farming, mostly by individual proprietors or partnerships, many of
whom are absentee.
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The third sector, fishing, only attracted ca pita I after the Second World War, but has since
expanded into a major processing and canning export industry, exploiting one of the world's
richest fishing grounds. The pelagic fishery, the largest locally based sub-sector, is controlled by
a handful of Afrikaner-owned companies who can or process the entire catch in modern factories,
largely at Walvis Bay, for export to South Africa or Europe.
In each sector the structure of ownership is distinctive: mining has been dominated from the first
by international corporations based mainly in South Africa and North America; fishing by a group
of companies strongly linked to 'Afrikaner' capital; and stock-raising, notwithstanding the existence
of a few ranching companies, by setter and absentee farmers.
It is clear that each major producing sector of capital in Namibia is interested in the local
population solelyas producers and not as consumers, and even then, not as producers of goods
but as sellers or reproducers of labour-power. This simplicity of interest allows a straightforward
concentration on maximising profits and output, and an uncomplicated relationship with the
colonial state. In return for the investment which finances its economic exploitation and military
priorities, the colonial regime guarantees both a rate of profi competitive with other potential
zones of exploitation and the conditions for stable investment planning.
One ofthe means by which it achieves this end is a generous servicing function: low taxation rates,
profit repatriation, permissive industriallegislation, and adequate infrastructure. The other is a
system of labour repression which in the latest form has come to be known as 'apartheid'. This
system performs both an economic and a political function. In terms of the former, it is a
consciously devised mechanism for structuring the sources and quantities of labour supply, as
well as minimising it cost to employers. The criterion for such discrimination is primarily, though
not exelusively, race identi. Politically, the system denies representation or status to most of the
working e1ass and seeks to destroy political or trade union organisations with any degree of
popular support.
Capital in Namibia, lacking a manufacturing sector, has been able to organise its labour process
wihout diffculty to conform to the system. Artsans, technicians, managers, and the higher grades
of administrative and supervisory staff can be recruited in South Africa and drawn from the
industrial metropoles by a premium in salaries and fringe benefis. The job category boundary
coincides invariably wih the racial crierion which restricts political rights to whites. Below this line,
apartheid provides for Iimited flexibilit by allowing intermediate groups, mostly 'coloureds' (person
of mixed race), into low-Ievel supervisory, clerical, semi-skilled or, in a few instances, artisan
categories on a free labour market basis. So rigidly hierarchical a labour process depends,
however, on drawing nearly all it productive labour-power from a mass pool of unskiled workers,
all ofwhom, under apartheid, are blacks - a few coloured, the remainder African.
Mobility between the racially-defined job strata is virtually non-existent, even where it is not
forbidden in law; and is meaningless within that stratum for black unskiled labourers. But for
blacks, apartheid is more than an all-embracing job colour-bar: it is a totalitarian system of
controls upon every aspect of their lives. It hinges upon the denial to blacks of any rights outside
barren, remote reserves, a denial policed by pass and contract laws which put absolute control
over job allocation, residence and mobility in the hands of colonial offcials.
There have been, however, significant historical variations in the system. German colonisation
expropriated and proletarianised most of the sparse indigenous population of the 'Police Zone',
but leftthe densely-settled peasantry of Ovamboland untouched. The German policy of genocide
during it suppression of the black rebellions of the 1904-07, which decimated 60 per cent of an
al ready sparse population, immediately confronted large employers with a chronic locallabour
shortage. This shortage, despite the German forced labour regime and the deliberate inadequacy
ofthe 'natie reserves' permitted by the South Africans, remained endemic to the colonial export
economy until the 1970s.
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From the very outset, and even under a forced labour regime, the potentially available unskiled
labour supply wihin the Police Zone fell short of the aggregate demand of capitalists who erected
means of production there. Ovamboland, subordinated to colonial administration only in 1915 by
invading Portuguese and South African forces, was the obvious fall-back. It thus became a
principal function of the colonial administration to e10se the labour shortall with migrant labour
from the Northern Zone and Angola, and to regulate its distribution between the sectors and
employers.
The South African administration attempted in it early years (c. 1915-25) to segment the sources
of labour supply into four mutually exclusive categories. In the first, workers on setter farms were
immobilised by pass and vagrancy laws. In the second, small, overcrowded reserves were created
to servce neighbouring farms and towns withrlabour migrants. In the third, the permanent urban
population was restricted to local employers' labour needs and barred from accumulating
propert.
Finally, migrant labour from the north - principally Ovamboland - was reserved for large
employers, at first only the government and the largest mines. But as the pace of capital
accumulation accelerated, so the functional segmentation broke down. By the late 1940s,
northern labour migrants were being directed to almost every sector of employment: mining,
farming, fish canning, government and municipal utilities, commerce, even domestic service. By
the mid-1960s, they formed 45-50 per cent of the total black labour force, some 40 per cent of
them from Angola, principally Angolan Ovamboland - a classical reserve army of labour power
for capitalist production in the territory as a whole.
The three sectors of colonial capital have not, however, been able to compete on equal terms;
nor is the character of their labour demand identica¡ii. The large and medium mines, operating
integrated and capital-intensive units of production, require a mass of predominantly unskilled
labour. Thus while their ability to lower the terms of labour by devolving onto the peasantry the
cost of its reproduction and of its subsistence during slumps is no slight advantage, their central
interest Iies in securing an adequate and regular supply of labour on a scale which enables them
to economise on recruitment overheads. The state and public utilities share much of this interest.
Fish canning and packing, similarly large-scale, mechanical and dependent on unskilled labour
has, however, a sizeable seasonal f1uctuation, and the ability to discard the bulk of its workforce
for the off-season without direct or indirect costs of maintenance is e1early of major importance.
Major construction projects, while target rather than season-oriented, have similar cost
considerations. To farmers, on the other hand, the rate of wages, despite the proportionately
greater cost of recruitment, has arguably been as decisive as supply shortalls, particularly before
the Second World War; complaints of labour shortage to some extent express a refusal to pay the
rate demanded by local workers. Yet even here, capitalist farming since the Second World War -
droughts excepted - has rarely been marginaL. In general, the consistently high rates of profi over
the last 30 years demonstrate that the lower cost of mig rant labour has seldom been a necessary
condition of profitability for capitalist producers.
5. Cf Clarke's analysis of post-1945 Rhödesia (Contract workers, ch.2).
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Ecology, subsistence farming and underdeve/opment in Ovambo/and
Peasant production in Ovamboland depends on a precarious combination of ecological
conditonsl6J. Over much of the Kalahari sandveid, the lack of dry-season surface water restricts
pastoralism and cultivation to isolated waterholes and the few periodical rivers. However,
Ovamboland, formerly the delta of the Kunene, forms a dead-Ievel plain from which the
accumulated summer rainfall drains only slowly. It is conserved by an impervious sub-soillayer
at a shallow depth, which also separates it from the generally brackish ground water; and in good
years is supplemented by the run-off (efundja) of seasonal rivers both from the plains to the north
and the higher rainfall highlands beyond. This water-action has replaced the north-west-trending
dune sequence with an intricate and generally converging network of broad, shallow water
courses (oshana), usually clay-bottomed, interspersed with low sandy ris es not usually flooded.
Within the oshana zone, suffcient surface and ground water can normally be stored in wells to
last the rainless winter and thereby make possible both settled field-agriculture and a semi-
nomadic cattle pastoralism, which also exploits the surrounding uninhabited grasslands,
particularly to the northeast.
Both forms of subsistence are nevertheless marginaL. Cattle diseases, especially lung-sickness,
are endemic, as apasture deficiency in phosphorus adds to their number. Prolonged drought, as
elsewhere in Africa, can decimate local stock, as much by reduction of pasturage as by lack of
available water. The summer rainfall, even in normal years, is barely adequate for the drought
resistant millet which provides the staple food. Its unreliability is the fundamental insecurity in
peasant production, for the local drought is usually compounded by the failure of the efundja. At
Ondangwa, using continuous rainfall records for the 51-year period (1922-72)171, in as many as
23 years precipitation was less than 85 per cent of the average, and in 11 of these less than 60
per cent. Furthermore, since precipitation is usually showery, it is often distributed unevenly both
regionally and locally. Figures for three adjacent stations illustrate this point clearly (see table 1).
Table 1. Local variations in avera e annual rainfall, 1940-72
.................------------_....
................-.----.
....MøM..dmØr~MØ$.l
...GômtiìrWm~ti.........
8.5%
12.6%
Note a: Mean differences between the station's annual totals as a percentage of the combined annual mean.
6. For a more detailed exposition of the following, see R.J.B. Moorsom, "The formation of the contract labour system
in Namibia, 1901926", in A. Zegeye and S. Ishemo, Forced labour and migration: patterns of movement within
Africa (London, Hans Zell, 1989); W.G. Clarence-Smith and R.J.B. Moorsom, "Underdevelopment and class
formation in OVamboland, 1845-1915", Journal of African History, 16,3 (1975), pp. 365-8; W.G. Clarence-Smith,
Drought in southern Angola and northern Namibia (SOAS/ICS African History Seminar, 1974); R.J. B. Moorsom,
"Underdevelopment and class-formation: the origins of migrant labour in Namibia, 1850-1915", in T. Adler (ed.),
Perspectives on South Africa: a co/lection of working papers (Johannesburg, African Studies Institute,
Witwatersrand University, 1977).
7. Of the years missing, 1926-27 were assessed from contemporary descriptions, and 1933 and 1936 were averaged
from the nearby station Olukonda. These and subsequent statistics are based on my own calculations from a wide
range of German and South African climatic data, in parlicular W.G. Clarence-Smith, Notes on drought, P. Heidke,
"Die Niederschlagsverhältnisse von Deutsch-Südwestafrika", Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten,
32(1919); references in the records of Sl. Marys Anglican Mission, Odibo, 1924-66, NVU Arch, AB851 and AB206)
and official correspondence of the Deparlment of Native Affairs 1908-16 (NA 4994/1227); SWA Administrator,
Annual Reports of the Administrator of South West Africa to the League of Nations, 1917-39, 1946.
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Taking an annual total of 450 mm as the standard minimum adequate for a normal harvest over
the f100dplain,i8J wih under 85 per cent defined as drought and over 150 per cent as floods likely
to cause some crop damage, the period 1968-1972 saw 50 years of partial or complete drought,
of which probably 15 were general and serious, a further 13 of abnormal floods, and at least two
of devastating pestilence (rinderpest 1897, locusts 1907). Even so, the area averages mask
significant regional variations. The marked decrease in average rainfall from north-east to south-
west leaves the south-west fringe ofthe oshana network at a precarious 400 mm per annum, with
a noticeably higher incidence of drought. Furthermore, the distribution of surface water is not
uniform. The main efundja appears to flood only Ukwanyama, eastern Ondonga and western
Ukwambi, the south-western oshana draining a progressively shrinking hinterland. While the
impact of drought in the east may be accentuated by the failure of the efundja, the south-west
depends largelyon its lower and more unreliable local rainfall.
Adapting to their complex but marginal ecological environment, Ovambo subsistence farmers had
developed before the mid-nineteenth century a diverse and highly integrated mode of
subsistencel9J. Settled on the sandy interfluves in dispersed family homesteads, each adjacent to
it own fields, the family allocated its labour-time more or less equally, in accordance with a rigid
sexual division of labour, between the two principal means of subsistence. These were stock-
raising, mainly cattle (which had to be trekked each year while water was accessible to ease
pressure on local pasturage), with some small stock and poultry; and field cultivation with pearl
millet as staple, sorghum mainly for beer, and a variety of vegetables and fruit, often vital in
serious drought. But other resources were fully exploited as well, notably fish, large numbers of
which are swept down in the efundja; game, large and small; and the abundant wild vegetables
and fruit. In additon, given an iron-age technology, the manufacture of household and production
implements (notably basketry, pottery and woodwork), regular repair-work and the frequent
rotation of the homestead site absorbed a sizeable proportion of family, especially male, labour-
time. Taking a general view, subsistence resources were fully exploited, the labour-time of the
subsistence farming family - the primary unit of production - fully employed, and the diverse
production tasks highly coordinated within it.
i
!
In contrast to the reserves in South Africa, that part of Ovamboland which fell within Namibia was
incorporated intact by the South African invaders in 1915; in fact, since the oshana zone forms
only one-third ofthe allotted reserve, ecological rather than political restrictions have defined the
area potentially available for subsistence production. Although South Africa maintained no more
than a skeleton administration in Ovamboland for 40 years, the impact of the new politicalorder
on the subsistence productive base was considerable. Despite the fact that pre-colonial
settlement (concentrated entirelywihin clusters of continuous land occupation) had been pushed
to the margins of the oshana zone, in 1920 about 60 per cent of the internal area was still virgin
landl10J.
Thenceforth, as large game was hunted to extinction and with inter-tribal raiding suppressed, the
farmer's traditonal right to cultivate new land became both more attractive and less risk-Iaden as
a means of escaping land pressure and restrictive tribal controls in the former centres. It is not
clear at what point this process of internal colonisation reached its limits; but this had probably
8. Bamard assesed the lands crop potential as follows: above 600 mm annually - normal dry land agriculture; 500-
60 mm marginal; 400-500 mm sub marginal; less than 400 mm - failure (W.S. Barnard, Die streekpatrone van
Suidwes-Afrika (PhD, Stellenbosch, 1964), p. 166 and fig. 36). My norm (450 mm) and definition of drought (below
85 per cent, or 382.5 mm) are therefore on the conservative side; but they do generally coincide with what harvest
descriptions are available.
9. Pre-colonial subsistence and underdevelopment has been fully discussed in Clarence-Smith and Moorsom,
"Underdevelopment" and Moorsom, Co/onisation.
10. Calculated from a map made by H.E. Schoch in 1920 (WU Arch, A839); also Barnard, Die streekpatrone, p. 235.
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occurred well before the late 1960s, when an offcial map confirmed its completionl11J. Its impact
is to be measured not simply in the ratio of population to cultivatable land, but also in the shifting
balance of subsistence resources. Game was rapidly reduced to small animals and birds; and
forest reserves (wood for bu ilding materials, wild vegetables, overspil pasture) both progressively
more depleted and less accessible to the densely populated centres.
Border
Central
Total
50.1
57.1
107.9
100.2
97.6
197.8
166.2
176.3
342.5
3.93
3.02
3.42
2.70
3.16
2.93
3.29
3.09
3.17
Border: Ukwanyama, Ombalantu, Nkolonkathi.
Central: Ondonga, Ukwambi, Ongandjera, Ukwaluthi.
Sources: SWA Administrator, Annual Report 1933, 1938; census reports 1951,1960,1970.
The general tendency was aggravated by the harsher regime of Portuguese colonial rule north
of the border, which split pre-colonial Ovamboland, and in particular Ukwanyama, into two.
Although the movement of people has never been effectively controlled, at an early stage the
Portuguese banned Namibian cattle from their former rich seasonal pastures between
Ukwanyama and the Okavango River. Furthermore, for at least 40 years after the devastating
defeat of the Kwanyama by the Portuguese in 1915, groups of refugees from Portuguese taxation
and forced labour, most but not all Ovambo, trickled steadily into a narrow belt along the border.
In both cases Ukwanyama bore the main brunt; offcial census statistics, although approximate,
suggest agenerally higher and more erratic rate of population growth along the border (see table
2).
In recent years state investment in water infrastructure has to an uncertain extent modified the
structural transformation of the subsistence mode. A 30 year period of irregular and small-scale
dam-building, mostly in east Ukwanyama, gave way in the mid-1950s to comprehensive regional
water planning. This centred on the construction of large numbers of small storage dams and of
two transverse canals through Western Ovamboland, drawing additional supplies from the
Kunene. The scheme was completed by the late 1960s.
The impact of this impressive-Iooking scheme on present production should, however, be
assessed wih caution. On the one hand, state-supervised 'scientific' farming, let alone 'betterment
schemes', appears not to have been extended beyond a few experimental projects, especially
since irrigation is largely impracticable and in most years unnecessary. On the other, water
availabilit wihin the settled area is on the whole irrelevant to land shortages or the conservation
of pasture or crops in drought(121. However, although not suffciently advanced to have more than
a limited impact on the last major drought sequence (1957-62), in guaranteeing a reserve water
supply during prolonged drought the scheme wil potentially reduce climatic insecurity for both
peasants and their stock. This, together with limited reserved pastures in drought and increased
expenditure on veterinary servces, is likely to have improved stock mortality rates somewhat over
11. Department of Foreign Affirs (SA), Owambo (Pretoria, 1971), A rough measure of this map gives a settled area
of 1.32 m ha, which compares with the 1.29 m ha estimated for the oshana zone by itself by Barnard (Die
streekpatrone, pp. 235-236).
12. Little attempt has yet been made, despite official claims, to open up adjacent waterless areas.
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the last 15 years. Probably more important in this respect, and of longer standing (the first
instance I have found is 1908), has been supply of government relief grain and, particularly after
the Second World War, access to the capitalist food market. It need hardly be pointed out that this
and the declining capacity of peasant production to generate substantial grain reserves has
placed a premium on securing an adequate cash income. It is suggested that the priority given
by a minorit of Ovambo contract workers to accumulating substantial savings accounts had this
object at least partially in view131.
Despite the lack of reliable statistics, the growing pressure on internal resources is readily
apparent. The ratio of available land to population, as the following table demonstrates, is now
generally below its pre-coloniallevels, and land shortages are greatest in the more numerously
populated eastern sector .(see table 3). Already in the early 1930s land shortage in central
Ukwanyama, where the pressure was most intense, was accelerating settlement east of the
oshana zone. By the 1950s serious overcrowding was unmistakable, and by 1968 peasants
around Oshikango averaged as little as 6.3 ha per household (see table 4)(141.
15.3
10.0
37.2 2.35 174,000 5.8 11.6
9.9 3.25 89,600 11.2 25.4
6.2 3.20 50,500 10.1 25.0
6.8 3.03 28,000 5.1 22.7
6.8 2.23 22,000 4.0 12.7
2.2 3.48 25,400 14.5 38.2
100.0 100.0 2.93 547,000 6.75 1,320,000 16.3 6.67 3.85
94.1 1,180,000 14.6 6.29 3.68
1,290,000 15.90 1,290,000 16.0 3.77
Notes: a) Including absentees in the Police Zone. b) Estimated by direct measurement from maps. c) Using the 1970
setlled area for all years. d) Assuming 7.3 persons per homestead, the 1951 average for Ukwanyama including
migrants (Bruwer, The Kwanyama, p.51); e) ie excluding district 8.
Sources: SWAAdministralor, Annual Reporls 1920s; census reports 1951 & 1970; Schoch, map of Ovamboland 1920; Dept.
of Foreign Affairs, Owambo, p.10 (map); Barnard, Die streekpatrone, p.235-6.
Note: a) ie within the oshana zone.
Source: Bruwer, Die Kwanyama, pp.5, 12, 35.
13. M.J. Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid en administrasie in die Mandaatsgebied van Suidwes-Afrika (PhD, Univ.
Stellenbosch, 1961), p. 392; Banghart, Migrantlabour, pp. 94-96.
14. On this, see SWA Administrator, Annual Repor;, and the quarterly magazine of St. Mary's Anglican Mission, Odibo
(complete set in WU Arch, AB 851), hereafterciled as QM; J.P. Bruwer, The Kwanyama of South West Arrica (TS,
Stellenbosch University, 1962), p. 74; Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid, p. 25; Banghart, Migrantlabour, p. 72.
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Land/population ratios bythemselves may be misleading, however, since land was not uniformly
interchangeable between different forms of production. In the Oshikango area of central
Ukwanyama, for instance, oshana beds, unusable for crops and for part of the year to stock,
covered as much as 40 per cent of the surface!15J. Further east, in the margins of the waterless
zone, oshanas took in 20 per cent and unoccupied land - principally areas more than half a mile
distant from oshana beds - another 15 per cent. On the remaining 55-65 per cent, now at a
premium, field cultiation has substantially displaced indispensable natural subsistence resources.
Indeed, the 100,000 ha area of cultiation estimated for Ukwanyama in the late 1950s, 70-80 per
cent of it under millet, would have embraced 60-70 per cent of potentially available landi161.
Figures for the whole Ovamboland for 1965 and 1967 suggest proportions for such land of 35-45
per cent in 1965 and 45-55 per cent in 1967, notwithstanding partial drought in each casel171.
Despite the extension of the area cultivated, however, the increasing density of settlement has
entailed a reduction in the average field area and harvest per family. By the 1950s, according to
Bruwer, in Ukwanyama 'even in good years, produce barely meets the demand of the growing
population'. If a 'good year', such as 1957, yielded a regional ave rage of about 13 to 14 bags of
milet per family, not only would major drought sequences such as 1957-62 bring disaster for
much ofthe peasantry, but even minor droughts such as 1965 and 1967 would suffce to reduce
yields well below subsistence needs (see table 5).
Table 5. Production of milet, 1957-67
NZ (000 bags)" 450 170 94 380 150 62 160
Ovamboland (000 bags) 426 277 405
Rainfaiib N/pD pD D/pD+ pD+ D+,L 0+ pD pD pD
Bags/homestead 13.8 5.4 2.9 11.6 4.4 1.7 4.0 7.0 9.5
Notes: a) Northem Zone, c 95 per cent produced in OVamboland. b) N - normal, 0- drought, 0+ - severe drought, L - rains
late, p - over part of area. c) Average 7.3 persons per homestead including labour migrants. d) Dept. of Foreign
Affairs, SWA Survey 1967, table 7. e) Magura, Die Entwicklung, p.171.
Sources: Barnard, Die streekpatrone, pp.304-5, 392; as above.
Significantly, and perhaps contrary to expectations, the average ownership of stock, increasingly
cattle, appears to have maintained its pre-Second World War level right up to the early 1970s. If
offcial estimates of carryng capacity are anywhere near accurate, however, this has been at the
expense of the gross overcrowding of the diminishing pasture availablel18J. Improved and more
reliable water supplies may have been primarily responsible for this. Even so, and despite the
increased consumption of meat noticed in the late 1960s, animal products cannot compensate
for the declining proportionate production of the staple cereal1191.
15. The following data are measured from Bruwer, The Kwanyama, map of Oshikango area.
16. OUver, /nboorlingbeleid, p.351, citing official Agricultural Annual Reports for 1957 and 1958, both years of normal
rainfall in Ukwanyama.
17. W. Magura, Die Entwicklung der Landwirlschaft in den Bantugebieten von Süd und Südwestafrika (Munich, i FO-
Institut für Wirtschaflsforschung, 1970), p. 71, presumably drawn from offcial sources.
18. P. Fraenkel, The Namibians of South West-Africa (Minority Rights Group, 1974), p. 52; cf Barnard, Die
streekpatrone, fig. 38.
19. Banghart, Migrant labour, pp. 96-97; cf Bruwer, The Kwanyama, pp. 7-8.
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Entrenching the labour reserve economy
There can thus be litle doubt that at least for the last 20 years food shortages have regularly been
a major factor impellng labour migration. This general deficiency has, however, been
compounded, and for a much longe r historical period, by specific requirements, both 'necessary'
and 'discretionary', which could increasingly only be supplied from capitalist production. Ovambo
subsistence farming entered colonial rule with few technological dependencies on capitalist
markets. This was largely due to the character of pre-colonial exchange relations, which had been
geared to the luxury consumption needs of the tribal aristocracy and to the supply of arms, whose
only productive use other than external raiding - game hunting - had anyway become an
aristocratic monopoly. The indigenous smith ing industry was an early casualty of colonial rule, cut
off from its supplies of both copper and iron ore, and undercut after 1925 by industrial imports at
local stores. The universal adoption within a couple of generations of European clothing, a
transiton part enforced, part induced by successful missionary evangelism, has become a second
major component of the peasants cash needs. The resilience of homecrafts, notably basketry
and woodwork, and the rebirth of small-scale metal-working using scrap, has, however, prevented
complete dependence on capitalist-produced household implements.
The skiIIs of indigenous craft industries, once substituted by imports, can rarely be revived. The
rate of substitution is, however, not exclusively a function of disparities in seilng price, although
this is usually the principal factor. Also significant are the available means of exchange
(particularly where the choice is between barter and cash mediums), the quality of 
the product,
and ideological resistances which yield to differing 'thresholds' of hardship. Where peasants are
effectively barred from producing for sale, their assessment of relative savings in productivity
between home production and imports accessible only through cash exchange is complex and
necessarily indirect, not being possible through the comparison of exchange valuesl20I.
Any analysis of trends in the terms of trade is vitiated by the absence of comparative data. It is,
however, noteworthy that the labour-recruiting agency, the South West African Native Labour
Association (SWANLA) and its predecessors, which had a retail monopoly in Ovamboland until
the 1950s and a wholesale monopoly until the late 1960s, was able not only to recover the high
costs of transport to Ovamboland but also to extract super-profis from local consumers to
subsidise recruiting operationsl211. Despite the take-over by imports of the supply of most means
of production, agricultural productivity, already effcient for its ecology, has improved only
marginally. The one majortechnological innovation has been the substitution of ploughs for hoes.
First introduced into Ukwanyama in the late 1940s, ploughs were stil an 'insignificant factor a
decade later, but by the late 1960s were 'now used extensively throughout Ovamboland'122).
The slowness of technological adaption and of production for sale, surprising as it may seem to
those familiar wih peasant innovation elsewhere in southern Africa, is attributable notto ineffcient
market assessment, but entirely to offcial trade restrictions and local conditions of production. By
not completing the railway connection to Ondonga started by the Germans, the South African
Administration effectively cut off any possible market for grain or vegetables, particularly at the
mines in the Grootfontein area. It has also maintained a ban on cattle exports - conducted on a
20. Voipio found, for instance, that 'women too are asking why they should wake up at 4 a.m. to grind corn and do
heavy digging when they can buy flour at a nearby shop' (R. Voipio, ''The labour situation in SWA", SAIRR, RR 2/73,
p. 14). Such a judgement centres on immediate labour saving comparisons and only takes into consideration the
cost to husbands in wage labour in a general or background sense; it also questions the very rationality of the forced
articulation of the two modes of production.
21. On this, see Olivier, /nboorlingbeleid, p. 386, quoting a SWANLA memo of 12 November 1949; cf. South West
Arr/ca Native Labourer's Commission (henceforth NLC) (1948), paras. 37-41. As late as 1974, despite the take-
over of SWANLA's trading activities by the Bantu lnvestment Corporation, Fraenkel noticed a substantial mark up
in Ondangwa on Windhoek food prices (The Namibians, p. 39).
22. V. Ndadi, Breakingcontract(ed. D. Mercer: Richmond, Canada, LSM Press, 1974), pp. 19-20, and p. 33; Bruwer,
The Kwanyama, p. 6; also Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid, p. 351; Banghart, Migrant labour, pp. 118, 133-134.
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large scale before 1915 - ostensibly to protect capitalist cattle-farmers from the lung sickness
endemic in Ovamboland. The climate is anyway too dry and the soil too poor for the replacement
of millet by maize, a more profiable export crop; and whatever means are used to break the soil,
the laborious tas k remains of building it into the ra ise d mounds essential for drainage and for
effcient fertilisation with cow-dung. That an energetic peasant response to favourable trade
opportunities was possible has been amply demonstrated in the Okavango valley. When it
became a major migration route to Wenela recruiting stations in the 1940s, it was reported that
'fields have been doubled or trebled in size, hundreds of ploughs have been bought, and all with
a viewto extracting as much wealth as possible from the stream of labour recruits'. By 1946 there
were 1746 ploughs in the area, or at a rough estimate one for every second homestead; and
labour migration by local residents was a meagre 269 per annum out of the 1,750 recruited in the
area(23).
It will be abundantly clear by now that wage-Iabour, or local pett-bourgeois activities dependent
on its earnings, has been the only possible source of cash income for the vast majority. Wage-
labour has in its turn made an appreciable and in some respects cumulative impact on the
subsistence productive base, in terms both of the division of labour and of the supply of material
needs through exchange. The extent to which the processes of underdevelopment analysed
above have modified the allocation of labour-time within the family unit of productionis
problematic. Colonisation reduced men's public obligations (wa rfare , tribal labour levies) and
traditonal male subsistence activites (game-hunting, long-distance cattle and trade treks). On the
other hand, cattle-raising, before 1915 under considerable pressure from both abnormal drought
and expropriation by the tribal state to meet its trading debts, appears to have maintained its
absolute proportion of family subsistence as that of field crops has declined. Since the Second
World War ploughing, and to some extent the Christian work ethic has pulled a growing number
of men into routine fieldwork as we1l124J. As most repair, supervision and homecraft activities
remain as demanding as previously, serious male under-employment, except perhaps between
adolescence and marriage, is unlikely to have been a major factor in inducing labour migration.
The fact that, nevertheless, a consistently high proportion of adult men, most of them in their
prime, should have migrated over a lengthy period can only have entailed consequences both
damaging and cumulative for so highly integrated a system of subsistence production. It would
appear that between 1910 and 1930 the average number of Ovambo men on contract in the
Police Zone at any one time was rare ly less than 20 per cent and after recovery from the Great
Depression, not less than 25 per cent (see table 6).
Sources: Olivier, Inboor/ingbe/eid, pp.288-9, 300-1,312; Banghart, Migrantlabour, p.49; Barnard, Die streekpatrone, p.162;
Bruer, The Kwanyama, pp.8, 12; SWA Administrator, Annual Reports; NLC, paras 9-10, 23, 25; Kane-Berman,
Contract labour, p.5; Stais, "Die aanraking", pp.333-4.
By stipulating standard minimum contracts of at least one year, offcial South African policy, in
force since the first years of its occupation, negated any attempt by migrants to articulate periods
of absence wih the labour demands of the seasonal production cycle, which had to some extent
been possible before 1915. Not only therefore could the migrant not be on hand when his labour-
23. NLC, paras, 38, 205, 225; Olivier, Inboorlingbe/eid, p. 315.
24. Ndadi, Breaking contraet, pp. 19 and 34; QM, also Bishop Tobias' letter in SA Outlook, 1, November 1938.
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time was indispensable, but a part of the following season's effort would be required to repair the
consequences. The loss could be partially compensated by lengthening productive labour-time,
but equally the long-term effect of the social disruption inherent in the break-up of the production
unit reduced that labour's general effciency251. A migration rate of 25 per cent implied an absence
for one in every four years, and a much higher proportion between the ages of 15 and 45.
It is not clear how far contract wages met either the loss of labour power and the effects of
dislocation on peasant production, or the cash requirements of both worker and family. The
provision of workers' immediate subsistence (food and accommodation) allowed employers to
justify a standardised low-wage policy, under which minimum contract rates (admittedly
substantially exceeded by a few large-scale employers), increased little overall in real terms
between the early 1920s and the late 1940s, and by not much more than 50 per cent by 1971
(see table 7).
Table 7. Index of monthl contract cash wa es at constant rices, 1913-71
Note: a) For lack of reliable wages and price data these figures are very approximate. Related so far as possible to official
minimum rates, they are intended to reflect the likely cash wages of the majorily of unskiled workers in each
category. They are drawn from disparate sources. The 'average wage' is at current prices.
Sources: Principally SWA Administrator, Annual Reporl and references in F. Troup, In face of fear, (London, 1950); Olivier,
Inboorlingbeleid; Banghart, Migrant labour; Fraenkel, The Namibians; W. Courtney & J. Davis, Namibia: US
corporateinvolvementínAfrica, (Africa Fund/WCC, 1971), p.13; J. Morris, ''The blackworkers in Namibia", in: R.
Murrayet al, The role offoreign firms in Namibia, (Africa Publications Trust, 1974).
By no means all of these meagre returns to labour were recycled into peasant production.
Expenditure on such basic items as clothes, bus fares and entertainment, fines under the harsh
net of race and labour laws, transport and luggage charges on the return journey, tribal taxation
and 'gifts' to tribal offcials, all combined to siphon off an appreciable part of contract wages!261.
Gifts to relatives and friends after return, church membership and education fees took a further
slice. Most of the rest, in the 1920s as in the early 1970s, was spent on basic e10thing and
household utensils, but in the late 1960s, especially during drought, increasingly also on
processed foodstuffs and meat271.
The impact of drought on marginal production can be seen in 1959, third in a sequence of drought
years, and severe in the western Ovamboland. Local production was a mere 90,000 bags; the
government sent in 100,000 bags of maize for relief, by no means all of which would have been
free; Ovambos bought 30,000 bags in Ovamboland at R2.30 each; and Ovambo workers in the
Police Zone bought another 30,000 bags. The total, about 240,000 bags, was a long way below
adequacy, yet the workers' own expenditure on the above totals amounted to an approximate
average of R6.60 per homestead, or R12.00 per contract worker then in the Police Zone.
25. These themes come through clearly in the replies to Voipio's questionnaire on migrant labour and marriage (R.
Voipio, Kontak - soos die Owambo dit sien (Johannesburg, Christian Institute, 1972); page references are to the
part-translation in Kane-Berman (Appendix IV).
26. Lebzeller's breakdown suggest a figure of 40 to 50 per cent in the late 1920s (V. Lebzelter, Eingeborenenkulturen
in Südwest- und Südafrika (Leipzig, Karl W. Hirsemann, 1934), vol.2, p. 219).
27. Ibid.; Voipio, ''The labour situation" and Kontrak. On the meat trade, Banghart, Migrant labour, pp. 132 and 138;
Bruwer, The Kwanyama, p. 7.
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Similarly, the value of all grain imports amounted to R18.30 per homestead and R33.30 per
worker - equivalent, if the full cost was borne by the workers, to 2%-4 and 6-10 months' wages
per worker respectivelyl281.
Although precise estimates are not possible with the available data, it would appear that except
with careful saving, little remained from cash wages either for insurance against drought and
changes in family circumstances, or as the means to larger-scale or more capital-intensive
farming. The violence done to family and social relationships by institutionalised labour migration,
to which Voipio's survey gives graphic insight, has entrenched disparities of perceived need and
patterns of involuntary spending in both worker and family, of which those familiar with its
counterpart in South Africa need no reminding.
The general character and rate of underdevelopment can therefore be established reasonably
clearly. It remains to situate the generation of labour migration and its forms of social
consciousness in the transformation of the indigenous social formation, more particularly, e1ass
formation and class mobilit. In this, colonial policy has played an overwhelmingly dominant role.
On the one hand, the incoming South African administration, applying classical principles of
indirect rule, successfully incorporated the pre-colonial stratum of state functionaries and war-
leaders as a subordinate bureaucracy, by allowing it local autonomy and autocratic powers and
a guaranteed stake in revenue from fines, land distribution and labour migrationl291.
On the other, offcial controis, both direct and indirect, have undermined any marked trend
towards e1ass polarisation. The preservation of tribal law and inheritance has prevented the
concentration and transmission of land rights, and thus the emergence of private ownership in
land. Non-investment in transport or credit facilities and restrictions on trading allowed the
commercial arm of the recruiting organisation a complete monopoly. Although after the Second
World War the more rapid penetration of cash exchange permitted the rise of a trading pett-
bourgeoisie, SWANLA and its successor, the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), retained a
virtual monopoly ofwholesale supply and credit, relying on its economies of scale and the legal
and at times illegal collaboration of government(301.
Table 8. White collar workers and the ett -bour eoisie in Ovamboland, 1972
Source: G. Tötemeyer, Die rol van die Wambo-elites in die politieke ontwikkeling van Owambo, (PhD, Univ. Stellenbosch,
1974), p,46ff.
Nevertheless, from the late 1950s the emergence of the pett-bourgeoisie provided the first
significant alternative to labour migration, and with its low entry-price, an outlet for savings from
contractwages. The number oftrading licences in, for instance, Ukwanyama, increased from two
in 1954 to 71 in 1958 and 330 in 1973 out of a total for Ovamboland for that year of 1 ,388 (all but
60 were 'general dealers')i311. But far larger numbers traded outside legal restrictions (4,975
identified in 1973, or, together with those Iicensed, about 1 for every 58 persons, making 1 in 8
28. See F. Lempp, 'The Ovamboland water scheme", in H.W. Stengel, Water affairs in SWA (Windhoek, Afrika Vig.
Der Kreis, 1963), p. 361.
29. See espeially Olivier, Inboorlingbe/eid, Chapter 4, p. viii, and Chapter 5; Lord Hailey, A survey of native affairs in
South West Africa (TS, 1946, deposited in Rhodes House Library).
30. Cf. Olivier, Inboorlingbe/eid, pp. 384-388; Voipio, 'The labour situation", pp. 6-8.
31. Bruwer, The Kwanyama, p. 84; Owambo (Government of), Deparlment of Economic Affairs, Annual Report for
1973.
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families, although few ofthese were fullime) as small-scale retailers, butchers and eating-house
proprietors, iIegalliquor dealers, or lorry owners. During the 1960s, white-collar employment in
education and administration came to provide a second main alternative as Tötemeyer's estimate
of elite groups in 1972 indicates (see table 8).
Local unskiled labour, mainly on housing, water and road construction has absorbed several
hundred more. Even so, these categories, open anyway to a number strictly limited by
circumstance or qualification, could take in only a fraction of those to whom wage-Iabour was
structurally necessary.
A number of general factors combined to condition the formation of social consciousness
amongst migrant workers. These can be broadly classified in terms of changes in structural class
posilon; working and livng condilons as wage-Iabourers in the colonial economy; and experience
of and resistance to labour repression.
Structural determinants of migrant labour consciousness
The centralit ofthe first ofthese will be readily apparent from the foregoing analysis of structural
underdevelopment. Labour migration on appreciable scale extends back over 60 years before the
1971-72 strike, and has become a permanent necessity over generations. Over the whole period,
the number on contract averaged one from every third homestead; after the Second World War
the proporton increased to 1 :2. With over 30 per cent of men absent at any one time, few families
will have escaped altogether, while for many the periodic or nearly continuous absence of at least
one member for the first 20-30 years of adulthood will have been normaL. Banghart's 1968
sample of Ovambo contract workersi321 had spent 26-31 per cent of their adult lives (Le. 15 years
and over) on contract, which if generalised for the 1971 total on contract, suggests that 74-89 per
cent of all men had migrated at least oncel331.
Since labour migration is thus so generalised through the population, it is important to understand
to what extent the two sources of subsistence are complementary. Wage-Iabour before marriage,
now as in its early years, has provided some of the means of courtship and of buying land for
establishing a family homestead. The unmarried among Banghart's survey comprised 17 per cent
ofthe sample; 62 per cent did not marry before the age of 25, and 35 per cent before 301341. Yet,
whereas men younger than 30 had spent an average 35 per cent of their time on contract, those
in the 30-40 age bracket had worked only 30 per cent. Further, 67 per cent had first migrated
before their 21 st birthday, and all but 2 per cent by their 26th. The age-structure is also clearly
related to the building up of cattle herds, younger migrants owning proportionately smaller
herdsl35l. To a certain extent, therefore, the worker could articulate his periods of wage-Iabour with
the life-cycle of peasant production.
It is equally evident, however, that such articulation is structurally subordinate to the general
impoverishment of subsistence production. Out of 93 in the Banghart sample 76 were already
married; 87 out of 105 were aged 30 or over, 35 over 44; and 74 had served more than 5
32. Op. eit. Based on random seleetion from the Tsumeb mine workforee, this sample (105 informants), Iimited and
unspeifie though it is, provides the only detailed breakdown 50 far available. In the following, I must emphasise that
my ealeulations are at times approximate; and that the interpretations are my own exeept where aeknowledged
(Bangharl doe not always make the basis of his tables elear; oeeasionally therefore, assumptions are required to
enable interpretations).
33. Bangharl, M/grant labour, table 26; Kane-Berman, Contract labour, p. 5. The pereentage spread eorresponds to
the outer limits of the age-bands used in the table. I am assuming an average eontraet period of one year, whieh
is roughly eorreet for the mid-1960s. The proporlion of younger eontraet workers is understated in the sample.
34. Bangharl, M/grant labour, table 34, re-worked by myself with the lwelve unknown eases exeluded.
35. Ibid., table opposite p. 73, re-worked. The tendeney is obviously understated for men older than e. 45, sinee the
proportion on eontraet, and reeorded here, deereases with age.
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contracts, 20 more than 10(361. Long-term, regular migration is thus the general rule for the
majori. Furthermore, while 98 per cent were aged less than 25 at their first contract, 46 per cent
were 18 or younger and as many as 19 per cent under 15, well before marriage can have been
in contemplation for all but a few371. Finally, of 72 workers 30 years old or more, 53 owned less
than the approximate Ovamboland average for the year of 11 cattle per homestead; and 15 per
cent of the sample owned no cattle at all(381.
The evidence is that the workers' own diagnosis of their reasons for migrating is accurate - 59 per
cent gave 'povert', 20 per cent to 'help family', and of the remaining 21 per cent, 8 per cent
wanted cattle, 7 per cent e1othes, 1 per cent land, 4 per cent to marry and only 1 per cent wanted
'adventure'139J. We wil see that contract labour was, given equal productivity, not an attractive
alternatie to agrarian production, and the rate of migration is therefore probably a fairly accurate
running index of its submarginality.
Age band:
20-34 14 70 5 25 1 5 20 100
35-49 29 52 23 41 4 7 56 100
50+ 5 31 6 38 5 31 16 100
Total 48 52 34 37 10 11 92 100
Note: a) The num ber of workers within the given age band.
Source: Banghart, Migrant labour, table opposite p.73.
Table 10. Distribution of cattle ownership in Ukwanyama, 1955
Notes: a) le within the oshana zone. b) Using 1955 stock and 1951 population figures at 7.3 persons per homestead.
Source: Bruwer, The Kwanyama, pp.12-13, 75.
The direction and rate of change in the relatie and absolute levels of subsistence production and
wage-Iabour have an obvious bearing on the sharpness and sense of crisis in peasant-worker
strategic perceptions. Broadly speaking, the Ovambo peasantry has passed through three stages
since colonisation: a period of respite (1916-29), ended by devastating drought and simultaneous
total unemployment (1928-34); an accelerated decline (1935-55), at the end of which the
proporton of men on contract hit a peak not reached before or probably since; and a paradoxical
final 15 years during which the rate of labour migration stabilsed while the decline into sub-
36. Ibid., table 26. Banghart's figures are fully borne out by Voipio's descriptive survey two years later (Kane-Berman,
Contract labour, App.IV, p. xxiii).
37. Banghart, Migrant labour, table 35. N B None of the workers interviewed was under 20; of the latter, most were on
farms.
38. Ibid., table opposite p. 73 (see fn. 34 above). The marked local disparities revealed in Bruwer's figures for
Ukwanyama in 1955 also suggest wide inequalities in ownership (se e table 10).
39. Banghart, Migrant labour, p. 92.
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marginal production continued unabated. Complexities multiply during this final period, as on the
one hand commodit exchange relations rapidly penetrated local consumption, and on the other,
state projects lessened climatic uncertainties. Neither are, however, likely to have compensated
entirely. By 1970, 30 per cent of Ovambo men were wage-earners; and including the pett-
bourgeoisie, about 36 per cent, were drawing some form of cash incomel40J. Som e 1,500 women
also fell under the latter category. It should be noted, although the evidence is fragmentary, that
there is little sign of closed stratification in the peasantry itself. In general, it may be tentatively
suggested that at the end of the 1960s the Ovambo peasantry was in the process of transition
from marginal to generally submarginal food production for which a cash supplement was
necessary to avoid real hardship. It is at this point that the relative importance of wage-Iabour and
agrarian production as subsistence providers is likely to be brought sharply into focus for
producers at both polesl41J.
The manner and rate of the shift in the peasant family's material stake from the production of its
own subsistence into wage-Iabour set the limiting conditions for general worker-peasant strategy.
Its application and success potential was nevertheless mediated by the migrant worker's
experience as wage-Iabourer. Wage-Iabour was unavoidable periodically for most, continuously
for some, for the first 25-30 years of adult life, by which time sons could take over the cycle.
Labour migration itelf was therefore a very limited bargaining option when wage-rates were near
or below the level of cash income necessary to reproduce the family unit; once entrenched and
generalised, over generations, it centred the worker's interest on adjusting the terms and
conditions of labour within capitalist production relations.
The determinants of labour consciousness in workers under such a system derived both from
objective e1ass position and from situational conditions. Contract labourers were involuntarily
involved in two modes of production, as coerced peasants and as forced wage labourers.
Although various methods of administrative coercion were employed from the outset, principally
through the coopted 'tribal' functionaries and more recently through cash taxation, the contract
regime relied mainly on generalised impoverishment to fuel its labour supply. Wage labour had
been necessary to supplement subsistence agriculture well before colonisation, and the South
African administration ensured that this dependence deepened by tying a growing population to
a fied usable land area and by denying peasant produce any possible market. The system was
designed to transfer most of the cost of reproducing and servicing its work force to the peasantry.
By imprisoning women in the reserves, capitalists could fix wages at little above the subsistence
needs of the indivdual workers. Thus contract labour entailed not merely the subordination of the
male migrant to a rigorous and inflexible work routine but also the extension of labour-time spent
by women both in food production for themselves and their dependents and in housework, the
regressive economic and ideological effects ofwhich were gradually cumulative.
The critical point at which the balance of objective e1ass interest transfers from peasant to
proletarian status occurs when the migrants family becomes regularly dependent on his wages
not merely for items of equipment but also for day-to-day living costs, in particular food. The
systematic separation of produce~ from reproducers in the economic structure at the same time
that the primary social units which bind them, monogamous families, are being strengthened
ideologically, in particular by Christianity, induces a differential consciousness which is
nevertheless unstable at both poles. Women are continuously confronted with their economic
exploitation and personal deprivation; men, having no rights at their place of work, seek to retain
the social ties wih the peasant formation which give them a modicum of security. Both perceive -
the men most sharply - the increasing separation of their supposed 'homeland' from the centres
in which their labour-power is actually being appropriated and whose very existence is the
40. Of Bangharts sample, as many as 40 per cent had one or more relatives working in the Police Zone (brothers - 18
per cent, sons - 13 per cent, others - 9 per cent) (ibid., p. 141).
41. W~h periodic relapses under climatic pressure and in the pre-marital stage of the life-cycle; and with specific cash
needs in utensils and clothing.
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manifestation of such appropriation. For many peasant families with mig rant workers, the critical
turning-point is likely to have come in the 1950s and 1960s; indeed, since the mid-1950s, if not
earlier, Ovamboland has been a net food importer except in the best harvest years.
From the 1950s onward about 30 per cent of Ovambo men - and a much higher proportion
between the ages of 15 and 45 - have been on a contract at any one time. In other words, an
average of one in two families have at least one adult male away on contract at any one time; and
most men have experience of labour migration, many for much of the first 30-odd years of their
lives. Their individual experience of wage-Iabour strengthens the objective tendency among the
peasantry as a whole towards proletarianisation. Furthermore, by 1971 this experience had been
generalised throughout the peasantry for decades, for many going back two or three generations
in their kin groups. The workers concern to strengthen their tactical position to improve wages and
working and living conditions had been present from the earliest days of wage labour. Following
a critical transition in the balance of their material interest, it was now to become the principal
focus of their general struggle.
The contract system, labour repression and informal resistance
I have been concerned to specify the limiting conditions and potential resources for the formation
of labour consciousness in a mig rant workforce. But it is struggle that a e1ass-in-formation
discovers and tests its strategic strengths and weaknesses. It is essential to dispense with two
myths. The first is the a priori assumption that because workers in a system of extreme institutional
repression have left few records of their collective or cooperative actions, their historical agency
has dissolved into the employers' ideal-type of 'docile' labour units. The second is the determinism
of linear evolution, which by dealing exclusively with the cumulative processes of e1ass
consolidation denies its equally crucial cyclical, dialectical dimension. Indeed, it was largely in
response to the success of the workers' challenge to state controls in the first decade of South
African rule that SWANLA was founded in 1926(42).
Since the contract labour regime has been adequately described elsewhere,(43) and will be familiar
to those conversantwih South African labour-repressive legislation, it is not necessary here to do
more than summarise its salient features. For nearly half a century (1926-72), the recruitment and
distribution of labour from the Northern Zone and Angola was the monopoly of an offcially
sanctioned organisation, SWANLA,(44) owned by the major capitalist interests in the colony.
Operating, except during the Depression and for brief periods thereafter, in conditions of excess
dem and for contract labour,(45) SWANLA's principal functions were firstly to impose on recruits a
standard scale of minimum wages, which employers could but need not exceed; and secondly
to arbitrate their allocation to applicants in accordance with the balance of capitalist interests.
Since Ovambos possessed no significant alternative sources of cash income, prospective recruits
had no option but to contract at the SWANLA rates.
From the mid-1930s, contract labour has become the mainstay of all significant sectors of
production. The periods of most rapid expansion are elear; in farming, 1935-46; in fishing, 1947-
42. See Moorsom, Colonisation.
43. Especially Simons "The Namibian challenge"; Kane-Berman, Contract labour; Ndadi, Breaking contra et;
contributions in R. First and R. Segal, South West Africa: travesty of trust (Deutsch, 1967).
44. First formed in 1926, the recruiting administration was originally sub-divided into two, the Southern Labour
Organisation, recruiting exclusively from Ovamboland for the diamond mines, and the Northern Labour
Organisation, recruiting on the Okavango River and taking the SLO's surplus and rejects. It was unified in 1943
under the title South West African Native Labour Association (SW AN LA), which for convenience I have used here
for the whole period.
45. I have no space to analyse productivity, overbidding, and the substitution for higher paid locallabour, all factors
integral to the system. Suffice it to say that ostensible labour demand expresses a complex of contending class
forces.
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60; in mining, 1946-1950 and, together with commerce and services, 1960 onwards (see table
11).
Mines 71Farms 29
Industry/govt
Other
Fishing
38 14 22 29 32 27 25 29
? 80 49 45 34 34 28 25
5 4 10 23 33 26 32
2 19 7 7 6 5 6'
7 10 5
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
7,680 16,500 19,200 22,800 25,100 38,500 43,400
Total % 100
- no.b 920
Notes: a) The categories are not alwys properl distinguished in the sourees. b) Contraet periods varied over time (approx.
18 months from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, 12 months in the mid-1960s). Thus in 1955, for instanee, about
34,000 workers would have been on eontraet at any one time. c) House servants.
Sources: Kane-Berman, Contractlabour, p.5; Dept. of Foreign Affairs, SWA Survey 1967, table 24; Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid,
p.289; SWAAdministrator, Annual Reports 1934, 1938, 1946; NLC, paras 9-10; Banghart, Migrantlabour, p.49.
All but a fraction of the work is unskiled, but some categories, particularly on the big mines,1461
develop marketable skiIIs through experience or on-the-job training. Nevertheless, conditions have
been far from uniform. Predictably, farming has been consistently the worstl471. Accommodation
has been primite and at least until the 1960s sometimes non-existent. The hours are long, with
dawn-to-dusk working and a 6%-- or 7 -day week common. Isolation is complete, especially for the
appreciable number of karakul herders, who might spend days out alone with floeks for which
they could be held legally accountable. Conditions in mines, factories and public services, which
took in the bulk of the remainder, are probably no more severe than in South Africa itself,
combining long hours of routine labour with autocratic supervision.
Several characteristics of the urban and mining centres served to make them the forcing ground
of labour consciousness amongst contract workers. First, most of the larger concerns employed
predominantly contract labour in the main production processes. The cultural homogeneity of
contract workers allowed but limited scope for divisive managerial tactics along ethnic or language
lines atthe point of productionl481. A second and related factor is that most workers came from a
single region - Ovamboland both sid es of the Angolan border - and shared a common history,
culture and language. No potentially explosive cultural cleavages therefore existed amongst
migrants themselves as foci for communal factionalism. Third, not only the large scale and
repetie routine of production but also compulsory residence in the ciosed, barrack-like bachelor
compounds appended to most mines and municipalities intensified social interaction and mutual
interdependence amongst contract workers outside as well as within the production processi49J.
The long-distance northern migrants were subject to a special web of controls under the contract
labour system. The population of the four northern reserves (now all bantustans) comprises some
46. See Banghart, Migrant labour, pp. 53-56.
47. Cf. the comments of the NLC; F. Troup, In face offear (1950); Ndadi, Breaking contract, passim.
48. This is, however, onlya qualified statement. Management of large eoneerns did altempt, with oeeasional sueeess,
to exploil geographically-based ethnie differenees, for instanee belween Ovambo and Kavango workers, notably by
alloeating eertain job categories, usually low grade supervisory or white-eollar, to partieular groups. For fuller
treatment of this theme, see R. Gordon, Mines, masters and migrants (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977).
49. It appears that workers were not segregated by job eategory, nor always even by ethnie origin. To most whites, the
terms 'OVambo' and 'eontract labourer' were synonymous, and this intrusion of el ass pereeption permilted a partial
loosening of apartheid rules in eontraet worker eompounds.
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65 per cent of all black Namibians, the Ovambo alone 53 percent. Outside their reserves, their
status was exactly equal to that of a foreign African. No black from the north was permitted to
leave the reserve except under a fixed-Iabour contract; women were barred altogether. Between
1926 and 1972, SWANLA and its predecessors was the only agency authorised to contract
labourers. The 'contract was in fact a standardised form of indenture specifying a uniform wage-
rate and conditions, over which no bargaining was permitted. It also carried not civil but criminal
sanctions for breaches of the serve disciplinary code to which it bound the worker. Thus, during
their ave rage 12-18 month period of contract, which they could not terminate of their own will,
workers were virtually forced labourers under prison-style discipline. Protest action against an
employer, whether individual or collective, was a criminal offence.
On the face of it, the totalitarian regime of labour regulation seems complete. Wage-Iabour was
only permited on contract; the recruitng organisation dictated wages, standard minimum lengths
of servce, and employer; once signed, the contract legally bound the worker to his employer, and
evasion was made hazardous by pass laws; and on termination, repatriation was compulsory.
Even so, the system had it weak points, which on the fragmentary evidence available,i50) Ovambo
migrants exploited to the fulL. To a certain extent, SWANLA's monopoly could be evaded. In the
1940s, before the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) struck an agreement with
SWANLA, workers could reach South African urban areas by traveIling hundreds of miles on foot
through Botswana, usually to a WNLA recruiting station. More generally, workers could reach
urban centres in Namibia by usingfalse or borrowed passes, by hitch-hiking, and by deserting,
especially from farms, once having legally arrived in the Police Zone. Once there, it was often
possible to find illegal employment and since the compulsory 'Identification Pass' did not contain
a photograph, to evade or manipulate the pass laws.
Even the apparently inflexible SWANLA distribution system was open to a degree of manipulation.
At SWANLA's Ondangwa compound, prospectie contract workers were medically examined and
classified into three grades of physical finess, which determined eligibility for different job
categories, and work parades were held at regular intervals to fill requisitions from the large
employers. Thus workers could reject the terms of recruitment and except for those in the C
grade, reserved exclusively for farms, discriminate between employers to a limited extent. It is
hardly surprising that from the earliest years of labour migration farm work was taken only as a
last resort, and even then was widely used by C grade contract workers as a means of illegal
entry to the towns.l51)
Under so totalitarian a labour-repressive regime 'informal' resistance was not merely residual but
an appropriate and effective mode of defensive labour action. The high rate of labour turn-over
and low rate of return to the same employer precluded all but short-term leadership at the point
of production, and hence any effective institutional resistance. Such forms would anyway have
been highly vulnerable to employer/state intimidations and victimisation, even where large-scale
employers had managed to entrench a high rate of return in their contract labour-force, as at
Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) (100 per cent) and the Tsumeb mine (40-70 per cent)i521.
Such informal action embraced not only evasion of the law to escape or evade the worst
employers or to seek higher wages, but also partal confrontations in the production process itself,
50. Mainly from NLC; Troup, In face of fear; Ndadi, Breaking contract; Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid; Banghart, Migrant
labour, R. First, South West Africa (Penguin, 1963); R. Gordon, "A note on the history of labour action in Namibia",
S.A.L.B., 1975.
51. Gordon "A note", pp. 12-13.40-50 per cent of contract workers, and most of those on farms, are from Angola. It
shouid be noted that the C grade specifically allowed for child labour (Le. under 15 years), which, although evidence
is scanty for the 196, was used exlensively on farms from the mid-30s to the mid-50s. When the authorities did
atlempt to enforce an age restriction, Ovambo parents would send their sons across the border to re-enter as
'Angolans' (cf. Olivier, Inboorlingbeleid, passim).
52. Banghart, Migrant labour, p. 56; Ndadi, Breaking contract, p. 34 and p. 46; UCT Wages Commission, TS Notes
on interview with CDM's personnei manager, June 1975.
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ranging from individual self-asserton against small-scale masters to go-slows or disruption on the
factory production linei531.
It is misleading also to characterise such acts of resistance, often restricted to individuals or small
groups, in isolation. Both evasion and resistance assumed a strong and general basis of mutual
solidarity, and the former an effcient communications network. And the very institutionalisation
of labour controls induced the verbal transmission of common tactics and accepted standards of
reciprocity. The fact that most non-farm workers lived together in large bachelor compounds
greatly facilitated rapid and general communications. Workers' living quarters in town, chiefly
attached to private houses or catering establishments, were focal points for pass evaders.
roximate size of main contract worker com ounds, 1971
Workers 5500 7400 3500 5000 4000 18,500-
22,000
60-75
Note: a) ie of all contract workers except those on farms and in live-in domestic service.
Informal resistance also depended importantlyon systematically rendering workers' motivations
opaque to labour supervsors and state organs. In this, contract workers appear to have become
marked ly successful. Attempts at cooption by the state were virtually non-existent: only at the
beginning of 1972 was a representative of the bantustan 'government' delegated to liaise with
workers in the Police Zone, and his homestead was one of the first to be burnt down in the
disturbances in Ovamboland in late January 1972(541. As for employers, CDM tested incoming
workers for leadership potential and allocated them low-Ievel supervisory posts; but few others
seem to have attempted a co-option strategyl55J. Informers - the only other means of rendering
repression effcient - seem to have been few and ineffectual, to judge from the total failure of state
intelligence before and after the strike.
The situational context of contract labour contoured migrants' social consciousness and shared
tactics in specific ways. In the mining and urban centres, workers are housed in dormitories in
large bachelor compounds, usually cramped and wih minimal facilities or personal privacy. Many
also work in large production units or work gangs. Horizontal communication bot h in and outside
working hours is as aresult dense and fairly continuous; it is unavoidable, as well as easy. At work
and in the compounds, their supervisors usually cannot communicate in their language, and to
a lesser extent the reverse is also true; the same applies to other black workers, from whom they
are largely segregated in the production process and residentially. Conversely, most contract
workers share a common language, whose dialects are mutually intellgible, and similar
geographical, cultural and social background. Such factors make a strong tradition of communal
solidarity among contract workers as a whole.
Forthe purposes ofthis analysis, and to bypass the definitional problems surrounding the concept
'class consciousness', it is most convenient to distinguish three levels of social consciousness
53. For examples of both, see Ndadi, Breakíng contraet, especially his graphie account of a go-slow in a Walvis Bay
fishing factory in 1959 (pp. 54-59).
54. Owambo (Government of), Department of Finance, Annual Report for 1972, para 4.2; Wíndhoek Advertiser, 25
January 1972.
55. Banghart, Mígrant labour, p. 79-80. See Gordon, Mínes, for an extended discussion on this theme for one mine.
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among contract workers: 'occupational', which is confined to tactical adjustments within the
organisational boundaries of the labour process and the supervsory regime; 'trade unionist', which
embraces wider challenges to the labour regime as a whole, but within the framework of the
existing exploitatie propert relations; and 'socialist' , which envisages the transformation of such
propert relations into non-exploitative, socially-controlled forms. Since under colonialism the
economy has been structured by primarily political means, both the latter two levels arè
necessarily channelled into or expressed within the political sphere. Since the large compounds
and production unit have been the forcing ground of worker consciousness, it is this context with
which i shall be concerned here for the most part.
'Beating the system'
The first level, 'occupational' consciousness, can aptly be described as the strategies that contract
workers adoptfor 'beating the system'.i561 It is equivalent to the pett pilfering, the creation of rest-
spaces within work time through covert 'tea' or 'smoke' breaks, or skiving as sick, by means of
which workers in the capitalist metropoles attempt to humanise the rigid industrial routine imposed
on their alienated labour. These practices are legitimised by a genuinely autonomous worker
morality, but it is a morality limited by the framework of capitalist ethics. Their sense of justice
depends upon non-discovery. Thus 'stealing' from the employer may be facilitated by the fact that
it is the product oftheir alienated labour; but when caught, the definition of the act as 'theft' is still
accepted, rather than as the re-appropriation of such alienated labour. Under a contract labour
regime this level of labour consciousness is no longer incidental or marginal: of necessity it
becomes central tactics of survival in, accommodation to and improvement of their positiön under
the system. It has to cover not merely the hours at work but all other phases of life as well. Labour
and compound supervsion is harsh and autocratic, and work and living conditions poor and often
dangerous, making escape and adjustment techniques imperative.
These conditons of necessit turn a wide range of individual or unconscious reactions into explicit
tactics of self-defence, whose general success depends on a shared acceptance of the norms
of solidarity. Since the penalties for direct confrontation with those in immediate authority are
generally severe -loss ofwages, sometimes physical violence, or more seriously imprisonment
or deportation to the reserve - an effective 'front' is imperative.
Several factors strengthen the effciency ofworkers' techniques, most hinging on the degree of
social distance between the workers and the supervisory level in which immediate control of the
production process is vested. Work-gang foremen - usually called 'indunas' or 'boss-boys' - are
promoted from the rank-and-file. Yet such is the insecurity and horizontal job mobility of all
contract workers and so great is their general subordination under a totalitarian colonial structure
that the boss-boys have to become mediators and negotiators in the interests of the workers
under their charge rather than surrogate disciplinarians for management.
The next level, that of the ganger, or works or factory foreman, is recruited entirely from the
racially-defined rules in colonial society. They do not understand by direct experience the shop-
floor environment, nor, usually, the workers' language - a key factor protecting workers'
autonomy. And they share with all öther whites the universal expectation that theirs is the right to
command in all situations in which they come into contact with blacks.
It is in the workers' interests to encourage the whites in authority over them in this belief, for by
reinforcing the stereotype with which their superiors characterise them, they gain more space
56. Evidence for my discussion of this concept is large ly drawn from Gordon's contemporary study of workers on a
copper mine. A1hough I do not agree with aspects of his theoretical framework, his empirical work yields valuable
insights.
Contract Labour & Worker Consciousness, 1915-72 Page 63
wihin the system to promote their partcular interests. A foreman's belief that his workers are lazy
and stupid allows those workers considerable latitude in determining the average pace of work,
particularly since in most cases production bonuses are minimal or non-existent. Individual
workers use the same technique extensively to secure favours from particular supervisors or
compound or offce staff, or protection against other whites.
This strategy carries an inherent contradiction. While rendering workers' motives and practices
opaque to supervisors, it also entails that the stereotype in terms of which these supervisors act
does not fully match the reality. Indeed, it is the principal object of the caricatures as which they
represent themselves. To a considerable extent the elements of self-justification in the
supervsors' ideology of superiori which the stereotype reinforced become self-reproducing: thus,
given that, for example, workers have succeeded in establishing a stereotype of 'Iaziness' or
'stupidity' in their supervisors' perception of them at work, slowing the rate of production further
will tend to intensify that perception, although also entailing of course - the balance of judgement
is a fine one - the risk of harsher control measures. But their success depends on obscuring the
deliberate and concentrated method by which it is achieved, as well as the relative autonomy
which it is designed to win, in this case humanising and controlling the process of direct
production. Workers have therefore to be constantlyon guard against discovery or discrepancies
in behaviour, and thus to monitor white authority figures closely and if necessary appease them.
The contradiction between the self-abasement such methods require and the self-esteem and
dignity for which they are designed to create space could hardly be more extreme.
To a large extent, though not completely, the tensions of keeping up the 'front' are compensated
by an intense ethic of communal solidari, a commitment to mutual support that amounts virtually
to a closed shop among contract workers. It is aptly designated 'brotherhood' by Gordon - indeed,
one worker's essay extollng the necessity of cooperation written in 1973, was entitled
'Brotherhood is essential at (name of workplace)'157J. It embraces far more than solidarity at the
point of production: transmitting money and messages to relatives in the reserves, banking a
compatriot's savings, doing favours, the prohibition on stealing from other workers (not from
whites) - all are covered by this comprehensive solidarity mechanism. Indeed, even that
apparently most incomprehensible of compound phenomena, the 'faction' or 'tribal' fight, may be
interpreted, as Gordon points outp8J as a perfectly rational, although drastic, means of conflict
resolution, wherebywhen other procedures have failed, 'brotherhood' obligations can be forcibly
reasserted over individualist deviants such as informers, bosses' favourites, and non-sharing
wealth accumulators, by means of intimidation and the redistribution or destruction of their hoards.
The managerial favourism which ofte n gives workers from a particular area a privileged position
tends to obscure the fact that such conflict is defined by the framework of 'brotherhood' solidarity.
Even the more violent 'riots' in which workers are seriously injured or occasionally killed, are
usually strongly conditoned by it principles, since the victims are often groups of workers brought
in from South Africa either as blacklegs or as better-paid specialists, who therefore threaten the
inclusive unity which is the basis of solidarity among the workers.
It is the artculation ofthis level of consciousness wih perception of the labour and political system
as a whole which is relevant to the discussion here. To a limited extent it would seem that
'brotherhood' reinforces a conservative, introspective focus. The key to preserving the delicate
balance between a real relative autonomy and an effective disguise for the perceptions of those
in authority is a systematic avoidance of 'trouble', which includes direct confrontations. To some
extent also, its internal mechanisms replace some of the functions of trade unions.
57. MS in author's custody.
58. In a case-study as yet unpublished.
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Nevertheless, in major respects 'brotherhood' is at worst neutral and at best ideologically and
tactically supportive towards class mobilisation on broader issues. First, it presupposes total
alienation from colonial society and regards agents as oppressors and therefore 'fair game'. This
applies most forcefully to immediate supervisors and repressive agencies such as police; but it
extends to the society as a whole, and therefore to all whites and to their black collaborators. The
force of the interaction of the generalised perception of colonialism with this level of
consciousness can e1early be seen in the instance of 'stealing' from whites, which contract
workers, recalling the killing of the last and most famous Kwanyama king by a South African
punitive force in 1917, describe as 'mourning Mandume'(591. Second, its membership criterion in
class-based, and not limited to the particular workplace or compound or to one tribal group. This
is not merelya permissive qualification, but a 'closed shop' upon entry to the ranks of contract
labourers: a 'brother' has the right to expect any other brother to live up to certain obligations and
standards of reciprocity. Third, its primary ethic of solidarity and egalitarian cooperation ingrains
a solid practical and ideological base for other forms of collective action. Fourth, it presupposes
a diffuse, rank-and-file leadership - where one is required at all - and a generalised versatilty in
techniques of communication and of 'beating the system'.
Finally, many of the tactical expedients developed under the umbrella of 'brotherhood' have
bordered on direct challenges to the system of labour repression, although initiated largely by
individuals or small groups. The major fields of conflict has always lain in avoiding controlon
movement and job mobilit. Under the SWANLA allocation procedure, newly contracted workers
were crudely classified according to four grades of physical finess and, to a limited extent, job
experience, and were then arbitrarily parcelled out to employers' requisitions. The system was and
has remained subject to state policing, which brings workers directly into confrontation with the
police, courts and puppet bantustan authorities. Workers have therefore devised a range of
techniques to maximise their choice of jobs and area - securing direct ca lis from favoured
employers, forging or buying passes and contract documents, deceiving colonial offcials as to
identi and personal detail and, if all else fails, deserting and surviving in town illegally. All require
considerable ingenuity and practical solidarity from brothers; all expose the oppression of the
contract system as whole and identify as its chief agent the colonial state.
By the 1960s, therefore, worker autonomy in their communal and culturallife was soundly based
and resilient in the face of a harsh, sometimes dangerous environment. In addition, the large
majority of Ovambo workers were working in the mines or towns and living in large compounds
or on their urban employers' premises, both of which factors were favourable to the associative
processes outlined above.
Correspondingly, the mechanism of labour repression and its agents were unusually free of
ideological trappings. The necessity for direct physical controis, which attempted to compensate
for their ineffciency by their crudity and severity, impinged upon every aspect of the labourer's
working and social existence. Labour supervsors, as dictators of an alienating production routine;
the police and labour and location offcials as heavy-handed repressers of worker attempts to
humanise their social environment; and the tribal bureaucracy, as slavish and self-interested
collaborators, together constituted a close cirele of labour-repressive devices. The tribal
bureaucracy requires special mention. During the relatively laissez-faire regime on indirect rule
prior to the 1960s, there is litle evidence of direct coercion in Ovamboland to stimulate recruiting,
either by forced labour or by heavy taxation. But by virtue of possessing considerable economic
power, especially over access to land, as well as autocratic executive powers, tri bal administrators
could exert pressure in response to central directives. More importantly, they could be used (to
59. C. Winler, Namibia: the story of a bishop in exile (Lutlerworth Press, 1977), pp. 107-108.
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what extent is unclear) to track down and punish transgressors of the labour laws, thus cutting out
a crucialline of escape(601.
The intensit of conflict between contract workers and the state is graphically revealed in the battle
for controlover the 5-6,OOO-man bachelor compound at Katutura, Windhoek, during the year
preceding the strike. By early 1971 the workers had made it virtually a no-go area for the local
police outside working hours, a haven for pass evaders and a centre for ilegal trading - liquor,
street trading, and an informal bulk-buying cooperative which served the whole location(611. The
authories' only resort in the face of such a challenge was to periodic mass raids by armed police
- there were three during 1971 alone. This final period of open confrontation witnessed not only
an immediate and massive communal response to interference from outside, but highly specific
actions directed at the agents of repression, such as the destruction of the entry control point to
the compound on the night of 11 November 1971.(621
Collective labour action without trade unions
In such circumstances, it is not easy to identify tendencies among workers towards political forms
of consciousness. Nor is the absence of overt labour organisation areliable indicator of a lack of
'trade union' perceptions, since many functions are taken care of by brotherhood mechanisms
and workers accurately perceive the vulnerability of a formal leadership, whether public or
clandestine, under so totalitarian a system of repression. There have indeed been several
attempts at formal unionism. An ICU branch existed at Lüderitz in the early 1920s, and the militant
Cape-based Food and Canning Workers Union successfully organised a branch in the same town
in the early 1950s. This latter initiative drew in contract labourers in the canneries either directly
or in parallei unions, and although the FCWU branch was destroyed by physical and legal attacks
by the state in 1952, contract workers mounted large strikes in 1952 and 1953. The key lesson
of this episode, however, was that standard trade-unionism could be easily smashed, and that
state ruthlessness in such suppression was without limits - several workers were killed or
wounded in the 1953 strike.
That workers should have concentrated largelyon small-scale action outside working hours
represents an accurate appreciation of their strategi c resources. Contract workers in mine or
urban compounds are nevertheless no strangers to large-scale collective action of an 'open'
character: the first strike - for higher wages - in which Ovambosare recorded as participating took
place in December 1893 at the South West African Company (SWACO) mine Gross Otavi(631.
Collectie industrial action has been periodically employed since the turn of the century in mines
and factories. Outright mass confrontation at the point of production has however been highly
vulnerable to isolation, physical repression and intimidation, and has rarely secured more than
min or demands. The nature of the control apparatus eliminated most tactical forms intermediate
between informal resistance and an attack on the system itself.
The long historical roots, the regularity and resourcefulness of such action, despite the lack of
supporting organisations, reveals the c1arity and depth of hostility with which workers perceived
the wider system which obtained them(641. Despite the scantiness of offcial records, strikes or
threatened stoppages appear to have occurred regularly from the start of the South African
60. To what extent they were used in this way is unclear before 1971. Latterly, their role in operating employment
bureaux and political blacklists has become more general and expliciL.
61. See especially, Windhoek Advertiser, March-April1971.
62. Windhoek Advertiser, 12 November 1971.
63. Gordon, "A note", pp. 8-11.
64. The workers' term for contract is oda/ate, derived from the Afrikaans word draad, meaning 'wire'.
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administrationi65l. Between 1950 and 1970, Gordon counted 43 'collective actions' reported in one
local newspaper alone - undoubtedly far from the true total - 22 on mines, five on the railways,
and the remainder in Windhoek and the two ports Lüderitz and Walvis Bayi661.
At Walvis Bay, on which more information is to hand than elsewhere, participant testimony and
incidental press references during the period 1959-71 demonstrate a high degree ofsophistication
and stamina in labour confrontations: not merely flash strikes, but also go-slows, overtime bans,
solidarity walk-outs over victimisation and general campaigns of non-cooperation, sustained at
times over very lengthy periods. The campaign launched early in 1968 for a proper system of
overtme payment was to continue intermitently for three full years, in the end winning substantial
improvements from the harbour authorities and stevedoring companies in January 1971. It was
broadly based - dockers were its leading force, but were joined on at least one occasion (July
1968) by most of the fish cannery workers. By consistently employing as its principal weapon a
tactic - the overtime ban - which disrupted but did not stop the labour process, it exploited the
reluctance of employers to lose production by staging a lock-out and mass deportation. Indeed,
when in July 1968 an overtime ban by cannery workers escalated into a strike, they held out for
nearly a month before the authorities eventually deported over 1000 back to Ovamboland.
Incoming contract workers sent in as blacklegs joined the strike as did sections of the dockers.
Ultimatelythe employers' gamble failed in its primary objective, to break the workers' resolve: by
February 1969, dockers had re-imposed their overtime ban. Sustained confrontation of this order,
in a workforce highly vulnerable to legal reprisals or deportation and with a high rate of turnover,
presumes both a developed and conscious tradition of collective solidarity and tactical skil in
grassroots communication and organisation.
Astriking feature of these campaigns is the extent to which both rank-and-file and leadership
could and did call upon 'brotherhood' solidarity and tactical experience; where class interests
intervened strongly and the tactical situation was appropriate, the contradiction between open
confrontation and 'avoiding trouble' became more apparent than reaL. An earlier struggle at a fish
cannery, described by one of the chief organisers, Vinnia Ndadi, provides auseful illustrationi671.
Once the initiative had been taken, the mass meeting became the main vehicle through which
grievances were artculated, spokesmen chosen, and tactics decided. Relations between leaders
and workers were determined in dialogue within the framework of the meeting, with no separate
superstructure. Given low pay, the long hours and appalling conditions of work, primary
grievances were plentiful and shared, and the decision to act was unanimous.
Two points in the ensuing campaign reveal the c1arity with which workers appreciated the scope
and limitations oftheir actual bargaining power. First, they deliberately restricted their action to the
single demand for the removal of their particularly vindictive factory foreman, a demand of
considerable symbolic importance to them. Second, when this was rejected by the factory
manager wih provocative arrogance, they restrained their immediate inclination to strike in favour
of a systematic go-slow. Ndadi, employed as shop-floor translator for the management and
therefore wih direct access to them, was able to put his double role to effective use in the conflict
situation, presenting to management in the form of non-committal reports the very demands he
helped to formulate, and thus protecting himself and other leaders against victimisation.
Most tellng of all was the success of the workers in staging two decisive confrontations in contexts
which momentarily stripped management of its power to command. In both cases, their strategy
was to exploit their stereotype as passive instruments of production by inducing factory offcials
65. For an account of the tactics and rank-and-file organisations of contract workers on the diamond fields belween
1915 and 1925, see R.J.B. Moorsom, "The formation of the contract labour system in Namibia, 1900-1926", in
Abebe Zegeye & Shubi Ishemo, Forced labour and migration: patterns of movement within Africa, (London, Hans
Zell, 1989), pp. 55-108.
66. R. Gordon, "A note".
67. Ndadi, Breaking contraet, pp.55-59.
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to call them together under managerial command. The offcials were then confronted with the
united power of the massed workers who insisted on their own terms in a mostly passive manner.
On the first occasion, which took place on the factory floor, the factory manager could only resort
to issuing orders and then retreating. On the second, by having reinforced the stereotype of
passivity and stupidity through the go-slow, the manager was induced to call a meeting in the
compound yard, where a well-timed revelation of real anger by the massed workers extracted a
rapid surrender from the manager and the transfer of the objectionable foreman. Throughout the
three days of action, the skilful tactics of the workers robbed management of its usual standby,
physical repression by the colonial police, and this was indeed the guiding strategic con cern of the
rank-and-file leadership in planning and mobilising the campaign.
The integration of the working and compound contexts under similar controls and organisation
implies that any separation of the shop-floor from communal actions is largely meaningless: to
workers, they are different boundaries of the same system; and compounds have tended to be
the main organising base for shop-f1oor campaigns. Indeed, the compounds were the key centres
for all major aspects of social, labour and political networks of association of contract workers -
they formed the essential haven for pass-dodging, for communication, for grassroots organising,
for mass mobilisation. By early 1971, the huge Windhoek compound at Katutura had, on the
admission of the police, become virtually a no-go area after working hours. The large bachelor
barracks, designed to function as concentration camps wih barbed wire perimeters and controlled
entrances, had before the general strike become to varying degrees autonomous enclaves within
colonial society.
Liberation poliics and labour action
We have seen that a number of factors operating at different leveis, notably the stage and rate
of decline of the average peasant product, the severi of working conditions and the pitiful returns
to wage-Iabour, and the pervasiveness and visibility of state repression, were together highly
conducive to the formation of a miltant worker consciousness after the Second World War.
Table 13. Membership of the Finnish Mission/ELOK, 1913-1972
1913-70
c3 c10 c20 29 33 49 57
Source: J.J. Kritzinger, Sending en Kerk in Suidwes-Afrika (DD., Pretoria,1972), p.63, table 7.
Influences external to the workers' immediate environment have also been an important means
of introducing wider action perspectives and a source of interpretative concepts. Fundamental in
this regard has been the cultural mutation associated with the complete success of evangelical
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Christianity in Ovamboland. Despite its pietism and its conservative leadership, particular
universalist teachings, notably on family cohesion and on inter-personal relationships, both of
which coincided with peasant tradition, supplied tools for a radical critique of institutionalised
labour migrationi681. Repeatedly in the course of the strike one finds religious idiom being
employed as means of expression and exhortation by grass-roots leaders, and the singing with
which large groups of strikers expressed their unity taking the form of hymns.
Probably the most important among other influences has been the symbolic role of the United
Nations, whose claim to legal authority has been instrumental in destroying the iIusion of
legitimacy of colonial rule. Its universalist humanism has also made available a powerful
alternative ideal-type.
But wihout the mobilising and coordinating power of independent organisations, collective action
as a class is conditional further on a generalised appreciation of the possibility of systematic
change. It is possible, indeed likely, that such perceptions developed organically from the interface
of struggle itself. Gordon records that as early as November 1952, 'a letter... from "Ovambo male
Okuga Jepongo"...complains about the serious malnutrition and underdevelopment in the
reserve, which the latter associates with the fact that 'the whole Ovambo-tribe is a fixed propert
of SWANLA (a human trade firm) and are the cheapest labourers for all the employers... The
poor Ovambo tribe has not got a mouthpiece to interpret its unsolved problems'i691.
While trade unionism in the orthodox sense familiar in the industrial West has always been an
unlikely strategy under a totalitarian contract labour regime such as the South African
administration erected in Namibia, contract workers were quick to perceive the necessity for
politcal struggle against the contract system when organisers first took the issue to rank-and-file
in the late 1950s. Rumblings of resistance had long been heard. Thousands of contract workers -
among them the future nationalleader Andimba ya Toivo - having been diverted into military
service during the Second World War, returned with a vastly broadened experience. In
Ovamboland during the early 1950s, there had been protests, petitions to the UN, and mass
meetings thousands strong against the systematic robbery of returning contract workers at the
Namutoni checkpoint by the policei7ol.
The first major initatie to organise nationally against the contract labour system(711 arose amongst
a group of Ovambo migrants working in South Africa, who, in 1957 formed the Ovamboland
People's Congress (OPC), renamed in 1958 the Ovambo People's Organisation (OPO). Deported
from Cape Town in 1958, their leading figure, Andimba ya Toivo, linked up en raute with other
grass-root leaders in Windhoek, notably Sam Nujoma and Jacob Kahangua, before returning to
Ovamboland as regional organiser. Launched in both Windhoek and Ovamboland during the first
months of 1959, in little more than a year the OPO became a mass organisation, its political
strongholds and branch structure based solid ly (though not exclusively) in the contract workers'
compounds of the towns and mines. Although its leaders had from the earliest days developed
and retained links with embryonic nationalist organisations and politicians, the OPO identified as
it primary task and as it mobilsing programme the aboliton of the contract labour system. It was
thus akin to a national general union of contract workers, though the political implications of its
attack on oppression under contract labour necessarily also gave it a broader political focus.
68. To this the replies to Voipio's survey are revealing testimony (Voipio, Kontrak).
69. Gordon, "A note", pp. 11-12.
70. Winter, Namibia, pp.89-93.
71. For the following, see First, South West Africa, pp. 196-202; A. Shipanga, Interview in depth (LSM Press, 1973),
pp. 4-9; Ndadi, Breaking contract, pp. 54-106; R. Vigne, A dwe/lng place of our own (International Defence and
Aid Fund, 1973), pp. 23-24.
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Once again, some measure of the explosive impact of the campaign to mobilise against contract
labour may be gained from the experience of the Walvis Bay branchl72l. Inspired by the success
of a go-slow strike against a vindictive factory foreman at a fish cannery in January 1959, contract
workers responded en masse to the OPO's first recruiting campaign, launched by Nujoma at the
end of June. Three months later, according to the then branch secretary, 'We had a membership
of several thousand (Le., the vast majority of the contract work force) and had collected over
£800'. Exploiting the scope afforded by the compound system for rapid and centralised
communication, and harassed from the outset by police and employer repression, the OPO
successfully formed a leadership structure at the level of the branch and of the compound.
Already, therefore, the new branch could afford to use mass meetings sparing ly, relying rather
on delegate and report-back meetings.
Comparison of this early phase of organisation among contract workers with the antecedents to
the national strike in 1971 is instructive. Mobilsation by the OPO did not lead to mass protest
action of any kind1731. 'For the next few months we continued collecting money for the organisation
and holding meetings in the compound'. The energies of activists were devoted principally to
gaining general political information and awareness. 'We discussed politics whenever we could;
talked about day-to-day problems, news from Windhoek and the rest of Africa, and our dreams
of freedom in Namíbia'1741. The tactical conditions of organising were not too dissimilar. While the
compound system facilitated the formation of collective consciousness and solidarity and the
circulation of leaders and information at the locallevel, the barriers to communication between
the towns and mines continued to present formidable problems for nationally coordinated
campaigningl751. These diffculties were compounded by the intensification of political repression,
which struck hard at allievels of leadership and part organisation, and made public activity, if not
always impossible, generally hazardous. Structurally, the position of contract workers in 1971 was
if anything easier than in 1959, for although the pace of underdevelopment had quickened in the
interim, in 1959 the Ovambo peasantry were in the grip of a second year of drought, by then
severel76J. It is thus the very similarity in many respects of the situations of 1959 and 1971 which
is most revealing. For notwithstanding the importance of specific influences immediately
preceding the 1971 strike, discussed below, the crucial condition of mass action in 1971 and its
extension on a national scale was the existence of an experienced nationalliberation movement
in the form of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO).
The transformation early in 1960 of the OPO, formed to oppose the contract labour system, into
SWAPO, a national anti-colonial united front and from its inception the leading force for liberation,
was the joint product of a year of struggle by contract workers without tangible gains and of the
realisation after the Windhoek massacre that sectional interests could only be secured under so
ruth less a colonial regime by the overthrow of colonialism itself.
This recogniton marked two basic shifts in strategy among the nationalleadership. The first was
that contract labour was too integral a part ofthe system of exploitation under colonial rule for any
campaign solely for its abolition to have a chance of success. The second was that if the enemy
was colonialism itself, the basis of mobilisation for liberation should embrace the broadest
possible national coalition of anti-colonial forces. Within a couple of years it had been followed
72. The following account is based on Ndadi, Breaking contraet, pp. 54-69.
73. The one exception was of course the resistance of the 'permanent' black Windhoek population to their enforced
removal from the Old Location to the new apartheid township, Katutura. The resistance c1imaxed on the night of
10 December 1959 when police fired on unarmed demonstrators, killng 11 and wounding 54 - Namibia's
'Sharpevile'. Nevertheless, contract workers as such were peripherally involved in this struggle.
74. Ndadi, Breaking contraet, p. 69.
75. Ndadi's account of the years 1959-63 abounds with instances of the difficulties caused by this constraint. Often
local branches depended on chanee briefings from activists passing through to obtain essential information.
76. See table 5 and discussion thereof above. The increased visibilty of the regime of exploitation may well have
facilitatec the rapid growth of SWAPO throughout Ovamboland in the latter half of 1960 (Ndadi, Breaking contra et,
pp. 62-67). Indeed, SWAPO brought the issue into focus by buying grain for the drought areas (ibid., p. 88).
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by a third, that the nature and practice of the colonial regime made armed struggle a necessary
part of the strategy for its overthrow. Neither in the OPO's campaign against contract labour in
1959 nor in the formulation of a nationalist programme for liberation in the early 1960s was more
than the vaguest attention given to the capitalist nature of the system of exploitation which colonial
rule was designed to guarantee. Nevertheless, liberation from this autocratic political form of
capitalist domination entailed revolutionary struggle and brought all working-c1ass action into direct
political confrontation with the colonial state.
It is not possible to detail here the course of the anti-colonial struggle in the intervening years. By
1971, however, despite having launched the armed struggle in the north five years earlier,
SWAPO had survived severe harassment to remain an effective national political organisation,
with contract workers still its most consistent and militant base. Through its structures, workers
retained access to an on-going tradition of radical thinking and experience, to organisational and
communications resources, and to leadership, particularly at the grass roots level. While the
precise linkage between political structures and the general strike is not fully known, some
indication of its significance wil be apparent in the account which foli ows.
Mobilsing against the contract labour system
Several factors raised the level of tension in the latter half of 1971 in a situation which had long
been potentially explosive. Gordon points OUt!771 that the implementation of tighter pass controls
from the end of 1970, with compulsory identity photographs, considerably increased the odds
against successful evasion. The June 1971 ruling ofthe World Court that South Africa's continued
occupation of Namibia was illegal highlighted the i1legitimacy of colonial rule and the sense of
impending change. The posite response to it of black leaders in Namibia ensured that its political
impact was generalised on a national scale. Particularly important in this regard was the joint
pastoral letter ofthe heads ofthe Evangeliese Lutherse Kerk (ex Rhenish Mission - ELK) and the
Evangeliese Lutherse Owambokavangokerk (ex Finnish Mission - ELOK), whose endorsement
of the ruling reached nearly every community in Namibia through the pulpits oftheir churchesl78J.
The latter half of 1971 witnessed a marked escalation of anti-colonial political activity in every
quarter, from statements and resolutions to demonstrations and defiance campaigns against
South African rule.
It was the leading role played by students in this mass upsurge which provided another of the
essential conditions for mobilisation on a national scalel791. Expelled from high schools in
Ovamboland in August 1971 for demonstrating against the South African regime, a group of
students, many al ready wih experience of contract labour, decided to seek support for mobilsing
for a general strike against the contract labour system. Having found contract work, mostly at
Walvis Bay, the ex-students, cooperating with local worker activists and SWAPO branches,
established contact with other students and branches, particularly in Windhoek, and began the
painstaking task of securing general acceptance for their strateg y at the grass roots.
It is c1ear that throughout this preparatory phase, the working relationship between the organisers
and SWAPO at the branch level was close. However, now and later during the strike the initiative
lay entirely with the organisers and workers; it was an autonomous field of struggle and was not
brought under wider considerations of strategy. In the early stages of the campaign, astatement
77. Gordon, "A note", p. 11.
78. The principles and framework la id down in Moderator Gowaseb and Bishop Auala's Open Letler to the Prime
Minister at the end of June 1971 were particularly influential in the formulation of the strikers' demands (see article
by J. Ryan in Rand Dai/y Mai/, 19 January 1972).
79. The following account is based on press cutlings (mainly Windhoek Advertiser, Namib Times, Rand Dai/y Mai/,
Star, Cape Times) and on the testimony of Hinananje Nehova, one of the ex student militants (''The price of
Iiberation", LSM News, 11-12, end 1976, pp. 30-36). Quotations are from Nehova unless otherwise atlributed.
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on 15 November by the Commissioner-General for Ovamboland, J. de Wet, e1aiming that contract
labour was not 'slavery' since workers came forward voluntarily for recruitment, was turned into
a principal consciousness-raising device. For contract workers, this statement brought into sharp
focus the fact that for most wage-Iabour was unavoidable for survival and that it was Government
policy which forced them to mig rate without the option of permanent settlement at their work
centre.
This mobilisation campaign took place against a background of sustained and militant struggle
by contract workers, who had already secured a substantial degree of autonomy in the big
compounds. Indeed, well before the strike campaign got under way, militants in Katutura were
actively mobilising on the basis of the World Court ruling by means of leaflet campaigns and
clandestine meetings. The only effective means of controlleft to the police, lacking an informer
network and with gate-guards and pass-offce clerks often conniving at evasion of pass and
residence regulations, was to mount mass raids. The standard tactic was to encircle the
compound wih armed police at dawn and systematically check all occupants and their propert
with considerable loss and damage to the latter. Workers would be arrested for the slightest
technical infringements, mostly of the pass laws. The police raided Katutura in March and June
1971; following the latter they erected a checkpoint at the sole entrance, at which workers were
forced to show valid passes to enter or leave - a serious threat to evasion tactics. Five months
later, on the night of 11 November, workers mounted a well-organised attack, completely
destroying the checkpoint and offices. Four days later the police retaliated with yet another
massive raid: it was virtually open warfare.
By early November, the organisers at Walvis Bay were strong enough to call a mass meeting
attended by the vast majority of contract workers. 'The reaction after the speeches was
overwhelming and support for the strike swelled.' The meeting decided upon a deadlinelBO) for the
start of the strike and sent delegates and lelters to other centres to mobilise national support. The
organisers spelled out the basis of their appeal in a letter to workers at Windhoek:iB1J
We are having problems with the white man de Wet. You are having similar
problems. He said we ourselveswant to be on contract because we come to
work. But we must talk about ending the system. We in Walvis Bay discussed it.
We wrote a letter to the government of Ovamboland and to SWANLA. We wil
not come back. We willieave Walvis Bay and the contract, and wil stay at home
as the Boer J. de Wet said.
The impact of this message is readily apparent in the diary kept by one of the organisers in
Katutura at the time.
It is clear that the strike was not mere ly a mass spontaneous outburst ventilating generalised
resentment, but was also a calculated political campaign, for which support had to be won and
organised towards a specific objective, the ending of the contract labour system. The mass
response to the strike call is suffcient evidence of the generally militant consciousness of the
workers, best exemplified in the almost celebratory atmosphere of their mass meetings. At one
such, called by the government at Walvis Bay on the Sunday preceding the deadline(12
December) to provide a platform for bantustan collaborators, pro-government speakers were
shouted down and Bishop Auala, influential head of ELOK, was persuaded on the rostrum to
80. 11 December according to Nehova, but it is apparent elsewhere in his text that his date-sequence is three days
behind. It was probably decided to call mass meetings on Sunday 12 December and to launch the strike the
following week; and such meetings did take place in the compounds at Windhoek and Walvis Bay. The strike starte d
on the 13th in Windhoek and the 14th in Walvis Bay.
81. From a diaiy kept by one of the 13 Katutura leaders put on trial in Januaiy 1972 (extracts published in "Strike diaiy",
Namibia News, Jan.-Feb. 1972; see also an edited version in South Arrican Labour Bul/etin: Speciallssue on
Namibia, 1978).
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endorse the strike. 'The crowd burst into shouting and applause, breaking up the meeting with
SWAPO songs. Those who had passes burnt them in further protest against the system.'
Nevertheless, the translation of mass enthusiasm into committed collective action in the face of
relentless state repression required sustained organisation and tactical flexibility. It is apparent in
accounts from both Walvis Bay and Windhoek (Katutura) that activists could not afford to take the
successful outcome of their appeal for granted. The partial failure of the strike at its originating
centre, Walvis Bay, illustrates the diffculties they faced on the ground. The mass meeting in early
November won the workers' support and launched the campaign; but it also revealed the timing
to the authorities and exposed the leadership. As aresult, 14 organisers were arrested , and the
few remaining principal activists had thereafter to work c1andestinely. The police could also harass
workers by pass arrests, raids and interrogation; arrange an anti-strike meeting two days before
the deadline, although this tactic backfired; and call the workers' bluff by providing trains,
importing strike breakers,I821 and mounting a show of force around the compound on the day to
deter pickets. It is not clear what effects such intimidation had on mobilisation, since newspaper
report are contradictory and incomplete; but many workers stayed on to claim back pay, and it
appears that only about 500 out of 3,0001831 at Walvis Bayeventually returned to Ovamboland.
The other apparent failure, at CDM, is also revealing. It is perhaps not surprising that CDM's
production workers, not wanting to risk losing the best wages and compound conditions in
Namibia as well as virtually permanent employment, chose not to join an indefinite all-out strike.
Nehova suggests that 'the "Baas-boys" who are paid better than average, had great influence'.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that most workers did in fact strike for three or four days, although
in the end less than 400 out of 4,000, mainly house-servants rather than production workers,
returned to Ovamboland. A deputation ofworkers left CDM's general manager in no doubtthat
the entire workforce was in complete solidarity with the strikers, and requested him to inform the
government of their stand. In this instance, concilatory tactics by management, in particular the
general manager, appearto have had considerable influence. The manager readily agreed to the
workers' demand, and was active in efforts to bring forward the proposed conference between
government and employers to review the contract labour system. A few days after the meeting
wih the deputation, whether or not coincidentally, CDM announced a wage rise of 10 per cent for
all contract workersl841.
In Windhoek, on the other hand, the organisers and workers were completely successful in
resisting sustained intimidation by the authories. The identity of the activists remains obscure, but
it is apparent that mobilsation was well advanced by the time the call to action arrived from Walvis
Bay on 5 December. Within Katutura, they employed the 'wallposter' technique, encouraging the
circulation and posting in public places of handwritten critiques, exhortations and notices, thereby
defeating attempts by compound offcials to confiscate them and an apparent display of armed
might by the police on 7 December. What seems to have been a meeting of delegates and
organisers, from Katutura and Windhoek, was convened on Saturday 11 December, by which
time letters from most other major centres had confirmed mass support for the strike. The
meeting endorsed the strike call, and a mass meeting on the Sunday decided to strike the
following day. Pickets were posted at night, but despite police action to drive them away from
gates, they were scarcely needed, so total was the stoppage.
As at Walvis Bay, the authorities tried to use bantustan offcials to cajole the workers' leaders to
back down. Faced wih a meeting at 24 hours' notice, the workers were able that Monday to elect
adelegate commitee, which met for three hours and produced a written statement of principles
and demands which was to leave the 'big men' from Ovamboland speechless. At the meeting on
82. Nehova states that the attempt to use strike breakers imported from South Africa was a 'total failure'.
83. It should be noted, however, that some 3,000 cannery workers finishing their seasonal contracts before the start
of the strike would have participated in the mass meeting which unanimously endorsed the strike strategy.
84. Cape Times, 29 December 1971, Rand Daily Mail, 31 December 1971, Cape Times, 5 January 1972.
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Tuesday the commitee resisted all pressure to comprise their popular mandate. The compound
was immediately sea led off, and over the next few days, as the workers entrained for
Ovamboland, police harassment became severe, extending to physical assault, arson, stoning
at night, and propaganda and intimidation by loudspeaker. But the strikers remained solid, and
it is clear from their own documents that the rank-and-fie leadership played no small part in
holding them together.
National strike and peasants' revolt
Despite the diffculties, the strike call was spectacularly successful. By 20 December, 11,500
workers had come out. By mid-January 13,500 had been transported to Ovamboland by rail by
the government. Some 18,000 (counting the 3000 cannery workers who returned earlier) had
returned to Ovamboland, about 25,000 had been involved in strike action,i851 22,500 of them from
towns, mines and camps making a total of 23 centres, 11 of them mines. In other words, well over
half the 43,400 recorded as being in the Police Zone in 1971 had joined the strike against the
contract system. It is not entirely certain what proportion of the striking workers were from
Ovamboland. Without doubt the vast majority of Namibian Ovambo workers (53 per cent of the
total) in the towns and mines were involved, together with a substantial number of domestic and
farm workers. A substantial though smaller proportion of Angolans (40 per cent of the total), who
were mainly concentrated on farms, also joined.
In the compounds, where decisions and organisation could take place within a framework of
collective solidari, fewworkers remained, although the return to Ovamboland was by no means
supported at all the smaller centres. Outside the compounds, news of the strike was passed by
word of mouth and by the media, especially the government-controlled radio. 'The South
Africans... made the mistake of announcing it over the radio and this alone caused a great many
workers to leave for Ovamboland. Even small boys working on farms... left their jobs.' According
to one farmer,i861 'my "kitchen-Ovambo" heard about the strike on the radio, told others about it,
and they all went on strike', despite beatings from the police. This was undoubtedly one of many
such instances at isolated points. Furthermore, they could generally count on at least tacit support
from other workers, especially in towns. Indeed at Walvis Bay at the time of the strike, 'even
people not working under the contract system came to stay in the compound. Others gave food
to the workers going on strike'. And in Windhoek, workers living in the town, especially domestic
servants, gave refuge to activists dodging the police.
The strikers' strategy was designed to exploit tactically the duality of their class position. It was
central to their resolve not merely to withdraw from the contract system, but further to return to
Ovamboland rather than remain at their work centres. Ironically, this demand coincided with the
pre-arranged contingency plan of a colonial regime anxious both to avoid open confrontation with
large, organised groups ofworkers near centres of production and white residence, and to disrupt
the strikers' collective solidarity. As a result, a large majority of the strikers had already been
transported back to Ovamboland before the end of December.
But the authorities' expectations were thwarted by the resilence of the strikers' rank-and-file
leadershipl87J. Linking wih an already miltant white-collar opposition within Ovamboland, activists
set up an ad hoc strike committee, whose members 'were elected on a regional basis'. On 3
January the committee met for the first time, resolved 'to reject any agreement reached if the
strikers were not consulted and did not support it', drew up and circulated a list of the workers'
85. Allowing for those who returned after striking initially, and for those who used alternative transport to return to
Ovamboland.
86. Cited in Namibia News, 4, 11-12, Nov.-Dec. 1971.
87. The following is based principally on Kane-Berman, Contra et labour, pp. 24-33 and Appendix ill (minutes of the
mass meeting held at Oluno-Ondangwa on 10 January 1972).
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grievances and demands, and put these as a series of resolutions to a mass meeting of 5,500
strikers called a week later. The meeting passed them unanimously, and elected a deputation to
represent them at the forthcoming conference at Grootfontein between the government, the
principal employers and the bantustan executive, which had been brought forward to 19-20
January. It warned against any attempt to restart recruiting in Ovamboland in the interim, and
indeed, recruiting remained at a standstill until several days after the conference. Pickets were
also successful in turning back at the border would-be migrants from deeper inside Angola; and
600 labourers on the Kunene project came out in sympathy. Overall, the dispersal of the strikers
from their concentrated strongholds in the compounds was compensated by more effective, if
tenuous, communication atthe regionallevel once inside Ovamboland. The unity of the strike was
maintained.
But very soon the struggle against contract labour had broadened into general resistance to the
apparatus of colonialism in Ovamboland. The sudden irruption of thousands of militant workers
into an al ready discontented peasantry with a radicalised white-collar stratum and intelligentsia,
with which they were anyway intimately linked, catalysed widespread direct action against the
symbols, fixtures and black personnei of colonial rule. By the second half of the January,
speakers at mass meetings were beginning to articulate peasant grievances as well. For a brief
period, government transport was stoned off the roads north of Ondangwa. On the night of 16
January, over 100 km of the border fence were destroyed. In the weeks following, there was a
series of attacks on both sides of the border on stock control posts and on inspectors, headmen
and informersissi.
There are good reasons why, as appears to have been the case, the most radical resistance was
concentrated in Ukwanyama, in particular along the border. As the largest and most militarised
pre-colonial kingdom, and the victim of bloody subjugation by the Portuguese in 1915, it
possessed a strongly self-conscious historical tradition of resistance. It was bisected by the
international boundary, and thus robbed of it best cattle-pastures towards the Okavango Riveris9J.
And crucially, it was by far the most overcrowded part of the oshana (f1oodplain) zone, a burden
exacerbated by the immigration of a steady stream of settlers from the north. It has also been the
one area where a non-evangelical mission (Anglican), with its own high school and using English
as its working language, has gained a large num ber of followers. Both before and since,
Ukwanyama has remained a storm-centre of resistance to colonial rule.
The aftermath: contra et workers and national /iberation
By late February both the strike and the peasant revolt had largely been broken, although
oppositon on both fronts continued on a wide scale for some time thereafter and merged with the
long-term guerrilla campaign in the north. Contingents of police moved in on 12 January, army
unit a fortnight later, followed on 5-6 February by reinforcements of police infantry. On the 4th,
the South African Government clamped draconian emergency regulations on Ovamboland (R17-
72) similar to those still in force in the Transkei. Police and army units instituted a reign of terror,
attacking and firing on strike meetings and gatherings of any kind as well as rounding up, holding
88. Most notable among the victims was the member of the Owambo Legislative Council appointed 'representative' for
contract workers in the Police Zone, whose house and store were gutted by arsonists (Kane-Berman, Contraet
labour, p. 29).
89. Indee, a letler from Ovamboland at the time suggests that this was a principal motive for destroying the boundary
fence, which 'prevents our catlle from reaching the grazing areas now at Angola'. In a similar vein, two strikers told
Kane-Berman that the fence was probably cut because 'we are oppressed by the Government and we don't feel the
fence was necesry. ONmbo is not a white man's country. Who gave the white man permission to build a fence
there?' (Kane-Berman, Contra et labour, p. 27).
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and imprisoning people on a large scalei90). Deliberate misinterpretation of the new labour
agreement reached at Grootfontein on 20 January was used to weaken the strikers' solidarity911.
Furthermore, when workers began re-applying to the 'new' labour bureau in Ondangwa in late
January, there is evidence that coercion was applied to prevent any bargaining over fresh
contractsi921. Police attacks on workers' meetings disrupted picketing and the coordination of
tactics, and many workers appear to have left to escape the reign of terror that was then in full
swing. Even so, according to offcial figures by mid-February only 6,148 had registered as work-
seekers, an unknown proporton ofthem not originally strikers in any case. As late as 7 July it was
reported thatthe number ofworkers in the Katutura compound had only just reached 4,000 - two-
thirds of it pre-strike total. A substantial proportion of the strikers continued to hold out for many
months.
Ultimately the workers could not escape the major contradiction in their strategy: that although
access to peasant resources considerably expanded their power to prolong resistance, they could
no longer, as a matter of inescapable necessity, opt out of wage-Iabour indefinitely. In one sense,
they had, by their national solidarity, transformed the colonial administration's standard method
of repressing isolated collective action by deportation to the reserves into a major tactical victory.
But in the end, when capitalists and government held to their intransigent position, it was not
enough of itself to break the system.
The return to Ovamboland was a symbolic act of withdrawal as well as a tactic for extending
survival. Indeed, Kane-Berman found workers asserting the possibility of self-suffciency in food
for Ovamboland. The strike commitee resolved on 3 January that 'the men should go back to the
land to raise as big a crop as possible to make Owambo independent of contract labour'i931. Many
may indeed have held to that injuncton through the 1972 harvest season, which was due to begin
in March. It is also fairly apparent that after the mass meeting on 10 January, the strikers tended
increasingly to merge their struggle with the gathering peasant uprising.
Nonetheless, the platform of the strike committee embodied a tacit acknowledgement of the
irrevocable necessit of wage-Iabour. The foundation of its demands lay in the replacement of the
SWANLA monopoly by a free labour market and the ending of influx control. Although not
concerned with the wage-relation as such, and thus with socialising production relations, the
platform contained a sharp critique of the dehumanising alienation of wage-Iabour (identifying it
as contract labour), of the function of the reserves as a labour pool, and of the key role of
SWANLA in profieering from low wages and primitive, prison-like living conditions. Implicit in this
declaration was a recogniton that as their labour was the foundation of colonial prosperity, so the
interests of contract workers were national in character. Given the fact that pass laws and influx
controls are the cornerstone ofthe colonial economy, the strikers' demands were thus inherently
subversive of the colonial dispensation.
This correlation was brought home sharply to workers returning on contract to the Police Zone
to find the system of labour repression, contra ry to government e1aims, the same in all essentials.
Perhaps the weight of their proletarian interest lay more firmly in the e1ass perceptions of returning
workers, for in the series of strikes and acts of defiance which they mounted immediately upon
their arrial, few were prepared to call the bluff of employers and government and risk a second
deportation. In the end, the workers' experience of the limitations of sectionally-based economic
90. Cf. ibid., p. 33. Offcially, 213 had been detained by 11 April, and altogether 303 in the whole of 1972 (SA Hansard,
6 February 1973, replies to questions); but the true total is likely to have been far higher with 'security forces'
operating outside the law.
91. In particular, the leader of the strike committee, Johannes Nangatuuala, was either induced to make astatement
or misquoted to the effect that the agreement met most of the strikers' grievances - implausible in view of the fact
that one of the mai n demands, for consultation, had not been met. This and other propaganda broadcasts over
Radio ONmbo was influential in deceiving many of the strikers (Kane-Berman, Contra et labour, pp. 25; 17, 26).
92. Cf. the comments of the two ex-strikers (Kane-Berman, Contraet labour, p. 17).
93. Kane-Berman, Contraet labour, pp. 32, 25.
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sanctions, combined with the collective self-confidence gained by successful mass action,
strongly reinforced the wider struggle for nationalliberation, the only means by which their 'trade
union' interests could be secured. In this, both contract workers and the peasantry to which they
are structurally bound have remained a disciplined and resilient core of the liberation movement.
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